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1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
1.1. Problem identification  
Cross-border electricity transmission investments aim to increase social 
welfare by allowing power to move from cheap areas to more expensive 
areas. Only investments where the benefits are higher than the costs should 
be realised. For interconnectors there are always two countries involved. 
Thus it is necessary to analyse how the costs and benefits are distributed 
between these two countries. Even if an investment increases overall social 
welfare, it usually also creates losers by increasing the market price in the 
exporting area and lowering it in the importing area.  Governments and 
regulators do not promote investments which they consider detrimental to 
their country, and likewise Transmission System Operators (TSOs) will not 
invest in projects which would be detrimental to themselves or to their 
owners.  
The objective of this study is to analyse to what extent national and 
company interests prevent electricity transmission investments which 
would be beneficial for Europe. 
1.2. Scope of the study 
The geographical scope of this study is the European Union (EU) Member 
States, Norway and Switzerland. Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus are not 
included in the detailed analysis due to their small influence in the 
electricity transmission system and due to lack of data. Norway and 
Switzerland are included as they have an important role in the cross-border 
trade in the EU. 
The study concentrates on analysing the behaviour of Transmission 
System Operators as investors in the transmission network. The influence of 
the owner of the TSO is in particular addressed. The role of governments 
and regulators as authorities who set the framework, and generation 
companies and final consumers as market participants is also analysed in 
this study. The role of other stakeholders such as traders and power 
exchanges will only be discussed indirectly. 
The past development of cross border capacities is analysed in the period 
2000 – 2010. The analysis on future investments is based on the ten year 
network development plan of the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators (ENTSO-E) for the period 2015 – 2020). This study 
analyses mainly interconnector investments but also discusses internal 
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transmission investments when these are necessary for increasing cross-
border capacity.  
The study focuses on wholesale markets. Retail markets are discussed 
only when they are directly relevant to the issue in question. 
1.3. Research method 
The study is based on analysing the increase in overall social welfare for 
Europe generated by interconnector investments and the distribution of this 
welfare. The study identifies the potentially efficient investments and 
compares them with the realised and planned investments. The results of 
this comparison are used to judge to what extent company and national 
interests have influenced investment decisions. Empirical knowledge on 
real investment cases and on policies of companies and countries is then 
used to validate the results.  
The study follows the sequence presented in Figure 1. After introductory 
Chapters 1 and 2 the study develops in Chapter 3 criteria for efficient 
interconnector investment based on social welfare. These criteria are 
applied to the European transmission system using data from the reference 
year 2008 and the method developed in this study in order to identify which 
additional interconnection capacity would have been efficient in that year. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Block diagram of the research method used in this study.  
 
The analysis continues in Chapter 4 with the discussion whether there are 
other than social welfare targets which interconnector investments aim to 
fulfil. All main factors influencing interconnector investment are aimed to 
be identified. Based on these findings, suggestions are made on how the 
investment framework should be improved in order to optimise the 
European social welfare instead of the national or company welfare.  
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In Chapter 5 the study defines what the expected behaviour of the TSO is 
if the social welfare is optimised for the company or for the country. This 
assumed expected behaviour is compared to the past realised investments 
in 2000 – 2010 and future investments planned to be finalised before 2025, 
basing the analyses on the realised and expected development of the 
interconnection capacity values and using the method developed in this 
study.  
Finally in Chapter 6 conclusions are drawn on whether national and 
company interests influence decisions on transmission investments. The 
chapter also includes an evaluation of the methodology used, summarises 
other findings of the study and gives recommendations for further research 
on the topic. 
1.4. Scientific overview 
There is ample scientific literature on transmission investments. The 
economics and welfare optimisation targets of transmission investments are 
well developed for simple interconnector cases such as single lines 
connecting two hubs or price areas. The concept of merchant lines and the 
difference of the merchant approach compared to the regulated approach 
are well documented, for example by Joskow and Tirole.1 However, there is 
much less scientific literature on concrete interconnector projects in the 
European transmission network.  
Social welfare benefits of interconnectors including the distribution of 
social welfare between generation companies, final consumers and 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are also well understood. 
Distributional effects are recognised to have an important influence on 
investments. For example Becker has written how pressure groups influence 
decisions to make them favourable for themselves.2 
TSOs publish information on transmission investments including the Net 
Transfer Capacities (NTC) between countries. Development of these 
capacities is analysed in several studies, but usually with only a limited 
number of countries or only one region in scope. TSOs have recently made 
big progress in publishing market relevant data such as commercial 
schedules in interconnections. This step, partly enforced by the European 
regulation, allows doing analysis that was possible only for a few countries 
in the past because of the lack of data. 
                                                 
1  Joskow and Tirole, merchant transmission investments, 2003 
2  Becker, pressure groups, 1984 
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Regarding the influence of the ownership of the TSO, some studies, in 
particular the impact assessment of the 3rd internal market package3 and the 
sector inquiry4 by the European Commission, have analysed the relation 
between unbundling and transmission investments. However, to the 
author's knowledge, no studies exist in which the influence of national 
interests and TSO ownership on the European transmission system are 
systematically analysed. The purpose of this study is to fill this gap.  
1.5. Scientific contribution 
The study shows strong evidence that company interests influence 
transmission investments. TSOs invest in interconnectors which are 
beneficial for their owners and stop or delay investments detrimental to 
their owners even if the investment would bring overall social welfare 
benefits. Similarly there is evidence that national interests influence 
interconnector investments. The study shows that welfare benefits are often 
nationally redistributed to accommodate consumer and producer interests 
to gain acceptance for the investment. Overall, the study demonstrates that 
the level of interconnection capacity is far below the overall social welfare 
optimum.  
The results of the study are applicable to the European electricity market 
based on zonal pricing. Many findings are, however, general in nature and 
can be applied to any electricity market. 
1.6. Other contribution 
Price convergence between different price zones in Europe is analysed in 
the study. This analysis allows understanding the role of interconnectors 
regarding price convergence which is fundamental for transmission and 
generation investment decisions. The study proposes how the European 
zonal pricing system should be improved by dividing Europe into bidding 
zones which better reflect the congestion pattern in the transmission 
network. This is important for efficient operation of the grid, for improving 
the investment signals for transmission investments and for efficient 
location of generation. 
The study identifies the main factors that influence interconnector 
investment decisions. Based on this analysis, a two-tier system is proposed 
                                                 
3   EU, 3rd package, 2009 
4  EC, DG Comp sector inquiry, 2007 
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to redistribute the costs and benefits of transmission investments in order 
to get all parties needed for the investments motivated to do their share of 
the work. Such a system could be important to avoid suboptimal 
investments due to the distorting effect of national and company interests. 
 
Figure 2 The author in action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
2. INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS AND TRANSMISSION INVESTMENTS 
2.1. Organisation of network access 
The EU electricity market is based on separation of the natural monopoly 
parts, transmission and distribution, from the competitive parts, generation 
and supply. The task of the Transmission System Operator (TSO) is to 
connect and provide access to all loads and generation units which need a 
connection at the transmission network level. Generators and consumers 
alike make their own decisions to produce or to consume, depending on 
their commitments towards their counterparts and market opportunities.  
In Europe, this access to the transmission network is organised through 
price zones which allows any electricity consumer in a price zone to contract 
with any generator in the same price zone without limitations due to 
network constraints. The generator is allowed to produce as long as it finds 
a consumer in the same price zone. 
There are exceptions to this rule. In most countries there is congestion 
inside the price zone, such as in Germany, Great Britain and Sweden due to 
surplus generation in the northern part of each country. When congestion 
appears, the TSO asks some generators to start or increase production and 
some other generators to stop or reduce production, in order to maintain 
the network security. This is called redispatching.5 The redispatched 
generators in most cases get compensation, according to the rules applied in 
the country in question. These measures are applied to consumers as well, 
but this is rarer. 
This guaranteed access does not usually cover exports and imports 
between price zones. All electricity that crosses a price zone border requires 
specific allocation of transmission capacity at that border. This can take 
place explicitly when the TSO gives or sells capacity for this crossing, or 
implicitly when the electricity that crosses the price zone border is selected 
from the bids in power exchanges operating on each side of the border.  
Some countries have been divided into several bidding zones, namely 
Norway, Italy, Denmark, the UK and also Sweden starting from 2011. 
Opposite tendency also exists as single price zones involving several 
Member States have been established, namely between Austria and 
                                                 
5  In this study "redispatching" is used for both internal redispatching in which 
all redispatched units are in the same price zone and for redispatching across 
price zone borders which is called usually "counter trading". 
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Germany, between the Czech Republic and Slovakia and the All Island price 
zone in Ireland. 
2.2. Transmission System Operators 
One of the key principles in the opening of the electricity sector to 
competition has been the creation of independent Transmission System 
Operators. In the past, transmission was part of vertically integrated 
utilities. It is generally considered that ownership unbundling is the best 
solution to the independence of the TSOs. In the last European Commission 
proposal concerning the internal electricity market, the so called 3rd 
legislative package6, the intention of the European Commission was to 
oblige all TSOs to unbundle in terms of ownership. This did not succeed as 
some Member States wanted to preserve the possibility for vertical 
integration. For this reason in the coming years there will still be vertically 
integrated TSOs in Europe. 
A Member State usually has one TSO. The exceptions are Germany with 
four TSOs and Austria with three TSOs. The first cross-border TSOs are the 
mergers of the former transmission network of Eon in Germany with the 
Dutch Tennet and the former transmission network of Vattenfall in 
Germany, now called 50 Hz Transmission, with the Belgian company Elia.  
All TSOs are regulated entities. Electricity transmission is considered a 
natural monopoly. TSOs are regulated at the national level by the National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA). For regulation at the European level the 
Agency for Co-operation of Energy Regulators (ACER) started in March 
2011.  
2.3. Competitive market 
An electricity market is based on competition in generation and supply 
activities. One can differentiate between the wholesale market in which 
generators sell their products to suppliers and big consumers and the retail 
market in which suppliers compete for final consumers. This study 
concentrates almost solely on the wholesale market. Retail markets are 
indirectly covered to the extent that the consequences of transmission 
investments will pass on to the retail market through the influence on prices 
in the wholesale market. 
                                                 
6  EU, third package, 2009 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                                     Introduction to Electricity Markets  
8 
In some European countries the market started to open already before it 
was required by the European legislation, notably in the UK and in the 
Nordic countries. In countries where several electricity companies existed 
before liberalisation, there was historically some level of competition or at 
least the companies could potentially start competing with each other, as 
opposed to countries where there was a single state or private monopoly 
company. 
State or other public bodies are still often the owners of electricity 
companies. In these cases the state has to manage the electricity companies 
as businesses, while at the same time the state has to decide on the market 
and regulatory framework to be applied. In an ideal case these functions are 
properly separated. There is, however, a risk that at the political level these 
roles are mixed up resulting in non-optimal compromise solutions. 
 
 
Figure 3 New roles thanks to opening of the electricity market. 
Strong structural measures to create the prerequisites for reasonable 
competition were taken in some European countries. The UK completely 
restructured the electricity sector in order to make it competitive. Italy 
obliged ENEL, the state owned utility, to sell a large part of its generation 
assets. Other approaches were also taken. Germany and Austria believed 
that the existence of several companies active in the country would be 
enough to start competition. The UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, 
Hungary, Germany and the Czech Republic allowed important foreign 
acquisitions to happen to improve competition. 
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Unfortunately, in spite of these partial measures to restructure the sector 
and to bring in newcomers, the list of countries with the old monopoly 
company in a strong dominant position is long: France, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Denmark, the Baltic States, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Portugal and the smallest Member States.7 
In these markets life can be very hard for newcomers. For example in 
France the position of Électricité de France (EdF) is so strong that only 
marginal investments are feasible for competitors. Newcomers can only 
hope that the regulator protects them for example from predatory pricing 
by the dominant player. Dominant positions are also difficult for the 
governments as it is almost impossible to keep control on these companies 
without regulating end-user prices in one way or another. 
 
2.4. Price zones 
For the European electricity market, the elementary cell is the price zone as 
already explained above.  When there is no congestion between two price 
zones, the price in both zones is the same. When congestion appears, the 
prices differ. An electricity consumer can only contract with a generator in 
the same price zone without the risk of extra costs due to a price difference 
between zones. Relying on imports includes the risk of cross-border 
congestion and the consequent price difference at the border. Price zones 
can be subdivided into bidding zones. These bidding zones act as price 
zones, they have their own price if there is congestion at the bidding zone 
border. The name bidding zone comes from the fact that bids on the spot 
market are made referring to these zones.8  
Bidding zones should be formed so that the congested parts of the 
network are at their outer borders and that inside the zones transmission 
from any generator to any load can be guaranteed with reasonable certainty. 
However, price zone borders in 2011 are still following country borders even 
if they in many cases are no more the congestion points of the network. This 
is mainly due to the wish to keep the country as a single price area. 
Large price zones are advantageous for competition in case there are no 
internal bottlenecks inside the zone. This is due to large price zones usually 
having more producers and consumers than small ones. Single price allows 
                                                 
7  EC, benchmarking reports, 2000 – 2010 ; Gapgemini, Market observatory, 
2009 
8  In this study the term "bidding zone" is used when a price zone is split into 
several subzones such as in Italy.  
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the market participants to act on the market on equal conditions. However, 
small price zones could be more advantageous for network operation as 
small zones give additional tools for the TSOs to manage the flows in the 
network. One can think about an optimal design of price zones taking both 
elements into account, but the task is not an easy one.9  
A system where zones are reduced to cover only one network node is 
called nodal pricing. Nodal pricing is applied in the area of the Regional 
Transmission Operator in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland (PJM) 
and in Russia. There are supporters for introducing nodal pricing also in the 
EU.10 The opponents of nodal pricing are against a mandatory pool which 
has been considered necessary to make nodal pricing work in PJM. The 
opponents also argue against the perceived unfair treatment of consumers 
in the nodal pricing system because the prices differ inside the country 
depending on the node. To alleviate this, it is possible to use the nodal 
pricing only for generators and to equalise the prices for end consumers. 
This kind of an arrangement is in use for example in Italy in the context of 
the Italian zonal market system. Nodal pricing is also opposed due to the 
perceived higher risk of market power abuse compared to zonal pricing 
because of the limited number of market participants in each node. This 
argument is contested as the possibility to use market power depends on the 
capacity of the underlying infrastructure and can equally exist in a zonal 
and a nodal system.11 
2.5. How cross-border flows are managed 
The transmission network of a TSO is often designed to allow a free 
dispatch of generators and load most of the time, as discussed above. 
Generators are just obliged to inform the TSO which units they want to run 
to enable the TSO to check whether the network can accommodate the 
resulting flows safely. However, at the European level a similar freedom of 
transporting electricity between any generator and any consumer is 
generally not possible due to transmission network constraints. Thus a 
congestion management method is needed to allocate the limited 
transmission capacity between control areas. 
                                                 
9  ERGEG, capacity allocation and congestion management, 2011 
10  MIT, Joskow et Schmalensee, nodal pricing, 1983; Bruegel, Zachmann, Policy 
brief, 2010 
11  Bye and Hope, market power due to network constraints, 2005 
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Figure 4 Share of electricity imports and exports of national consumption in Europe in 
2008.12  
Cross-border trade is enabled by allowing a generation surplus in the 
exporting control area and a corresponding generation deficit in the 
importing control area. TSOs manage the cross border flows by first 
calculating in a network model how big this surplus and deficit can be 
taking into account the technical constraints of the cross-border 
infrastructure and of the upstream network. Then the TSOs transform these 
results into a cross-border capacity value called Net Transfer Capacity 
(NTC)13. This capacity is offered to the market. Market participants then bid 
for the amounts of cross-border flows they wish to transport from one area 
to another. The market will attribute the available cross-border capacity to 
the highest bidders.14 When the market result and the resulting cross border 
                                                 
12  Source: statistics on commercial flows of ENTSO-E and the former TSO 
associations. Some values are estimated as there is missing data in the 
ENTSO-E dataset.  
13  ETSO, transfer capacity definitions, 2001 
14  EU Regulation 714/2009 requires that when there is congestion, the capacity 
is allocated using market base methods. Accepted market based methods are 
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nominations are known, the TSOs will double-check in the network model 
the feasibility of these flows and transform them to a scheduled surplus or 
deficit in each control area. The task of each TSO in real time is to ensure 
that the surplus or deficit in the own control area follows this schedule.15 
For some European countries cross border trade is a large share of their 
domestic load, for some countries cross border trade is marginal. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.  
From Figure 4 one can identify the typical transit countries Switzerland, 
Latvia, Denmark and Slovenia.  Import countries (FI, NL, BE, PT, IT and 
GR) and export countries (BG, CZ, FR, DE, NO and RO) are also easy to 
recognise. 
2.6. Need for transmission investments 
A transmission network is needed to bring electricity from where it is 
produced to the place where it is consumed. Transmission networks take 
care of the higher volumes, be it shorter or longer distances. Transmission 
systems directly connect the biggest power plants, the distributions 
networks and in many countries also the biggest industrial consumers. The 
purpose of distribution networks is to bring electricity to final consumers 
and to connect smaller power plants.  
Electricity is not very easy to transport long distances with today’s systems 
based on Alternative Current (AC) technology. For longer distances the use 
of Direct Current (DC) technology is cheaper. For a single overhead 
transmission line the break even distance between AC and DC is about 400 
– 600 km.16 This does not mean that electricity can not be traded over 
longer distances. Surplus areas can be far away from deficit areas if there 
are in-between areas which are reasonably neutral in their power balance. 
In a way, electricity can be floated over these neutral areas with the help of 
their power plants maintaining the voltage and reactive power in the system 
at a proper level. 
When possible, power plants should be built close to consumption to 
minimise transmission needs. However, often the location of the power 
plant is decided on other grounds such as availability of the resource (for 
                                                                                                                    
explicit and implicit auctions. In explicit auctions the TSO sell cross-border 
capacity separately, in implicit auctions the capacity is allocated together with 
energy bids in organised markets. These bids are utilised to transfer 
electricity from the lower price zone to the higher price zone. 
15  UCTE, Operation Handbook, 2004 - 2010 
16  Prof. Andersson in the DACH 2010 conference in Munich organised by VDE 
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example hydro, wind, coal, lignite, gas, cooling water and harbour facilities), 
taxes, subsidies, permits, construction and labour costs or stance on nuclear 
power. Often there is a need to keep a minimum distance to residential or 
vulnerable areas. 
In times before market liberalisation each country wanted to be self-
sufficient regarding electricity production. The longest distances to 
transport electricity were from the surplus areas to the deficit areas inside 
the country. Sweden, Finland and the UK are typical examples of this 
evolution with hydro resources in the North and consumption in the South. 
In the Soviet Union transmission distances were even longer. 
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Figure 5 Main electricity surplus, deficit, storage and wind production areas in Europe in 
2008.17 
For cross-border transmission in Europe the pioneers were the Alpine 
countries and their neighbours. Hydropower from Austria and Switzerland 
was consumed in Germany and Italy thanks to interconnectors dating back 
to the 1920s.18  Later on, cross-border exchanges were significantly 
increased with the construction of nuclear power plants. Italy, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK, not being able to construct enough 
nuclear plants themselves, contracted nuclear power from France which 
                                                 
17  The map shows the realized power balance in Europe in 2008. This balance is 
based on economic dispatch of generation within the network constraint 
limits. The map should not be mixed up with generation adequacy maps 
which indicate how much could be produced based on installed generation 
capacity. Data is collected from European and national electricity statistics 
sources. Data for storage hydro plants is from reference: Swissgrid, Tillwicks, 
hydro storage, 2010. Data for Nordic hydro storage capacity is from Nord 
Pool Spot. 
18  VDEW, history, 1984 
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was prepared to increase nuclear capacity far beyond its own needs. These 
import contracts were made between vertically integrated monopolies.  
Today markets are open and anybody can trade electricity and transport it 
cross the borders from one control area to another, subject to getting cross-
border transmission capacity from the TSOs. In spite of this freedom, 
today’s transmission flows are still largely inherited from the past. The same 
surplus and deficit areas formed in the times of vertically integrated 
monopoly utilities are still clearly visible in the transmission pattern. The 
following map shows those electricity surplus and deficit areas. 
The biggest combined deficit area in Europe is formed by Northern Italy, 
Southern Germany and South Eastern France. Deficit in Southern England 
is also important. The biggest surplus areas are in Northern and Eastern 
France. Also Scotland and Scandinavia have an important electricity surplus 
in rainy years. Wind power surplus is mainly located in Northern Germany, 
Denmark, Spain and Scotland. Development of off-shore wind parks in the 
North Sea will further increase the Northern wind surplus.19 
2.7. Cost of electricity production 
Need for transmission is not only due to surpluses and deficits of 
generation capacities but it is also influenced by the search of the most 
economic dispatch. In particular in low load periods there is a lot of idle 
generation capacity available and methods are needed to decide which unit 
will run. In the old monopoly times the dispatch was made by establishing a 
merit order. Power plants were ranked according to their marginal cost of 
production and they were centrally dispatched starting from the cheapest 
one. In the electricity market the same principle applies, but now the power 
plant owners make their own dispatching decisions, based on the market 
price and their expectation on its development. In principle, both systems 
should result in the same dispatch of power plants. However, optimisation 
of dispatch is a rather complex task which makes it difficult for example for 
the TSOs to predict which plant will run and which not until the generators 
have confirmed their dispatching decisions.20   
 
2.7.1. Hydropower 
 
Historically hydro resources have allowed supplying electricity at an 
affordable price. Transmission lines have been built to exploit hydro power 
                                                 
19  EWEA, wind production forecast 2020 - 2030, 2009 
20  Wood, Wollenberg and Sheblé,  Power systems operation and control, 2010 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                                     Introduction to Electricity Markets  
15 
sometimes far away from consumption. Hydro power is usually very 
flexible. Flexibility allows hydro power to participate in balancing and 
regulating power markets in which prices are usually higher than in the 
longer term markets.21 The amount of energy produced by hydro power 
plants is dependent on the rainfall. Thus there is an interest to use the 
limited amount of water in the periods when the price is high. Storage 
power plants, common in Norway and in Alpine regions, are capable for 
daily and seasonal production patterns which enable this optimisation of 
production. 
 
2.7.2. Nuclear power 
 
Nuclear power is currently the cheapest alternative for base load 
electricity.22 As all countries do not accept nuclear power plants in their 
country, this creates a business opportunity for cross-border trade and is 
currently the main reason for cross-border flows. In 2008 net exports from 
France were 48 TWh, net imports to Italy 40 TWh and net imports to the 
UK 11.5 TWh.23 Switzerland’s imports from France in the same year were 
about 18 TWh, Switzerland exported nearly the same volume to Italy. 
It remains to be seen whether comparable nuclear surpluses will be 
maintained in the future or whether nuclear capacity will be limited to the 
base load needs of each country using nuclear power. This question 
concerns France in particular. The capacity factor of the French nuclear 
plants in year 2009 was only around 71% and in 2010 around 74%, which is 
low in international comparison.24 The main reason for this is that at night 
and in summer vacation periods the nuclear production capacity in France 
exceeds consumption and thus the production from nuclear plants needs to 
be curtailed in those hours. To manage this challenge, the French nuclear 
plants are designed for this load following operation. 
 
 
                                                 
21  Regulating power, often also called balancing power, is bought by the TSO to 
keep the load and generation in balance in its control area. TSOs need both 
positive and negative regulating power for upwards and downwards 
regulation. Upwards regulation is usually more expensive, the cheapest 
source being hydro power which can rapidly increase production. To provide 
upwards regulation in thermal systems there needs to be spinning reserves 
which are not producing at full capacity. For downwards regulation almost 
any power plant in operation can participate by reducing the output.  
22  Tarjanne, generation costs, 2010 
23  Source: ENTSO-E 
24  Platts, Nucleonics week, 2010, 2011 
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2.7.3. Gas power 
 
Combined cycle gas turbine is today the technology often setting the market 
price. The biggest share of the marginal cost for these units is the gas cost. 
Thus gas availability and price are important factors influencing the 
electricity price and the investments in gas turbines. As most European 
countries have gas and gas power plants are usually not considered 
particularly harmful by the citizens, gas turbines can be located close to 
consumption.  
 
2.7.4. Wind power 
 
Wind power, like hydro and nuclear, has a low short term variable cost of 
production. In some cases, depending on the subsidy system, wind 
generators have an interest to produce even when the market price is 
negative.  
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Figure 6 Correlation of exports of Germany and wind production as percentage of installed 
capacity in 2009.25 
Windy days create important export opportunities for countries with a 
high share of wind power, see Figure 6. With high wind, the market price 
decreases as there is less need for conventional generation. Low price will 
lead to exports to neighbouring price zones, in particular if the price in the 
neighbouring zone is less affected by wind power. Germany and Spain are 
good examples of this phenomenon. 
 
                                                 
25  Source: Amprion 
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2.7.5. Other renewable electricity 
 
Until now, renewable electricity has been mainly generated from hydro, 
biomass and wind. The outlook to increase hydro power is rather modest. 
The bulk of the increase in electricity production to meet the 2020 
renewable targets will come from biomass and wind. From the other 
renewable sources the outlook for solar power is the most promising. Solar 
photovoltaic power has increased rapidly in some areas thanks to powerful 
subsidy schemes. Concentrating solar power technologies26 have been 
brought forward in the context of the North African and Mediterranean 
solar power projects. Deep geothermal energy could also be feasible for 
large scale exploitation in the future.  
 
 
Figure 7 Electricity generation costs with emissions trading.27 
 
2.7.6. Market price 
 
Cross-border exchange of electricity is ultimately driven by market price 
differences between price zones. The market price in each price zone is 
dependent on market fundamentals such as the level of demand, generation 
capacity availability and cost of production. The market price can also be 
influenced by company and authority decisions such as a lift up enabled by 
market power or administered prices imposed by regulators. Finally, cross-
                                                 
26  Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) is a technology in which the solar radiation 
is concentrated to elements which will produce steam for a conventional 
thermal cycle. 
27  Based on February 2010 prices. Wood and wind are without taking into 
account subsidies; Tarjanne, generation costs, 2010 
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border exchange of electricity itself influences the market price, decreasing 
it in high price zones and increasing it in low price zones. 
Figure 8 indicates the average spot price for each price zone in Europe in 
2008 and the prevailing commercial flows following the price difference.  
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Figure 8 Average hourly spot prices and the main export directions following the price 
differentials in Europe in 2008. 28  
                                                 
28  Source: Power exchanges' websites. In France the yearly average spot price 
was higher than in Spain. However, the net commercial flow was 
predominantly towards Spain because Spain was more expensive in more 
hours than France and probably because of an existing long term contract 
from France to Spain. The flow in the Greece-Italy interconnector was 
predominantly towards Greece which is against the average spot price 
difference. The assumed reason for this is market imperfections in Greece. 
The price differential between Great Britain and Ireland is difficult to 
establish because of the lack of comparable spot markets. The flow, however, 
in the Moyle interconnector is predominantly from Great Britain to Ireland. 
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3. CROSS-BORDER TRANSMISSION 
INVESTMENTS 
3.1. Economic principles 
It is obvious that any TSO should make only beneficial transmission 
investments. The challenge is to identify which transmission investments 
are the most beneficial and how to prioritise them. 
Inside a control area, transmission investments are needed to connect 
power plants, distribution systems and industrial consumers to the 
transmission network. Without a connection, a power plant, distribution 
system or consumer is not able to operate. Regarding investments in 
interconnectors, there is an option not to build anything at all as they are 
usually not absolutely necessary for the functioning of the system. The need 
for interconnectors is reduced by the common political wish of many 
sovereign states to have a high degree of autonomy in the electricity supply. 
For large countries a certain level of autonomy is necessary from the 
technical point of view, at least with currently used transmission 
technology. Only small countries could be entirely supplied from the 
neighbouring countries, Luxembourg being an example. This means that 
even if it is well possible to optimise European electricity production by 
transporting electricity from surplus areas to deficit areas, it is not possible 
in practise with current transmission technology to cover the consumption 
of the whole Europe by producing only in a small number of countries.  
Thus the main role of interconnectors is, in addition to providing system 
security back-up to national systems, to optimise the overall system by 
allowing some higher cost generators to be replaced by lower cost 
generators in the regional dispatch. This means that an approach based on 
optimising social welfare when deciding on building an interconnector is 
very appropriate even if the political wish for autonomy might in some cases 
overrule the social welfare calculations. The assessment of the increase in 
social welfare due to building new interconnectors is developed in this 
chapter.  
3.2. Social welfare 
An interconnector between two price zones with a price difference will allow 
generators in the low price zone to supply load in the high price zone. This 
will result in an increase of overall social welfare if the net increase in 
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producer surplus, consumer surplus and congestion rent is higher than the 
investment costs. However, there can be important distributional effects. In 
the low price zone, part of the consumer surplus will be transferred to the 
producer surplus as the price increases. Equally, in the high price zone part 
of the producer surplus will be transferred to the consumer surplus, as the 
price decreases. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 9.  
 
 
A: An absolute increase in consumer surplus due to increased transmission capacity 
B: An absolute increase in producer surplus due to increased transmission capacity 
C: A transfer from producer surplus to consumer surplus 
D: A transfer from consumer surplus to producer surplus 
E: Congestion rent 
 
Figure 9 Social welfare effects of an interconnector investment.29  
As shown in Figure 9, the transfer of surplus from producers to 
consumers and vice versa is dependent on the slope of the demand and 
supply curves. If the supply curve is gradual, a capacity increase will cause 
only a modest transfer of surplus. If it is steep, the transfer of surplus is 
important. Regarding prices, a steep supply curve will cause prices to 
change faster when increasing cross-border capacity than in the case of 
gradual supply curves. 
In large price zones supply curves are more gradual than in small price 
zones as there are more power plants forming the supply curve. Thus 
building an interconnector between a large and a small price zone will 
                                                 
29  UCB, Lesieutre and Eto, 2003; CRE, interconnection 2008, 2009 
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influence the level of prices more in the small zone. However, the transfer of 
surplus can also be important in the large price zone as the price change 
applies to bigger volumes. 
Also, in peak load conditions supply curves tend to be steeper than in base 
load conditions. This means that the influence of interconnection capacity 
to prices during peak load times can be more significant than during base 
load hours. 
Figure 9 is simplified by leaving out the effect of demand elasticity. 
Demand is usually inelastic in short term. In longer term, demand is elastic 
in all electricity markets and needs to be taken into account when analysing 
transmission investments.30 
Consumers are particularly interested in congestion costs for consumers31 
which are equal to the area of zone D as shown in Figure 9 subtracted from 
zone C +A. It is interesting to note that increased interconnection capacity 
does not automatically lead to increased welfare to consumers when 
summing up the effect on both sides of the border. For example if the 
supply curve in the exporting country is very steep and in the importing 
country very gradual, the result of building an interconnector is a 
substantial price increase in the exporting country but only a slight price 
decrease in the importing country. In these circumstances, overall social 
welfare for consumers will be reduced while overall social welfare for 
producers will be increased. An inversed slope of the supply curves would 
give the opposite result.32 
3.3. Congestion rent 
TSOs are particularly interested in congestion rents, zone E in Figure 9. 
Congestion rent is collected by the TSO in the form of auction revenue from 
selling interconnection capacity as already discussed above. This can take 
place explicitly when the TSO sells interconnection capacity and the traders 
                                                 
30  In this case the welfare effects will be even bigger as deadweight loss is 
reduced. 
31  Congestion cost for consumers is the difference in overall costs for consumers 
between the congested situation and the situation without congestion. 
32  This analysis only takes into account the effect on the electricity market in the 
respective countries caused by the new interconnector. The long run general 
equilibrium consequences of any voluntary trade are always beneficial. This 
is due to the fact that resources in the importing country can be reallocated to 
be better used in other sectors, and in the exporting country resources will be 
allocated to the electricity industry from less value creating sectors (comment 
by Mats Nilsson). 
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organise themselves how to use this capacity, or implicitly when cross-
border electricity flows are decided based on bids in power exchanges.  
Welfare effects in function of the increase of cross border capacity are 
shown in Figure 10. When the capacity of an interconnection is increased 
from zero, the amount of congestion revenues received from selling 
transmission capacity first increases rapidly as shown by the parabolic 
congestion rent curve. With a further increase in capacity, the increasing 
flow in the interconnector reduces the price difference over the 
interconnection and the congestion rent will grow slower until it reaches its 
maximum. From that point onwards a further increase of capacity will 
reduce the congestion rent until it becomes zero at the full price 
convergence point. 
The increase in producer and consumer welfare is almost opposite to the 
increase in congestion rent. With small capacities the increase in producer 
and consumer welfare is small but they increase exponentially with the 
increase of capacity. Thus the first megawatts are interesting for the TSOs' 
income and the last megawatts are interesting for the producer and 
consumer welfare. However, it is important to note that the biggest 
influence of an interconnector capacity increase is usually through the 
transfer between the producer and consumer welfare within each country as 
shown in Figure 10. This transfer increases almost linearly with the capacity 
increase until the full price convergence point. 
In Figure 10 it is assumed that a linear capacity increase is possible. In 
practise the main capacity increase option is adding new transmission lines 
corresponding large capacity steps. However, smaller intermediate steps are 
often possible such as upgrading existing lines to higher capacity ratings.  
From Figure 10 interesting observations can be made regarding the 
optimum outcome for various parties. A merchant investor would aim to 
maximise the net revenue for the interconnector owner which is reached 
with the capacity of 1500 MW. The overall social welfare maximum of the 
investment corresponds to the capacity of 3000 MW or 3500 MW which 
has almost the same overall social welfare as 3000 MW. In the case of 3500 
MW the TSO would make a loss. Country A would choose a capacity of 
2000 MW because at higher capacities the social welfare for Country A 
decreases. Country B would invest up to 4500 MW, which is the capacity 
needed for full price convergence, because this gives the maximum welfare 
for Country B. 
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Figure 10 Welfare effects of an interconnector investment in function of 
capacity. Detailed data is presented in Table 1 in Appendix 2. 33 
Figure 10 illustrates the importance of the transfer of social welfare 
between producers and consumers. The negatively affected parties 
potentially seek for limiting the capacity of the investment far below the 
overall welfare optimum level.  
                                                 
33  Discussions with Peter Jørgensen, Energinet.dk in 2002;  EPFL, Duthaler 
and Finger, congestion revenues, 2008; ESRI, Valeri, IE-UK interconnector, 
2008 
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Figure 11 Congestion rent accrual follows a parabolic curve. 
Congestion rents have increased constantly after the introduction of 
implicit and explicit transmission capacity auctions. Year 2009 was an 
exception. In 2009 congestion rents dropped due to consequences of the 
economic crises reducing electricity cross-border trading. It is, however, 
foreseeable that the overall congestion rents in Europe will increase again 
when the economic crisis is over. There are also some borders on which 
congestion rent is still not collected but capacity is given for free based on 
historical long term contracts.  This applies in particular to the Swiss 
borders. In the EU priority allocation of cross-border capacity for historical 
contracts is forbidden.34 Table 1 gives the development of congestion rents 
in Europe in 2006 – 2009.  
It is important to understand how congestion rent is accumulated as a 
function of the price difference and the capacity of interconnection. In most 
interconnections in Europe the price difference and hence the commercial 
flow is predominantly in one direction as illustrated in Figure 12. 
On average only about 10% of the commercial flows are in reverse 
direction. Only in the Finnish-Swedish, German-Swiss and Belgian-Dutch 
interconnections both directions were almost equally used in 2008.  
The price difference can change direction in different time patterns. Daily 
or seasonal price difference patterns are usual between thermal and hydro 
systems. Thermal systems have typically a high price difference between day 
                                                 
34  EU, court decision C-17/03, 2005 
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and night. Hydro systems have a smaller price difference between day and 
night because of the storage capability.  
 
Table 1  Annual congestion rents collected by the TSOs in Europe in 2006 - 2009.35  
 
TSO Country 
2006 
[M€] 
2007 
[M€] 
2008 
[M€] 
2009 
[M€]
Verbund APG Austria 26.3 44.5 63.2 49.45
Elia Belgium 58.1 40.3 29.2 28.6
ESO Bulgaria 0 2.3 23.6 19.1
Swissgrid Switzerland 35.3 40.1 78.1 59.4
CEPS Czech 
Republic 
102.0 59.8 34.6 26.2
EnBW (DE), RWE (DE), EON (DE), 
Vatenfall (DE), VKWNetz (AT) 
Germany 316.3 220.6 222.5 167.9
Energinet.dk Denmark 79.5 95.2 129.9 58.3
OÜ Pohivork Estonia 0 0 0 0
REE Spain 25.8 61.8 78.0 41.6
Fingrid Finland 11.9 22.6 23.2 4.9
RTE France 342.0 376.5 380.6 257.0
HTSO Greece 22.0 5.1 30.9 35.5
Mavir Hungary 29.4 47.1 76.4 49.0
EirGrid Ireland 6.2 13.1 0 0
Terna Italy 89.8 333.8 299.6 187.8
AB Lietuvos energija Lithuania 0 0 0 0
Cegedel Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
AS Augstsprieguma tikls Latvia 0 0 0 0
Tennet Netherlands 107.6 54.0 105.9 59.0
Statnett Norway 18.0 31.9 112.9 45.6
PSE Operator Poland 70.2 40.9 28.1 13.4
REN Portugal 0 23.2 32.3 5.5
Transelectrica Romania 10.7 17.7 36.7 22.1
Svenska Kraftnät Sweden 35.4 67.8 85.3 28.2
ELES Slovenia 3.1 25.9 32.6 33.0
SEPS Slovakia 22.48 44.39 36.2 27.9
National Grid United 
Kingdom 
61.14 106.0 66.1
TOTAL [M€]   1412 1730 2046 1286 
 
                                                 
35  EC, ITC consultation documents, 2008 ; ENTSO-E, congestion rents 2008, 
2009; ENTSO-E, congestion rents 2009, 2010; CRE, interconnection 2007, 
2009 
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Figure 12 Net hourly commercial flows in each direction at the European interconnections 
in 2008.36 
A usual seasonal variation in hydro systems is low prices in spring when 
snow is melting and high prices in winter when there is less water available. 
As an example, the price difference pattern between Norway and Germany 
is shown in Figure 13. This dynamic price difference pattern is one 
                                                 
36  Source: ENTSO-E. Some values are estimated as there is missing data in the 
ENTSO-E dataset. 
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important part of the economic basis for a cable investment between these 
countries. 
       Average week in Germany and South-Norway 2002 – 2008 
€/MWh  
80 
 
                                                                                                                                           EEX 
                                                                                                                                  
40 
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Figure 13 Average weekly pattern of the hourly spot price difference between the 
Norwegian price area NO1 in the Nord Pool Spot power exchange and the German spot price 
in the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in the period 2002-2008.37 
 
Real congestion rent usually remains below the theoretically possible 
congestion rent. There are several reasons for this. Capacity is not always 
available due to outages or due to curtailment of capacity for network 
security reasons. Another reason is that in most European interconnections 
congestion rent is not gathered from implicit auctions but from explicit 
auctions or from a combination of these two types of auctions. Explicit 
auctions give a congestion rent based on traders' estimate of the price 
difference, not on the final price difference. Usually implicit auctions give a 
higher rent for the TSO as in explicit auctions the uncertainties for traders 
are higher.38  
A comparison between the real congestion rent accrual with the 
theoretical accrual, calculated by multiplying the hourly price difference 
with the maximal flow, is presented in Table 2 for some European 
interconnections. From the table it can be seen clearly that in some cases 
the real congestion rent is close to the theoretical congestion rent but in 
some others both the utilisation ratio and the congestion rent is far below 
the theoretical maximum. Explanations for this lack of efficiency are further 
explored in this study. 
As congestion revenues indicate how much market participants value the 
possibility for cross-border trade, congestion rent could be a good criterion 
                                                 
37  Statnett, Bente Hagem, transmission investments, 2010 
38  Frontier Economics and Consentec, congestion management methods, 2004 
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to determine at which interconnection capacity should be increased.39 
Congestion rent can be easily compared with the cost of any potential 
investment to remove congestion.40 TSOs are obliged to publish the 
commercial flows and congestion rent at each interconnection which allows 
any stakeholder to have a view whether a higher capacity might be justified. 
The analysis needs to be based on an estimation of future congestion rents 
for which the current rents are not necessarily a good proxy.   
 
Table 2 Comparison of the realised congestion rent with the theoretical congestion rent at 
some European interconnections in 2008.41  
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DE FR 2675 16 69% 10 156 232 67% 
NO NL 700 4 60% 27 113 168 67% 
FR IT 2525 18 81% 21 300 454 66% 
FR ES 1300 4 35% 17 93 192 49% 
DE NL 3925 14 42% 10 65 329 20% 
 
It has been discussed whether the whole transmission infrastructure could 
be financed through congestion rents. A general conclusion of this 
discussion has been that even if a considerable share of the investments can 
be made using congestion rents, it is usually not possible to cover all 
transmission costs from them.42 From Tables 1-2 one can observe, however, 
                                                 
39  For interconnector projects between countries with no existing 
interconnectors there are no historical congestion rents, so other methods 
need to be used for assessing the profitability of a possible interconnector.  
40  In many countries congestion rents are collected from several borders. An 
interconnector investment affects the market price and thus also affects 
congestion rents at all borders, not only at the border at which the new 
interconnector is built. Thus it is necessary to take into account the combined 
effect, not just the increase of congestion rents at one border. 
41  ENTSO-E, congestion rents 2008, 2009; ENTSO-E, NTC winter 2007 – 
2008, 2007; Price data from Power exchanges' websites. Theoretical 
congestion rent calculation is based on hourly spot price differences. Yearly 
average absolute price difference is the average of the absolute values of the 
hourly spot price difference 
42  Rubio-Odériz and Perez-Arriaga, marginal pricing of transmission, 2000; 
Duthaler and Finger, congestion revenues, 2008 
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that for small transit countries situated at  a high price gradient, namely 
Switzerland, Slovenia and Denmark, this might well be possible.43 
The congestion rent declines when the cross-border capacity is close to the 
price convergence level, as illustrated in Figure 10. This decrease in 
congestion revenues could discourage TSOs to invest up to the overall 
welfare optimum level. It is important that this phenomenon is taken into 
account by the national regulators when setting incentives for the TSOs and 
by the ACER when giving an opinion of the ENTSO-E ten year network 
development plan.44 
3.4. Identification which interconnector projects would be 
profitable 
To identify which interconnector projects would be profitable from the 
overall social welfare point of view in Europe, a method is developed in this 
study. This method is illustrated in Figure 14 and a detailed description of 
the method together with the input data and calculation results are 
presented in Appendix 1. 
  
 
Figure 14 Approximation of the supply curves on both sides of the interconnection by using 
linear supply curves as a proxy and estimating the relative position of the supply curves 
through the congestion rent. 45 
                                                 
43  See also Table 3 later in this chapter as well as Tables 2 - 5 in Appendix 1. 
44  According to Electricity regulation EC/714/2009 one of the tasks of the ACER 
is to give an opinion on the ten year network development plan of ENTSO-E. 
45  It is assumed that both the supply curve and the load in each country are 
fixed. Trade between the two countries moves the operation point in each 
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The method is based on a model using as input parameters (i) supply 
curves with the slope equal to the linear regression line of correlation 
between spot price and load in 2008 (2009) for each price zone as 
illustrated in Figure 15, (ii) the cross-border capacity and trade between 
countries in 2008 and (iii) the congestion rent collected from each border. 
An equivalent price difference between two countries is generated by 
dividing the congestion rent in 2008 by the corresponding cross-border 
flow. The linear supply curves are set in the model to a distance 
corresponding to this equivalent price difference. The changes due to 
increasing the interconnection capacity are then calculated by assuming 
that the additional capacity is fully utilised and that the flow at the 
interconnection reduces the price difference in function of the new supply 
balance in each zone as illustrated in Figure 14. 
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Figure 15 The regression line of correlation between the hourly spot price in APX Power NL 
power exchange and the hourly load in the Netherlands in 2008, used in this study as a 
proxy for the slope of the supply curve in the Netherlands.46 
The model allows calculating all relevant parameters for an 
interconnection capacity increase. The calculation in Appendix 1 includes 
the optimal increase of capacity and the change in congestion rent and 
social welfare. Summary results of this calculation are shown in Table 3 
below.  
                                                                                                                    
country along the supply curves as part of the load in Country B is served by 
generators in Country A.  The linear regression line of correlation of spot 
market price versus load is used as a proxy for the supply curves in the 
calculations. Detailed description of the method is in Appendix 1. 
46  Source: APX Power NL. 
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The first conclusion of the calculation shown in Table 3 is that there is 
clearly potential for many profitable interconnector projects in Europe. In 
particular links between the Nordic countries and the Central Europe, 
investments at the borders of Italy and the UK are extremely profitable even 
if they would be DC interconnectors with an annual cost in the range of 50 – 
100 k€/MW/a.47 
Also many investments inside Central Europe are potentially profitable. 
Even if price differences in Central Europe are not as important as between 
Central Europe and the other regions, the possibility to build relatively 
cheap overhead lines makes them interesting from the social welfare point 
of view.  
The fact that building overhead lines has become very difficult because of 
public acceptance issues means that this potential is not easily realised. 
Most of the interconnectors that have been successfully finished in the past 
years are expensive undersea projects which are less sensitive regarding 
public acceptance. 
The results presented in Table 3 are based on a method using rather 
heroic assumptions.48 One needs to be particularly careful when 
interpreting the results for the highly meshed Central European 
transmission network. Interconnectors often have influence on several 
countries, not only on the two countries between which it is built. This is a 
main limitation of the method used in this study.  The increase in flows and 
the changes in market prices are assumed to take place only in the two price 
zones between which the interconnector is built. In the case of a small 
increase of capacity, this is accurate enough, but if the increase of capacity is 
large, also the flows in the other interconnections of the two countries in 
question are affected.  
When capacity increase in one interconnection affects several 
interconnections, it is necessary to analyse what would be the optimal 
combination of capacity increase in all these interconnections. This is 
particularly true for transit countries. 
                                                 
47  Costs of DC interconnectors vary depending for example on technology, 
capacity and length of the interconnector. The range of 50 – 100 k€/MW/a 
corresponds to such recently finalised or planned investments as BritNed 
(1300 MW of capacity, about 600 M€ of investment costs), NorNed (700 
MW, about 650 M€) and France-Spain interconnector (1400 MW, about 800 
M€). Shorter interconnectors such as Estlink (350 MW, 110 M€) have lower 
annual costs. 
48  The method is based on calculating the optimal capacity for interconnections 
one by one, all other borders remaining unchanged. Thus the welfare 
calculations do not try to reflect a simultaneous optimisation of the European 
grid.  
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Table 3 Summary results of the calculation of welfare gains of potential interconnector 
investments in Europe using the method developed in this study. The method is presented in 
Appendix 1 and the detailed results in Table 5 in Appendix 1.  
Exporting 
country 
Importing 
country 
Capacity in 
2008 
[MW] 
Optimal 
additional 
capacity from 
the social 
welfare point 
of view 
[MW] 
Increase of 
social 
welfare at 
optimal 
capacity 
[M€/a] 
NO UK 0 9159 992 
NO DE 0 4673 383 
SE DE 600 3665 229 
FR ES 1300 4343 215 
FR UK 2000 4488 203 
NO NL 700 1818 197 
NO SE 2825 2349 127 
FR IT 2525 2563 124 
DE FR 2575 2699 97 
AT HU 500 895 96 
PL DE 1150 1273 87 
SE PL 600 1967 80 
AT IT 210 1024 56 
PL SK 475 567 49 
RO HU 800 562 46 
PL CZ 1630 724 43 
BE UK 0 731 40 
NO DK 750 677 37 
CH IT 3525 604 25 
DE CH 1900 628 23 
NL UK 0 574 20 
FR CH 3100 588 20 
ES PT 1200 793 20 
DK DE 2050 454 18 
BG GR 550 313 12 
DK NL 0 302 12 
RO BG 625 303 11 
AT CH 1000 335 10 
AT SI 350 143 6 
UK IE 410 254 5 
CZ SK 1150 150 3 
DE NL 3925 224 3 
NL BE 2150 161 3 
CZ DE 2275 201 2 
SK HU 1000 97 2 
HU SI 0 52 1 
FR BE 2950 69 0 
SE DK 1980 41 0 
SI IT 380 20 0 
CZ AT 250 10 0 
IT GR 500 1 0 
DE AT 1500 0 0 
FI SE 1600 0 0 
EE FI 350 0 0 
LT SE 0 0 0 
LT PL 0 0 0 
LV EE 750 0 0 
LT LV 1100 0 0 
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For example for Switzerland, Denmark and Slovenia, the only possibility 
to considerably increase exports is to increase imports.49 A simultaneous 
increase in imports and exports gives a much higher overall welfare gain 
potential than if the effect of imports and exports are calculated separately. 
For example for a line passing through Switzerland, the figures calculated 
for the interconnection between France and Italy give an order of 
magnitude for the potential overall gains. Similarly, figures for the 
interconnection between Austria and Italy can be used to estimate the 
potential gains for Slovenian interconnector projects and for Denmark the 
figures for projects between Norway and Germany are relevant.  
It is also important to notice that our static linear model only 
approximates the potential of dynamic changes in prices. Dynamic changes 
are particularly important for countries which have similar yearly average 
prices but still have different price volatility patterns in the seasonal and 
hourly prices. Additionally, the model excludes the gains from the shorter 
term markets, such as from the intra-day and regulating power markets, in 
which prices and thus social welfare values per MWh are usually much 
higher than in the day-ahead spot market. Intra-day and regulating power 
markets do not currently generate congestion rents as the transmission 
capacity for these markets is allocated for free.  
For the investment and operating costs of interconnectors, standard costs 
per capacity unit based on estimation by the author are used in the 
calculations in this study. For DC lines the standard cost is 50.000 €/MW/a 
and for AC lines 10.000 €/MW/a. 
The method developed in this study could be utilised for analysing the 
combined effect of several interconnector investments by using an iterative 
calculation which combines projects for example by region. This study does 
not include such calculations. Instead, a calculation of the optimal 
interconnection capacity between regions is performed by assuming that 
there is full price convergence inside each region. Even if this is a heroic 
assumption, it is clear from Table 3 that the largest welfare potential for 
price arbitrage exists between regions. For the calculation, Central Europe 
is considered as one block, the Nordic countries, the UK and Ireland, the 
Iberian peninsula, Italy and Central Eastern Europe are each one block.  
Capacity increase is assumed to be made with DC links except for the 
connection between Central Europe and Central Eastern Europe. The 
results are shown in Figure 16.  
 
                                                 
49  CESI, CIGRE, Venturini et al, exchanges between IT, CH and DE, 2008 
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Central Eastern Europe
Imports in 2008  - 20 TWh
Capacity with Central Europe / MW
• Initial (2008): 3375
• Planned increase: 800
• Optimal increase: 1600
Slope of supply curve 3.0 €/GW
Italy
Imports  in 2008 43 TWh
Capacity with Central Europe / MW
• Initial (2008): 6640
• Planned increase: 1150
• Optimal increase: 2300
Slope of supply curve 3.3 €/GW
Iberian peninsula
Imports in 2008 4 TWh
Capacity with Central Europe / MW
• Initial (2008): 1300
• Planned increase: 2600
• Optimal increase: 6300
Slope of supply curve 1.5 €/GW
UK and Ireland
Imports  in 2008 13 TWh
Capacity with Central Europe / MW
• Initial (2008): 2000
• Planned increase: 3290
• Optimal increase: 6300
Slope of supply curve 1.3 €/GW
Northern Europe
Imports in 2008  - 17 TWh
Capacity with Central Europe / MW
• Initial (2008):   3350
• Planned increase: 2250
• Optimal increase: 7200
Slope of supply curve 1.5 €/GW
Central Europe
Imports in 2008   - 29 TWh
Slope of supply
curve 0.29 €/GW
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Central Europe -35 -53 NA 1.2 1.8 348 86 
Northern Europe -20 -63 -14.8 5.2 12.6 93 358 
Central Eastern Europe -7 -14 -4.1 3.8 6.6 17 45 
Italy 10 20 15.2 -3.0 -5.8 22 41 
Iberian peninsula 23 55 16.9 -3.5 -7.7 116 255 
UK and Ireland 29 55 16.0 -4.1 -6.4 128 225 
Sum    724 1009 
 
Figure 16 Welfare calculation of increasing interconnection capacity between regions in 
Europe using year 2008 as the reference year. 
The results from the pan-European optimisation of interconnections are 
very striking. The calculated optimum capacities are substantially higher 
than the current capacities indicating that at least the first projects to 
increase capacity will be highly profitable. The results suggest that annually 
more than one billion euro of overall welfare increase could be reached. 
The price effect for Central Europe is modest. On the contrary, the prices 
in the peripheral regions change substantially when interconnection 
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capacity increases. It is important to note that an interconnector capacity 
increase always reduces the absolute price difference between the connected 
areas. The change in the average price depends on whether the price 
difference is always in one direction, as assumed in the model used in this 
study, or whether the price difference changes direction over time for 
example daily or seasonally. In the latter case, the increase of 
interconnection capacity can result in a lower average price for both zones. 
In addition, the welfare distribution effect is mitigated by the changing 
import-export pattern which might be important for getting acceptance 
from the stakeholders.  
Interconnections in which this changing pattern is important are the 
interconnections between Central Europe and the Nordic countries and the 
interconnection between the Iberian Peninsula and France. 
The interconnectors included in the ENTSO-E ten year network 
development plan yield an increase of overall social welfare of about 700 
M€/a. At this level of interconnection capacity most of the increase in social 
welfare is captured by the TSOs in form of congestion rent and only a 
smaller part is in the form of absolute increase in producer and consumer 
surplus. At the optimal level of interconnection capacity a much bigger 
share of increase of social welfare is in form of producer and consumer 
surplus. 
The interconnectors in the ENTSO-E ten year network development plan 
result in only relatively modest changes in price differences. However, in 
the optimal interconnection capacity case price effects in the form of price 
convergence are already significant. In spite of this, even with the optimal 
capacity, significant price differences between regions remain as shown in 
Figure 16. This reflects the high costs of building DC transmission lines. 
Thus for the profitability of DC interconnectors a substantial remaining 
price difference is necessary if the profitability is judged based on price 
arbitrage.  
The calculations confirm the importance of distributional effects in 
optimising the European interconnectors. Both in the planned 
interconnector and welfare optimum case there is a huge redistribution of 
social welfare in favour of producers in the North and consumers in the 
South and in the UK, amounting to several billions of Euros.  
There are several ways to improve interconnector welfare calculations. 
One possibility is to construct supply and demand curves based on power 
plant and load data and to use these synthetic supply curves in a market 
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model.50 This allows forecasting prices in each price zone and calculating 
profitability of interconnectors. A major problem with this approach is the 
time span. It is very difficult to forecast the generation mix for the lifetime 
of a transmission investment. Also, the supply curve is dynamic in time, for 
example the gas, coal and emission allowance price fluctuations modify the 
supply curve continuously. Further, the merit order of power plants can 
change over time. Thus we have chosen not to base our method on 
generation and load scenarios.51  
One limitation of the method used in this study is the use of one single 
base year 2008 in the calculations. The choice was made because the 
availability of data for earlier years was not sufficient in particular regarding 
congestion rents and commercial flows. Year 2009 was influenced by the 
economic crises, this is why it was not used in the calculations. For 2010 no 
complete data set was available yet. When comparing the data for the period 
2008 – 2010 and also the data for earlier years to the extent available, it is 
clear that there are important differences between the years for example 
regarding congestion rents and commercial flows. For example 2008 was a 
wet year in the Nordic countries resulting in low prices in particular in 
Norway. However, in Europe the overall trading patterns and price 
differences remain relatively stable over time which gives confidence in the 
results presented in this study. It is left to further work to investigate to 
what extent the results might change if the calculations were based on a 
longer observation period. 
It is important to note that, contrary to power plant profitability, 
interconnector profitability is not dependent on the absolute levels of 
market prices but on the price difference between two markets. This 
influences how modelling should be done. For example if fuel costs have a 
high correlation on both sides of the interconnector, they will not drive 
profits. Price peaks are particularly interesting when they appear only at 
one end of the interconnector. For example the high price period in the 
Nordic market in 2003 should have had a positive impact on profits for the 
SwePol link between Sweden and Poland and for the Baltic cable between 
Sweden and Germany.  
Another approach to calculate the social welfare is to base the analysis on 
historical bids made in the market. One of the problems in using bid data is 
                                                 
50  Frontier Economics and Consentec, transmission investments, 2008; KEMA, 
transmission investments in Eastern Europe, 2005 
51  Baltso et al, Baltic interconnector study, 2009; ENTSO-E, ten year network 
development plan, 2010; EC, comments on ten year network development 
plan, 2010 
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that only part of the electricity traded is covered by these bids. There is also 
the problem that historical bids do not necessarily sufficiently reflect future 
prices. However, the advantage of using real bids instead of synthetic supply 
curves is that they include the strategic behaviour of companies. 
The calculations in this study have confirmed that there are potentially 
many profitable interconnectors missing in Europe. This results in a loss of 
social welfare which could reach one billion Euros just taking into account 
the price arbitrage between spot markets. This conclusion calls for a more 
accurate analysis. Such an analysis could start with building a demand and 
supply scenario, accounting for the EU wide and national scenarios. Plans 
to fulfil the renewable targets should give a good estimate of the new 
generation capacity to be installed in the coming years. The European 
Transmission System Operator's organisation ENTSO-E is indeed making 
such scenarios as part of the ten year network development plan.52 
3.5. Role of the regulator in the transmission investments 
Regulators have a key role regarding transmission investments. At the end 
of the day, even if the national law sets the general framework for the 
transmission investments, the regulator approves directly or indirectly 
which investments are accepted to be covered from transmission tariffs. The 
regulatory treatment of transmission investments varies widely. In some 
countries practically all projects proposed by the TSO are allowed to be 
passed on to the asset base. In other countries regulators or governments 
need to approve all investment projects before they are allowed to be 
financed via tariffs. An exception to this rule is merchant interconnectors.   
There is quite a lot of discussion how to incentivise TSOs to build 
interconnectors, for example by offering a higher rate of return linked to the 
delivery time. The general trend is that incentive schemes for TSOs are 
getting increasingly sophisticated. Incentives are more often performance 
based which means that the TSO is rewarded if it meets the output targets, 
not just the cost targets.53 For example performance based schemes are 
used with success to reduce congestion costs in Great Britain. Germany 
allows higher rates of return for selected transmission lines considered 
important for integrating wind power to the system.54 However, 
                                                 
52  ENTSO-E, scenarios for 2020, 2011 
53  EMV, annual report, 2010 
54  Frontier Economics and Consentec, transmission investments, 2008 
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performance based schemes have probably not yet been used in any 
Member State to incentivise interconnector building.  
 
 
Figure 17 Regulator's work is not always easy. 
The third legislative package strengthens the role of regulators regarding 
transmission investments and gives the new TSO association, ENTSO-E, the 
important task to plan the European transmission network. In particular, 
for the transmission systems which remain vertically integrated, namely 
ITOs (Independent Transmission Operators) and TOs (Transmission 
Owners), the national regulator has to approve the investment plan. The 
regulator has the powers to impose investments in the transmission 
network by third parties if the ITO or TO refuses to invest.55 The ACER has 
to give an opinion on the ten year network development plan and to verify 
that the national plans are coherent with the European ten year plan. If they 
are not, The ACER shall make recommendations to amend either the 
national plan or the ten year plan. ENTSO-E and the ACER shall monitor 
the implementation of these plans.  
It remains to be seen whether these institutional changes are sufficient for 
successful development of the European transmission system. Decisions on 
investments still remain in national hands. Even if binding decisions on 
investments have been made, without a proper political backing to 
overcome local resistance the result is not guaranteed. Stakeholders can not 
differentiate which projects are serious and which are cheap talk, using 
                                                 
55  EU, third package, 2009; EC, interpretative note on unbundling, 2009 
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academic terms by Farrell and Saloner.56 There is a real risk for a big 
discrepancy between good intentions and concrete results.  
Good reading regarding institutional changes needed because of 
technology development in networks is provided by Finger and his 
colleagues.57 
3.6. Merchant interconnectors 
Merchant interconnectors are allowed in the European legislation, subject 
to approval of the regulators concerned, the ACER and the European 
Commission. Merchant interconnectors have to cover their costs through 
the income from selling interconnector capacity.  
In the UK there are limitations for the TSO to recover interconnector costs 
from UK tariffs. This has in practise left merchant investments as the only 
interconnector option for the UK. It is unclear to what extent this merchant 
system has been an obstacle to interconnector investments between the UK 
and the neighbouring countries. There are only two projects in construction, 
one between the UK and the Netherlands, the Britned cable and another 
project connecting Ireland to Great Britain. The Irish project is fully paid by 
the Irish and the European Recovery Fund.58 However, some new thinking 
is being developed in the UK which might explain why the number of 
planned interconnectors has increased recently.59 In the past, 
interconnectors had to pay a tariff as if they were a generator and a load in 
the UK, now this has been removed. 
In principle merchant lines should be economically efficient. Merchant 
investors would compete for projects until an appropriate level of 
interconnection capacity has been reached. Merchant investments would be 
done efficiently under competitive pressure. However, it has been shown 
that many features of an interconnector investment do not favour merchant 
approach. For example according to Joskow and Tirole, distortion in price 
signals and some features of transmission investments such as lumpiness, 
the stochastic nature of the income and the strong link with system 
operation could lead to suboptimal merchant investments. 60  
                                                 
56  Farrell, cheap talk, 1987 
57  EPFL, Finger et al, governance and technology, 2005; EPFL, Finger et al, 
institutions, 2010 
58  ESRI, Valeri, IE-UK interconnector, 2008 
59  Ofgem, interconnectors, 2010 
60  Joskow and Tirole, merchant transmission investments, 2003 
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In Europe merchant line projects are exceptional as an exemption is 
needed from certain provisions of the European legislation to make such 
investments. Exemptions are possible for DC lines and in exceptional cases 
also for AC lines. Most Member states do not favour merchant lines as they 
do not consider them necessary. There is a fear that the whole transmission 
system will become more difficult to design and operate if there are several 
owners each willing to optimise the use of their own network. 
Until now the European Commission has accepted exemptions for all 
projects that have reached the Commission, namely Estlink between 
Estonia and Finland, Britned between the Netherlands and the UK, two 
East-West links between Ireland and Great Britain and the Arnoldstein – 
Tarvisio line between Austria and Italy. However, the conditions imposed 
on these projects have been strict. For example in the BritNed case the 
Commission imposed a revenue cap which makes the project resemble a 
regulated interconnector. In the Estlink case the fact that the investors are 
committed to sell the cable to the TSOs after a limited period of time was 
important for granting the exemption. Regarding the two East West 
projects the Commission's acceptance was conditional on Eirgrid building a 
regulated interconnector between Ireland and Great Britain which has a 
major impact on the profitability of these two other interconnectors.  
A generation company or a big consumer would be a natural candidate for 
building merchant interconnectors. They could themselves benefit from the 
interconnector capacity for additional exports or imports. Even more 
important could be the influence on prices in the price zones which the 
interconnector is connecting. A generator would build export capacity to 
increase the price level in its own zone. Thus the logic of a generation 
company building a merchant line would be quite similar to the logic of a 
vertically integrated TSO building the line. The difference is in the 
treatment of congestion rents which in the case of a TSO are considered to 
be part of the regulated income but in the case of a merchant investor can 
generate non-regulated profits, depending on the exemption decision.  
3.7. Other targets for cross border investments 
A transmission system fulfils two functions at the same time. The primary 
task of a TSO is to transport electricity from generation plants to load in a 
secure manner including keeping balance between generation and load at 
all times. The second task of a TSO is to provide a marketplace for electricity 
in order to optimise social welfare. The first task can hardly be taken away 
from the TSO. Regarding the second task some people argue that it does not 
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need to be performed by a TSO. Indeed, there are countries such as Spain 
where a separate body takes care of operating the marketplace. One should 
recognise, however, that an electricity market is strongly based on 
transmission networks, and that market operation has strong links with the 
primary task of a TSO. It is also true that these tasks cannot be performed 
by the TSO alone. A TSO is dependent on generators, distribution system 
operators, consumers, traders and power exchanges in performing these 
tasks, and increasingly from other TSOs as well. 
The optimisation of social welfare through price arbitrage, discussed in 
the beginning of this chapter, is closely linked to the electricity market and 
thus to the second task of the TSO. In the following it is discussed what 
other targets could be set for building interconnectors, including targets 
related to the primary task of a TSO to provide network access for the 
generators and consumers and operate the network in a reliable way.  
3.8. Technical targets 
A transmission network should in normal conditions allow all connected 
generators and loads to access to the network when they so wish. Only 
extreme conditions such as extreme temperatures or unforeseen outages 
could justify curtailing generation or load. In other words, the network 
should enable a secure dispatch of generation and load based on decisions 
made on economic grounds by the generators and consumers without too 
much interference by the TSO. This target of unconstrained dispatch of 
generators and loads is, however, not met everywhere in Europe. 
Transmission lines often take more time to construct than power plants 
which has led in some places to serious limitations in grid access. 
Historically, interconnectors were usually not technically necessary for 
allowing access of generators and loads to the network and thus they were 
not built for this purpose. Their role was to improve system security due to 
reserve power provided through interconnectors in the case of generation or 
network incidents. They were also used to increase social welfare through 
optimising the use of generation assets in Europe by enabling cross-border 
trade. With increased wind power in the system, this situation has changed. 
Today, without interconnectors access to network would need to be denied 
much more often in areas with high wind power production.61 
Even if interconnectors are beneficial for the European system, they also 
have some unwanted consequences. In today's transmission system which is 
                                                 
61  CEPS, comments on EWIS study, 2010 
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mainly based on the use of alternative current and a meshed network, the 
flows follow the physical characteristics of the network and ignore country 
borders.62 For this reason a TSO in one country could allow an access to 
generators and loads in such a way that the TSO in the neighbouring 
country is not able to guarantee a similar access to its own consumers 
because of the cross-border flows. Then the question arises that if network 
access limitations are needed, in which country such measures should be 
enacted and who should bear the costs.  
In the context of promoting renewable electricity generation, EU 
legislation63 requires positive discrimination schemes for renewable energy 
by giving it a priority or guaranteed access to the network. This means that 
in the case of congestion, restriction of access to the network is applied to 
other forms of electricity production than renewables. A technical target for 
a transmission system could be minimising this restriction of access. 
3.9. Minimum interconnection capacity targets 
Heads of states agreed in the European Council in 2002 that every Member 
State should have at least 10% import capacity compared to the installed 
generation capacity in the country.64 This simple target intends to promote 
interconnectors with the least connected Member States. In 2002 the 
countries below this target level were Ireland, the UK, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, France and Italy. From this group Portugal, Greece and France have 
already reached the 10% target. Also Ireland will meet the target when the 
planned interconnector between Ireland and Great Britain is in operation.  
Among the new Member States who joined the EU in 2004 - 2007, 
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Malta and Cyprus are below the 10% target. 
Romania and Italy could relatively easily reach the target level. On the 
contrary, Spain and the UK will not reach the target in the foreseeable 
future even when the currently on-going interconnector projects are 
finalised. The Baltic States are a special region in this respect. There is a lot 
of transmission capacity between the three Baltic States and the 
interconnection capacity with Russia and Belarus is also high. However, 
there is very little capacity to any other EU Member State. This situation 
                                                 
62  This phenomenon is important in Central Europe where there are parallel 
paths for flows encompassing several countries, less important in more radial 
networks in the outskirts of Europe. 
63  EU, renewables directive, 2009 
64  EU, Barcelona European Council conclusions, 2002 
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will be corrected with the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan 
(BEMIP).65 
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Figure 18 Evolution of interconnection capacity in the EU Member States, Norway and 
Switzerland since 2001 regarding the 10% target agreed in Barcelona in 2002.66 
 
It is evident that the ten percent target is rather simple and does not take 
into account the specific situation of each Member State. For transit 
countries the target is obviously less relevant. Transit countries can have a 
serious lack of interconnection capacity even if they have already reached 
the 10% target level, as the import capacity serves both transit and import 
needs. However, overall this target of 10% has efficiently drawn attention to 
the poor connection level of some EU Member States. 
The current level and evolution of interconnection capacity since the 
Barcelona summit are shown in Figure 18. Some countries have successfully 
increased the capacity, such as Belgium, Austria, Germany, Greece and 
Portugal. However, for example for Sweden the import capacity has 
diminished.   
                                                 
65  EU, Bemip, 2010 
66  The values for Figure 18 have been calculated from ETSO NTC values for 
summer 2001 (used in EU infrastructure communication, COM (2001) 775, 
20.12.2001) and from ENTSO-E NTC values for winter 2009-2010, taking 
into account overall import limitations when they have been declared. This 
method tends to give too optimistic values. Also, in some cases there is no 
agreement between the TSOs concerned on the value to be applied. To 
calculate more accurate values for aggregated import values, network 
modelling techniques should be used. The values in this table, however, give 
a rough indication for the situation of each member state regarding the 10% 
import capacity target and for its evolvement in time. 
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3.10. Security of supply targets 
Security of supply in electricity is reached when there is sufficient amount 
of electricity available to the society at all times except for very short periods 
of non-availability accepted as a trade-off for not making the electricity 
system overly expensive. The security of supply target can be divided into a 
short term and a long term target. The short term target is to minimise 
black-outs and system disturbances through system operation. This target 
can be called security of system target. The long term target is to maintain a 
sufficient generation and transmission capacity through investments in 
power plants and transmission networks. This target is called the system 
adequacy target, divided into a generation and a transmission adequacy 
target. Security of supply is a fundamental driver for the design and 
operation of the electricity system, because even very short incidents can be 
extremely costly to society.67 
Interconnections have an important influence in meeting both the short 
and long term security of supply target. Interconnectors were first built in 
order to improve operational security and to reduce the cost of achieving a 
secure network. Today interconnectors are increasingly used for trading 
purposes in order to better utilise generation resources. The resulting cross-
border trade involving longer transmission distances is a challenge for 
operational security as TSOs are more and more dependent on each other. 
Co-ordination between TSOs did not develop sufficiently in the beginning of 
market liberalisation to meet the new requirements including intensive 
loading of interconnectors. The black-out in Italy in 2003 confirmed this as 
the main reason for the black-out was the lack of co-ordination between the 
TSOs involved.68 
For generation adequacy, interconnectors generally have a positive effect. 
If a country does not have enough generation capacity, electricity can be 
bought from the neighbour. Import possibility, however, can reduce the 
incentive for investments in generation capacity as it could be cheaper to 
import electricity than to produce it locally. If many countries take this 
approach, this may lead to a situation in which generation adequacy in peak 
demand conditions is not ensured at the European level. Interconnectors do 
                                                 
67  Consentec, EWI and IEAW, security of German electricity supply, 2008; 
Frontier Economics, security of German electricity supply, 2008; Eurelectric, 
power outages 2003, 2004 
68  TSO system operation co-ordination has developed strongly in recent years. 
Coordination of Electricity System Operators (CORESO) and Transmission 
System Operator Security Cooperation (TSC) are two examples of initiatives 
between TSOs with the aim of detecting system operation risks and 
dangerous network situations.  
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not help if nobody has invested in peak generation capacity. At the moment 
this risk seems implausible. The ENTSO-E Winter 2010 – 2011 Outlook 
does not foresee any European wide difficulties to cover peak demand even 
if some local shortages may exist in extreme weather conditions or in the 
case of several simultaneous generation outages.69 
There is academic literature indicating that energy based electricity 
market does not provide a sufficient business case for generation units to 
cover peak load. One of the reasons put forward is the short duration of the 
highest load which is partly due to lack of demand elasticity. The business 
case is further weakened if there are price caps in the electricity market.70 
Thus a Member State could wait and hope that the neighbour invests in 
peak plants financed through subsidies or capacity payments collected from 
grid tariffs. The European legislation requires that the Member States shall 
take appropriate measures to maintain a balance between the demand for 
electricity and the availability of generation capacity.71 However, this 
obligation is not very precise which makes it difficult to enforce.  
One could think that building an interconnector could replace peak 
generation units for ensuring security of supply. Interconnectors, however, 
have two features which do not favour this approach. Firstly, the economic 
case for an interconnector usually can not be based on the peak load 
because of its very short duration. Secondly, interconnections have not 
proven to be politically reliable in situations when supply has been tight. 
Several cases of cutting exports rather than letting correct scarcity prices 
come into effect have already appeared, using the excuse that the own 
security of supply is in danger. The national legislation of some countries 
even explicitly provides for this.72 
Electricity generation in Europe is to a large extent dependent on 
imported fuels such as natural gas, coal and uranium. If fuel supplies are 
cut, generation can be partly substituted by power plants using indigenous 
sources or by switching to fuels stored for security reasons. Interconnectors 
can help countries which are more vulnerable for fuel import cuts. This 
criterion can be taken into account in interconnector planning. However, 
for the purposes of security of supply, interconnectors can be important 
                                                 
69  ENTSO-E, Winter 2010 – 2011 outlook, 2010 
70  Hobbs, capacity payments, 2005; DUT, De Vries and Hakvoort, security of 
supply, 2002 
71  Directive 89/2006/EC 18 January 2006 on security of electricity supply 
72  In the past at least Spain, France, Czech Republic, Poland and Greece have 
applied export restrictions if the national electricity supply balance has been 
tight. 
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only for small countries as for most big countries cross-border trade 
remains marginal, at least with current transmission capacities. 
3.11. Competition targets 
Interconnection capacity is interesting also from the competition point of 
view. It allows the producers and suppliers on the other side of the 
interconnection to compete in the same market as the local producers and 
suppliers. When the capacity is high enough to reach full price convergence, 
the connected price zones have the same price and their liquidity is pooled. 
This positive effect on competition has been welcomed in particular in 
countries which have allowed the old monopoly company to keep a 
dominant position in the market. This has helped in particular small 
countries to avoid splitting the incumbent for competition reasons into 
uneconomically small entities.  
Influence of cross-border competition through interconnections is 
significant if the cross-border capacity is large enough. For example in 
Denmark, interconnections define in practise the upper and lower limit of 
the market price through the influence of the Swedish, Norwegian and 
German prices. However, in big countries such as in France even 
considerable interconnection capacity does not bring real competition to the 
market. A consultant has calculated that to reduce the market power of EdF 
to a reasonable level, France should have 33.000MW of interconnection 
capacity.73 This is of course completely unrealistic with today's transmission 
technology. Thus to increase competition in France it is necessary to apply 
structural measures inside the country. 
Analogously, there is a risk of exporting market dominance. If a company 
is active on both sides of the interconnection, increasing interconnection 
capacity improves the possibility to use market power. This situation exists 
for example at all French borders. 
In some cases target levels for interconnection capacity have been 
explicitly set following competition cases. For example, in the merger case 
of Energie Baden Württenberg (EnBW) and Hidrocantabrico in 2002, EdF 
committed to a target of 4000 MW between France and Spain.74 In some 
cases governments have committed to bilateral interconnection capacity 
targets such as for the capacity between Spain and Portugal which is 
increased for improving the functioning of the Iberian market.  
                                                 
73  Ramboll and Mercados, electricity infrastructure, 2008 
74  EC, competition case EnBW, 2002 
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3.12. Climate change and sustainability targets 
It has been argued that climate change targets should be considered 
separately from the social welfare targets. This assumes that reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and promoting renewable energy contain such 
externalities which are not captured by the carbon price in the emissions 
trading scheme or by the subsidies used to support renewable electricity 
production. Such an externality could be for example improved security of 
supply resulting from investing in European indigenous energy sources. 
A detailed analysis of interconnection capacity targets based on climate 
change and sustainability criteria can be very complicated. In the author's 
view, the criteria discussed above could already take sufficiently into 
account climate change targets and thus they could be a sufficient basis to 
guide infrastructure investments. Some specific issues such as the trade-off 
between curtailment of peak wind production and cost of transmission 
infrastructure could be subject to a separate analysis. 
Views that renewables should have an absolute priority independently of 
the cost of using them do not seem to be economically or even 
environmentally justified. If carbon is correctly priced, market will guide the 
system to an optimal dispatch taking into account the climate change 
targets.75 
3.13. Price convergence targets 
Price convergence has sometimes been advocated as the ultimate target for 
the internal electricity market. However, full price convergence should not 
be a target itself. In some cases price differences in short term and even in 
longer term are justified due to a permanent cost advantage in one region 
compared to the neighbouring region. If prices were always equal in the 
whole Europe, this would suggest that too much transmission capacity has 
been built. Opposite to this argument, there are also factors which call for 
investing more than what price arbitrage optimisation would suggest. 
Lumpiness, long lead times and anticipation of generation investments 
could justify higher capacity than what is indicated by a pure price arbitrage 
calculation. 
Price convergence has important competition benefits as it allows to pool 
liquidity from a wider area. Trading with long term financial products 
requires stable price references. Nord Pool system price is the reference for 
the long term products in the Nordic market. EEX launched the price 
                                                 
75  Newbery, renewable integration workshop, 2010 
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reference European Electricity Index (ELIX) in October 2010. ELIX could 
become important for trading in the Central European market. The 
efficiency of these reference prices depends on how much the spot price in 
the individual price zones covered by the reference price differs from the 
reference price and what are the possibilities to hedge this price difference 
for example through Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs). Price 
convergence could thus be one criterion for infrastructure investments. To 
analyse the influence of cross-border capacity on price convergence, the 
method developed in this study is used. The results are shown in Figure 19. 
In Figure 19, the starting point of each brown bar shows the level of price 
convergence today and the length of the brown bar corresponds to the 
increase in price convergence when 100MW of cross border capacity is 
added.  In Figure 19 price convergence is expressed in percentage of full 
price convergence. The method assumes that the supply curves are linear as 
explained in Chapter 3.4. This results in a linear increase of price 
convergence when capacity is increased. Thus for example, 50% price 
convergence corresponds to the capacity level for the maximum congestion 
rent.  
The calculation shown in Figure 19 is based on increasing the capacity of 
one interconnection at a time, effects caused by other interconnections of 
the concerned countries are ignored. In reality all interconnectors have an 
influence on price convergence and should be taken into account in any 
detailed calculation. Also, the calculation shown in Figure 19 on price 
convergence has been made assuming that each country is a single price 
zone. This is not the case in Italy, Denmark, Norway and the UK which are 
divided into several bidding zones. However, for the purposes of this study 
aiming to give an overall view of price convergence, this simplification does 
not significantly change the results. To make the analysis more accurate, 
each bidding zone should be modelled separately. This step is left for 
further studies.  
One can make several interesting observations from Figure 19. Firstly, 
there is a systematic difference between interconnections inside Central 
Europe compared to interconnections connecting Central Europe with the 
regions in the outskirts of Europe. In Central Europe there is already a high 
level of price convergence which could be further increased with a relatively 
small increase of capacity. In particular Central Eastern Europe (excluding 
Germany and Poland) is composed of small systems which are sensitive to 
price influence from neighbours being thus good candidates for full price 
convergence. Better utilisation of the existing transmission capacity through 
market coupling will already increase convergence once the coupling is 
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achieved. This means that Central Europe, in particular Germany, will 
confirm its position as the price reference for the whole Europe. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Price convergence [%]
NO - NL
NO - DK
DK - DE
SE - DE
SE - DK
SE - PL
DE - NL
PL - DE
DE - FR
FR - BE
NL - BE
FR - UK
FR - ES
FR - CH
DE - CH
DE - AT
CZ - DE
PL - CZ
PL - SK
CZ - SK
SK - HU
CZ - AT
AT - HU
AT - CH
AT - SI
RO - HU
RO - BG
BG - GR
IT - GR
ES - PT
FR - IT
CH - IT
AT - IT
SI - IT
FI - SE
NO - SE
NO - DE
NO - UK
BE - UK
UK - IE
DK - NL
HU - SI
NL - UK
EE - FI
LT - SE
LT - PL
In
te
rc
on
ne
ct
io
n
Influence of existing capacity on price convergence
Influence of 100MW of additional capacity on price convergence
 
Figure 19 Influence of 100 MW of additional capacity on price convergence in European 
interconnections. The calculation method is presented in Appendix 1.  
 
Price convergence between the Central European market and the 
neighbouring regions, namely Northern Europe, the UK, the Iberian 
peninsula and Italy, does not seem realistic. The interconnection capacity 
needed for full price convergence is several thousands of MW which would 
be very costly at least with current transmission technology. This means 
that in the medium term, taking into account the current and planned 
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transmission network, these regional markets will still have an important 
price difference with Central Europe, and consequently a rather 
independent price formation.  
Increasing variable wind production will probably inverse the trend of 
increasing price convergence in Central Europe. Wind power already causes 
important price fluctuations between zones inside Central Europe. Thus 
wind power sets new requirements for both system operation and market 
design. This might require a review of the split of Europe into price zones to 
allow more efficient congestion management in the network. Smaller 
bidding zones distribute the overall price difference in smaller steps to an 
increased number of bidding zone borders and hence give more precise 
scarcity signals. This could improve significantly the utilisation of the 
current grid and could also have a big influence on the profitability and the 
optimal location of transmission investments. This proposal is further 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
3.14. Conclusion on targets and criteria for cross border 
investments 
From the discussion above it is difficult to draw a conclusion regarding the 
priority of targets for transmission investments. It seems evident that there 
is a hierarchy of targets similarly as humans need first shelter and food 
before they can concentrate on arts and sports. Technical targets come first, 
driven today by investments in renewable generation. These targets need to 
be met, otherwise generation investments are stranded. Price convergence 
and competition targets are important for efficiency but not to a similar 
extent vital for the functioning of the transmission system.  
Technical targets such as connecting each generator and load are 
addressed mainly at the national level. For interconnectors price arbitrage 
targets are more relevant. The rest of the study uses price arbitrage as the 
basis for analysing interconnector investments. However, based on the 
findings later in this study, also some observations are made on how 
technical targets should be taken into account when deciding on 
interconnector investments. 
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4. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE TARGETS 
AND CRITERIA FOR INTERCONNECTOR 
INVESTMENTS  
4.1. Introduction 
The discussion in Chapter 3 concludes that it is appropriate to use social 
welfare as the main criterion for interconnector investments. Security of 
supply and competition benefits of interconnector investments are 
important and part of the social welfare function even though they are 
seldom mentioned when social welfare is calculated. Probably the reason for 
this is that estimating these other benefits is more difficult than estimating 
price arbitrage benefits.  
The costs and benefits of interconnector investments are influenced by 
many factors. This chapter identifies the most important factors to be taken 
into account in investment decisions. Concrete examples on how these 
factors influence the decisions are presented in the empirical country by 
country analysis in Chapter 5.  
4.2. Influence of the capacity calculation and allocation 
method 
4.2.1. Capacity calculation 
 
Interconnection capacity calculation is a complicated matter. To agree on a 
bilateral Net Transfer Capacity (NTC)76 between two countries, only two 
TSOs are involved. If transmission capacities are defined regionally, the 
number of TSOs involved is already significant. 
One complication in the capacity calculation is the fact that 
interconnections are usually composed of several individual lines. The full 
thermal capacity of any line can only be used in special circumstances 
because of redundancy requirements.77 The N-1 rule requires that the 
                                                 
76  ETSO, transfer capacity definitions, 2001; NTC, Net Transfer Capacity, is a 
bilateral cross-border capacity value indicating the maximal commercial flow 
between two countries. 
77  DC lines can be loaded up to their full thermal capacity if the rest of the 
network can secure the breakdown of the line for example through 
redundancy in the AC network or through the reserve power arrangements at 
both ends of the line. This is important for the profitability of DC lines as the 
costs are relatively high. The situation becomes more complicated when high 
capacity DC lines will be added in parallel of the existing AC network. 
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network shall be able to face the breakdown of a single network element 
without supply interruption.  
Another complication in the capacity calculation is the inherent 
disconnection between commercial schedules and physical flows in the 
zonal price system. The maximum commercial schedules that can be 
allowed from network security point of view are calculated relying on 
simplified network models which treat interconnections as bilateral flow 
gates between price zones. A NTC value is calculated for each flow gate, this 
is the upper limit for a commercial schedule at that interconnection.  
The actual physical flow can differ radically from the commercial 
schedule, sometimes it is even in the opposite direction. This is due to the 
fact that each cross-border commercial schedule creates a whole pattern of 
physical flows spreading over several interconnections. This means that the 
capacity of those other interconnections will be affected as well even if one 
schedule appears commercially only in one interconnection. Thus the NTC 
value of an interconnection is dependent on the NTC defined for other 
interconnections in the region. 
To catch the whole pattern of power flows spreading in a meshed network, 
a system of Power Transmission Distribution Factors (PTDF) has been 
developed. PTDFs indicate how a commercial flow will be spread between 
each possible path between the price zone of origin and the price zone of 
destination. This approach helps to analyse which combination of 
commercial flows is optimal, with the possibility to set the overall social 
welfare as the objective function.78  
 
4.2.2. Capacity allocation 
 
Regarding capacity allocation, it is well known that the current methods 
used in many interconnections in Europe are not optimal even if there has 
been a lot of progress in recent years.79 There are still many 
interconnections which only use explicit auctions instead of more efficient 
implicit auctions.80 There are still interconnections without intra-day 
capacity allocation even if this has been required by the European 
legislation from the beginning of 2008.81  
                                                 
78  ETSO, co-ordinated auctioning, 2001 
79  EC, congestion management, 2002 
80  Frontier Economics and Consentec, congestion management methods, 2004 
81  EC, infringements, 2010 
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One of the main reasons why more efficient capacity allocation methods 
are not used is due to differences in national electricity markets. These 
differences make it difficult to apply methods which require a higher level of 
harmonisation. Another reason is the lack of liquid day-ahead spot markets 
necessary for implicit auctions.  
 
 
Figure 20 A tentative timetable for the day-ahead market coupling in Europe.82  
An advanced capacity allocation method called flow based capacity 
allocation has been developed by the TSOs.83 This method identifies critical 
network branches, independently whether they are at the borders of or 
within price zones, and uses the maximum flow allowed in these branches 
as the basis for managing the cross-border flows. With this method, 
capacity can be allocated more precisely and consequently the network can 
be used more efficiently without endangering the security of the network.84 
Flow-based capacity allocation with implicit auctions has been accepted as 
the target model for electricity cross-border trade.85 Figure 20 presents a 
time-table for implementing implicit auctions for day-ahead capacity 
allocation in Europe. Applying these methods will significantly improve the 
                                                 
82  EC, day-ahead market governance, 2010. In addition to country names, the 
following abbreviations have been used: BS= Baltic States, CWE = Central 
Western Europe, NE=Northern Europe, SW=South Western Europe, 
CSE=Central South Europe, CEE=Central Eastern Europe, SEE=South 
Eastern Europe, SEM=Single Electricity market (Ireland), MIBEL=Iberian 
Electricity Market, FUI=France, UK and Ireland, TLC=Trilateral market 
coupling (France, Belgium and the Netherlands). 
83  ETSO, vision congestion management, 2002 
84  Consentec, comparison between ATC and FB, 2008 
85  ETSO and EuroPEX, Flow based market coupling, 2004; AHAG 
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efficiency of interconnector utilisation as indicated by the reports of the 
European regulators, the French regulator Commission de Régulation 
d'Énergie (CRE) being the most active one in reporting on this topic.86 
Reasons for inefficiencies listed by CRE are (i) difficulty to anticipate the 
market situation day-ahead to make explicit auctions efficient, (ii) market 
imperfections at both sides of the interconnection and (iii) mismatch of 
long term products with the hourly resolution of interconnection capacity. 
Another source of inefficiency is the uncertainty on the exact location of the 
electricity produced and consumed. Sub optimally, this gives the TSO an 
incentive to use a higher security margin in the capacity calculation and 
allocation phase than what would be necessary if the location of generation 
and load was known more precisely. Also strategic behaviour of trading 
companies in the way they use or withhold interconnection capacity can be 
a source of inefficiency.87  
Network capacity calculation poses an important question of 
transparency. European legislation requires TSOs to communicate 
bottlenecks in order to enable the market to better understand how the 
network behaves in different situations. However, only in rare cases 
bottlenecks, at the borders or inside the control area, are published and 
made so transparent that even another TSO could share the congestion 
analysis and confirm the results of capacity calculation.88 This means that 
for an external observer without access to network models it is practically 
impossible to make a meaningful analysis on congestion patterns and 
whether the TSO manages the network in a neutral and efficient way, 
following requirements of the EU legislation.  
 
4.2.3. Influence of the difference between the commercial and physical 
flows 
 
As explained above, in an electricity market using zonal pricing, differences 
between the commercial schedules and the physical flows are inevitable. 
Some differences are because of the network topology, others are because of 
a deliberate choice made by the TSOs on the commercial capacity value at 
each border. The freedom of choice for the TSO is particularly high if the 
cross-border capacity limits are due to congestion inside the national 
network. This is usually the case for large countries such as France, 
                                                 
86  CRE, interconnection 2007, 2009; CRE, interconnection 2008, 2009; 
ERGEG, CWE, CS and SW report on 2008, 2010 
87  TUD, Zachmann, inefficiencies, 2009 
88  ERGEG, compliance monitoring report, 2010 
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Germany, Sweden and Poland, but also applies to many smaller countries 
such as the Netherlands and Austria as well.  
An example of the use of this discretion on commercial capacities are the 
France – Italy and France – Switzerland interconnections in which the 
commercial capacity is set to a very high level on a common agreement 
between the countries involved. Another example is the Austria – Germany 
interconnection which is declared to have unlimited capacity. The German 
internal North – South flows are a further example of this discretion as 
there is no explicit limit to these flows even if they are heavily using the 
networks of the neighbours.89 These unilateral or bilateral decisions by the 
TSOs create problems regarding an objective allocation of cross border 
capacity. There is usually no publicly available information which would 
enable to judge whether these unilateral or bilateral decisions can be 
justified based on underlying fundamentals. None of the above mentioned 
countries are transparent regarding the internal bottlenecks or the 
bottlenecks towards the partner country. 
There are several places in Europe where the difference between 
commercial and physical flows has a strong influence on transmission 
investments decisions, in particular when transporting electricity long 
distances. The most important transmission axis in Europe is from North to 
South and is used here as an example to illustrate this phenomenon.  
In the North-South axis, surplus electricity flows first from Norway and 
Sweden to South mainly through Denmark, partly using DC links. In 
Northern Germany this electricity joins the wind surplus electricity 
produced locally and in the North Sea. This combined surplus travels more 
than 1000 km to Southern Germany and Northern Italy using the Central 
European AC meshed network. The electricity flow uses all possible 
transmission paths, namely the direct path through Germany and 
Switzerland but also the side paths. In the West the side path goes through 
the Netherlands, Belgium and France and in the East through Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia. All these parallel 
transmission paths are under stress in high wind conditions. This is why all 
countries on the side paths of this North South dipole, except France, have 
complained about these parallel flows, often called loop flows. 
One important issue at the European scale related to these loop flows is 
that the method applied by the TSOs for congestion management does not 
yet take sufficiently into account the interregional commercial and physical 
flows. TSOs still apply bilateral NTC values allowing nominations of 
                                                 
89  EWIS, European Wind Integration Study, 2010 
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commercial capacity in a chain which potentially deviates considerably from 
the physical path used by this commercial flow. To improve the situation, a 
flow-based capacity allocation system has been developed but not yet 
applied in Europe.90 
 
 
Figure 21 The difference between yearly average physical and commercial flows and the 
estimated monetary value of that difference in 2008 in Central Europe. A positive value of 
the difference, expressed in TWh, means that there has been more physical flows than 
commercial flows. The arrows indicate the prevailing direction of commercial flows.91  
If the commercial flow is higher than the physical flow, the country wins 
as the congestion rent is based on the commercial flow but the costs are 
based on the physical flow. If the physical flow is higher than the 
commercial flow, the country is on the losing side. Figure 21 illustrates the 
difference between commercial and physical flows in the interconnections 
in Central Europe in 2008. The estimated positive or negative monetary 
value of this difference for each interconnection based on the congestion 
rent at that interconnection is also shown. The sum of these differences is 
                                                 
90  TSOs are working on a European capacity calculation system in the 
framework of Capacity calculation Working Group of Ad Hoc Advisory 
Group, initiated by the Florence forum. 
91  The value given in the picture indicates the yearly average net difference 
between physical and commercial (nominated) flows in 2008 and the 
estimated commercial value of the net difference (potential congestion rents 
not received or received in excess) based on the congestion rent collected at 
the same interconnection in 2008. For commercial and physical schedules 
data from Entsoe.net is used for the calculation. 
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calculated for each country, taking into account half of the value at each 
interconnection, assuming that the benefit or loss is shared equally between 
the two countries. This is justified as the benefit or loss is realised as an 
increase or decrease in congestion rents which are usually shared equally 
between the two TSOs. 
In Figure 21 the influence of the North-South dipole is clearly visible.92 It 
seems also evident that the flows from North to South are over 
proportionally nominated through the Central Western Europe and under 
proportionally through the Central Easter Europe. This explains why France 
is the biggest winner regarding the difference between commercial and 
physical flows, the biggest loser being the Czech Republic together with 
other countries on the Eastern path. 
The TSOs' data portal Entsoe.net contains for some countries information 
about the difference between commercial and physical flows. The way the 
information is presented is symptomatic regarding the importance of this 
issue. Ironically, instead of relaying the true picture of the situation as in 
Figure 21, the information is presented with such an aggregation that the 
difference between commercial and physical flows is practically not visible.  
The difference between commercial and physical flows and all 
uncertainties linked to this issue can seriously hamper cross-border 
investments. If an investment which would be beneficial for the European 
welfare does not benefit the investing country either through an increase of 
capacity at its own borders or through an increase of congestion rents, or 
through any other form of compensation such as increased inter-TSO 
compensation revenues, it is clear that there is little motivation for 
investing. In order to unblock the situation perhaps more innovative 
approaches are needed, including opening up transmission investments for 
other companies than TSOs. Economic theory has addressed similar issues, 
for example in papers on social cost by Coase.93  
This question of sharing of welfare and investment burden between 
countries is already acute and is becoming more and more important 
because of the investments needed for the integration of the increasing 
wind power in the European transmission system. The reaction of ČEPS, 
the Czech TSO, to the EWIS study is highly recommended reading for 
anybody interested in this topic.94 It illustrates in concrete terms what kind 
                                                 
92  The graph does not include the Nordic countries, even if they are part of the 
North-South dipole, because most of the connections are DC lines in which 
there is no difference between physical and nominated commercial flows. 
93  Coase, The problem of social cost, 1960 
94  CEPS, comments of EWIS study, 2010 
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of national interest elements are at stake, both regarding sharing of costs 
between countries and regarding the influence of cross border flows on the 
need to limit the access of domestic generators and consumers to the 
network.  
 
4.2.4. Technical versus commercial solutions to the loop flow problem 
 
The uncertainty of the benefit for an individual TSO for its investment calls 
for a European approach in planning, financing, operating and sharing the 
costs and benefits of the common network. Figure 22 gives a schematic 
example on how important co-ordination of investments is at the European 
scale. The picture illustrates the challenge of adding new lines in a meshed 
alternative current network with resemblance to the situation of the North 
– South dipole in which many countries are involved.  
 
 
Figure 22 Options to increase capacity of a transmission path in a meshed AC network.95  
Figure 22 shows how the overall capacity is limited by the weakest line in 
the system. In Case 1, adding a new line to the system results in a relatively 
small increase in the overall commercial capacity as there is a weak line on 
the parallel path. This is because the maximum flow in the system is 
determined by how much electricity can be transported in a situation when 
the strongest line is not in operation. This is the consequence of applying 
the N-1 rule. To increase capacity from Case 1, it is efficient to upgrade the 
weak line as illustrated by Case 2a. The TSO can also invest instead in a 
phase shifter on the weakest line as in Case 2b. Phase shifter transformers 
                                                 
95  It is assumed that all parallel lines have the same impedance and N-1 rule is 
respected. Individual capacities of the lines are thermal capacities. 
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are able to increase the impedance of lines, thus it deviates physical flows to 
the other parallel lines. Phase shifters can thus be efficient in alleviating the 
flow in one line but they tend to shift the problem to the other lines. In the 
example, the line upgrade, Case 2a, results in a higher overall capacity than 
when installing a phase shifter, Case 2b.  
Countries on the side paths of the North-South dipole have already taken 
action against loop flows. Belgium has invested in three phase-shifting 
transformers thus pushing part of the electricity back to Germany. Poland 
has refrained from reinforcing interconnectors with Germany as this would 
attract more loop flows and might further endanger the safe operation of 
the Polish grid. Instead, the Polish TSO will install a phase shifter at the 
existing interconnector with Germany. Slovenia has invested in a phase 
shifter at the Italian border and the Czech Republic has considered 
installing them. 96 
One idea to solve the North-South dipole issue is to bridge it with DC 
technology.97 This would indeed be interesting as DC solutions are capable 
of transporting big volumes long distances. However, for building a meshed 
DC network on top of an existing AC network some technical challenges still 
exist, such as development of a protection and control strategy for a 
combined AC and DC network and development of DC circuit breakers. If 
appropriate solutions to these challenges are found, using a DC overlay 
network seems to be a promising way to develop the European transmission 
system in the future.98 
There are also commercial solutions to the loop flow problem. The main 
solution is to influence the generation dispatch in such a way that loop flows 
are avoided. This would mean that some generators in Northern Germany 
will be turned off when the production from wind is high. To make this 
happen in a market based manner, Germany should probably be divided 
into several bidding zones along the North-South axis, with a limited 
capacity between zones. Even nodal pricing could be envisaged. The 
disadvantage of this commercial solution is that it would reduce the 
pressure on the TSOs to make optimal network investments. It would be a 
poor man's solution to survive day by day with a weak grid with potentially 
important welfare losses due to congestion. 
                                                 
96  CEPS, comments on EWIS study, 2010 
97  Amprion, Kleinekorte, DACH 2010, overlay grid, 2010 
98  GIGRE, Bergen conference documents, 2009  
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4.3. Influence of the congestion management method chosen 
4.3.1. Congestion management inside a control area 
 
If a TSO can guarantee free dispatch of generation and load in its control 
area, the control area forms a single price zone as explained in Chapter 2. In 
a singe price zone every generator and load has the same market price. 
Historically, transmission networks have been stronger inside control areas 
than between control areas. This has lead to a situation where most control 
areas form a single price zone. However, some price zones include several 
control areas. Germany has a single price zone in spite of four control areas. 
Additionally, Austria has declared to be part of the single price zone of 
Germany. The Czech Republic and Slovakia as well as the island of Ireland 
have also formed a common price zone, each of the zones including two 
control areas.  
If there are transmission constraints inside a control area, the TSO has 
three possibilities to act. Firstly, the TSO can redispatch generation, in some 
cases also load, to relieve congestion. This means that the TSO pays 
separately for some generators to produce more or to produce less, or 
analogously it pays some consumers to consume more or to consume less. 
The generators and loads to be redispatched need to be chosen in a way that 
the redispatch relieves congestion, more generation in the deficit areas and 
less generation in the surplus areas, for the load vice versa.  
As a second possibility, if redispatching is not enough, the TSO can split 
the control area into bidding zones. By defining how much electricity can 
flow between the newly created bidding zones, the TSO can manage the 
congestion exactly as described above for cross-border flows. Evidently, 
there will be a different price in each bidding zone when there is congestion 
between zones.  
Network constraints have already forced some countries to split the 
control area into several bidding zones. In Norway there are up to five 
bidding zones, Italy has six bidding zones and the UK two bidding zones, 
namely Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In Italy bidding zones are used 
to give geographically differentiated price signals only to generation units. 
For load, prices are averaged for the purposes of equal treatment of 
consumers and for facilitating the retail market. Thus Italy is a single price 
zone from the end consumer's point of view. A negative consequence of this 
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price equalisation is that it does not provide incentives for the consumers in 
high price zones such as Sicily to attract power plant investments. 99 
As a third possibility for the TSO to relieve congestion inside the control 
area is to reduce cross-border capacities offered to the market. It is 
worthwhile to note that EU law prohibits excessive limitation of cross-
border capacity to defend the integrity of the price zone because limiting 
cross-border capacity usually favours market players inside the price zone 
compared to the ones outside the zone. Limiting cross-border capacity is 
allowed for temporary actions needed for reasons of operational security or 
for actions which can be justified based on cost-effectiveness and 
minimisation of negative impacts on the internal market in electricity.100 On 
this issue Danish consumers complained about the behaviour of the 
Swedish TSO claiming that the Swedish TSO Svenska Kraftnät 
discriminates Danish consumers by reducing cross-border capacity at the 
Swedish – Danish border.101 The Swedish case was solved by the 
commitment of Svenska Kraftnät to introduce in Sweden four price zones in 
2011, to use more redispatching before the price area splitting is effective 
and to solve the congestion in the longer term by investing in new 
transmission lines. Other similar cases have been raised in the context of 
infringements against Member States because of non compliance with 
Regulation 1228/2003 on cross border trade of electricity and with 
congestion management guidelines.102 
The split into price zones does not mean that each price zone has always a 
different price than the other zones. In periods when there is no congestion 
the prices converge. Only when congestion appears, there is a price 
difference between zones. For example in the Nordic market there are price 
zones which share prices more than 90% of the time. 
It is not easy to evaluate in which cases it is still possible to keep a single 
price zone through redispatching and when a split into several bidding 
zones is necessary. Regarding redispatching, it is difficult to make a 
transparent system to optimally select the generators to be redispatched. 
                                                 
99  Redispatching has been raised as a temporary solution for Sicily before a new 
line under the Messina strait has been built. A proposal is made to virtually 
mix some generation bids from cheaper price zones to Sicily even without 
having the underlying transmission capacity, and then redispatch some 
generators in Sicily. In this way the overall payments to Sicilian generators 
could be reduced. MF, virtual transmission lines, 2010 
100  Regulation EC/714/2009 of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the 
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity  
101  SVK, commitment, 2010 
102  EC, infringements, 2010 
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Redispatching also invites the units which expect to be redispatched for 
gaming. Texas introduced nodal pricing partly because of the risk of 
gaming.103 Regarding price zone splitting, decisions on the limits of the 
zones may have distributional effects which could make it difficult to get the 
necessary political support for these decisions. The generators in the price 
zone with a lower price after the splitting will suffer as well as the 
consumers in the price zone with a higher price. Smaller price zones could 
also affect retail markets as an increase in market power could reduce 
competition and make risk hedging more difficult.104 
As price zone splitting decisions have radical consequences on the market, 
TSOs seem to use limiting cross-border capacity to avoid price zone 
splitting even if cross-border capacity limitation to manage internal 
bottlenecks is against the European rules. This limitation can significantly 
reduce the overall social welfare and in any case has important effects on 
distribution of welfare between the two countries involved. The Danish 
complaint against Svenska Kraftnät was mainly based on the important 
welfare loss for the Danish end consumers due to the limited cross-border 
capacity allocated by the Swedish TSO towards Denmark.105 
Another important factor is the timing of these measures. Price zone 
splitting is a structural measure which needs to be in place permanently or 
semi-permanently as applied in Norway. Cross-border trade limitations can 
be decided in a more flexible manner, latest before the day ahead capacities 
are announced to the market. At that stage the uncertainty of generation 
and load schedules is still relatively high. Redispatching is planned and 
operated closer to real time when there is a much better view on congestion.  
Redispatching costs give an indication to what extent the network is 
supporting maintaining a single price zone. High redispatching costs would 
suggest that splitting into several bidding zones should be considered. Table 
4 gives an estimate of redispatching costs in some control areas in Europe. 
It is very difficult to get comparable information on redispatching costs, 
thus Table 4 is not complete and shall be considered as indicative only. The 
TSOs and regulators should work on publishing relevant information on 
this important topic. 
 
                                                 
103  PUCT, impact assessment, 2008 
104  Fingrid, price areas in Finland, 2009 
105  Copenhagen Economics, capacity limitations, 2006 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                  Factors that influence the targets and criteria  
63 
Table 4 Costs of redispatching in selected EU Member States.106  
Control 
area 
Redispatch-
ing costs in 
year 2008 
[M€] 
Remarks 
Austria  APG 24 M€107 Redispatching costs have decreased after 2008 due to 
completion of the 400kV ring in the East. 
 
Belgium 3.6 M€107 Phase shifters are important for keeping the cross-
border flows in control and to avoid internal 
bottlenecks. 
 
Finland 1 M€108 These costs are used for countertrading between 
Sweden and Finland, not for internal bottlenecks. 
 
France 40 M€107 RTE has a contract with EdF which allows decisions on 
dispatching of nuclear generation taking into account 
the network constraints. Redispatching is applied both 
to manage internal bottlenecks and to guarantee cross-
border capacity. 
 
Germany – 
sum of costs 
for all four 
TSOs 
45.6 M€107 109 The figure does not include the costs for redispatching 
in cases when the German legislation allows 
redispatching without compensation to redispatched 
units. 
 
 
Italy 
 
85 M€107 
 
These redispatching costs are used for redispatching 
inside Italy to guarantee the cross-border capacity at 
the Northern border. There are additional redispatching 
costs due to managing of internal bottlenecks in Italy. 
  
Sweden 4 M€110 Limiting cross border capacity at Southern 
interconnectors has been used to keep redispatching 
costs relatively low. 
 
UK 263 M£ (about 
300 M€)111 
263 M£ constraint costs in the financial year 2008 – 
2009. 
 
Investigating redispatching costs only does not give a reliable picture on 
whether bidding zones are appropriately defined because reducing cross-
border capacities is a common way to reduce redispatching costs as 
                                                 
106  Redispatching costs are not always published. A reason for this might be that 
as TSOs need to provide redispatching from the market they are not willing to 
disclose how much they have to pay for it for commercial reasons. In 
Germany redispatching costs are considered as politically sensitive 
information because it is linked to the definition of price areas and to the 
priority dispatch and subsidies for wind generation. 
107  ERGEG, CWE, CS and SW report on 2008, 2010  
108  Source: Fingrid 
109  TUD, Waniek et al, redispatching, 2008 
110  EMI, price zones in Sweden, 2007; The figure is an estimation of average 
redispatching costs based on historical data. 
111  Source: National Grid 
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explained above. For this reason, the amounts used for internal 
redispatching remain generally small and usually are only a fraction of the 
congestion rents collected from interconnectors. TSOs do not generally 
provide information on what basis it is decided when to use redispatching 
and when cross-border trade is reduced.112 
If the critical network elements are inside the national network, there is 
often a wide set of possible commercial cross-border capacity combinations 
that are feasible. Thus the TSO can decide at which interconnection it limits 
the capacity. By analysing duration curves of available cross-border 
capacities one could get an idea how often the TSO limits cross-border 
capacity for congestion management purposes. 
If there are three short term solutions for a TSO to manage congestion 
discussed above, namely redispatching, splitting the price zone into bidding 
zones and limiting cross-border trade, the long term option is naturally to 
build more transmission capacity. The investment signal for infrastructure 
building for a TSO is dependent on which one of these three short term 
options is used. When using redispatching, the TSO could try to reduce 
redispatching costs by strengthening the transmission network at the 
internal bottleneck. When using curtailing cross-border capacity, there 
might be no incentive for the TSO to do anything if this limiting of cross-
border trade increases congestion rents.113 Splitting the control area into 
bidding zones will generate congestion rents from inside the control area. 
This could reduce interest in investing in the network. To put the choice of 
the congestion management method into perspective, the benefits or 
disadvantages of smaller bidding zones for the network operation is 
probably a far more important factor for the TSO than a possible increase or 
decrease in congestion rents. 
To achieve the necessary investments in the grid for a well functioning 
market it is very important that the regulator gives the TSO proper 
incentives and does not focus only on limiting the costs and profits of the 
TSO.114 In general reducing congestion will require investments both within 
and at the borders of the price zone. Thus interconnector investment 
calculations need to take into account also the necessary internal 
transmission line investments. 
                                                 
112  SEA, handling of bottlenecks in Sweden, 2005 
113  However, in other cases, depending on the level of price convergence, 
increasing interconnection capacity might increase the income for the TSO as 
discussed in Chapter 4 and would thus give an incentive to invest.  
114  The EU 3rd internal market package includes this task for the national 
regulators in Electricity directive 2009/72/EC Art.36 (c). 
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4.3.2. Locational signals and optimal size of price zones 
 
Zonal pricing gives an important signal for the investors where to locate 
generation plants. Zonal pricing promotes generation investments in high 
price zones. The system of zonal pricing has, however, an inherent flaw 
regarding locational signals. It will not use the transmission system as 
efficiently as a system with a finer geographical resolution such as nodal 
pricing. In the zonal system, generators close to the border of a 
neighbouring zone with a lower price are favoured as they get a higher price 
than they objectively should, seen their use of the transmission network. 
Similarly, generators close to the border of a high price neighbouring zone 
are disfavoured as they just get the price of their own zone.  
In large price zones this price zone flaw is more important than in small 
price zones. Large price zones are thus in conflict with the scarce nature of 
transmission capacity. This is true in particular if there is an important 
surplus of generation or load in some locations inside a large price zone, for 
example due to fuel resources or due to concentration of population or 
industry. Inside a single price zone neither generators nor an end consumer 
have an economic signal to behave according to the transmission 
constraints because all generators and consumers respond to the same 
market price.  
It is generally considered that large price zones are more beneficial for 
retail competition than small zones, as there are more market players in a 
large zone. Small zones have usually less market players and require more 
effort in market surveillance. However, it has been proven that market 
power is linked to physical properties of the network and not to the size of 
the price zone.115 If a generator is necessary for the secure dispatch of the 
system because of network constraints, it can potentially abuse its position 
in spite of the existence of other generators in the same price zone. 
A single price zone is the preferred solution for many countries including 
big countries such as the UK, France and Germany. In these countries it has 
been considered as an important basic right for citizens that every generator 
and final consumer is equally treated independently of their geographical 
location in the country.  
Particular attention to this issue of lack of locational signals in big price 
zones has been given in Germany. The single price zone of Germany does 
not incentivise locating new generation investments to the generation 
deficit areas in the South but most investments are planned to be located in 
                                                 
115  Bye and Hope, market power due to network constraints, 2005 
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the Northern harbours where there is already a surplus due to wind 
generation.116 German market participants have been hesitant even to think 
about splitting the country into bidding zones as the outlook for 
competition in smaller zones allegedly would be worse than in the single 
German price zone. However, discussion on splitting Germany into bidding 
zones and on other methods such as nodal pricing has already started.117 
The Central Western European regulators have agreed to make a regional 
study on optimal bidding zones. This study will probably constitute a real 
laboratory for analysing national and company interests, starting from the 
terms of reference, through input received from stakeholders, to 
interpreting the results. For example, concentrated interest groups such as 
generation companies or retailers might be better equipped than dispersed 
tariff payers for providing a good quality input for the study to achieve the 
result they prefer.118 
In some countries, instead of splitting the country into bidding zones, 
other locational signals are applied. The UK utilises grid access tariffs which 
are modulated based on demand and supply balance in each area, high 
access tariffs for generators in surplus areas and low, even negative tariffs in 
deficit areas, and vice versa for loads. Also Norway and Sweden have 
locational access tariffs. Norway even applies an hourly modulation of the 
losses component of the access charge. For Norway and Sweden these 
measures are additional to the bidding zone split. For Great Britain it 
remains to be seen whether network investments can be done fast enough 
so that the modulation of grid access tariff and redispatching will allow 
maintaining the single price zone in the future or whether a splitting of the 
single price into bidding zones becomes necessary. 
Locational connection and access tariffs are an interesting way to promote 
building generation and consumption units in places which are beneficial 
for the grid. There are, however, serious design issues linked to these 
locational tariffs, such as for how long time the tariff remains fixed, what 
happens if a new plant is built in the neighbourhood or how the tariff is 
changed when the flow patterns change. A volatile system of locational 
tariffs can be an important source of uncertainty for the investor. Locational 
                                                 
116  Frontier Economics and Consentec, locational signals, 2008; BNA, decision 
on redispatching, 2008; TUD, Dietrich et al, location of power plants, 2010 
117  Consentec and Frontier Economics, German bottlenecks, 2008; German 
TSOs, Regionenmodell « Stromtransport 2012 », 2008; RWTH, IEAW, 
Mirbach, DACH 2010, German price zones, 2010; EC, Florence forum 
conclusions June 2010, 2010; DENA, grid study II, 2010  
118  Becker, pressure groups, 1984 
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tariffs can distort the market if they are applied locally without taking into 
account the need for European investment signals. 
Transmission network congestion will increasingly constrain dispatch in 
the future. Power flows from wind power including off shore wind 
generation in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea reserve a growing share of 
network capacity. For this reason good locational signals for both short 
term dispatch decisions and long term investment decisions for locating 
new generation are very important. Thus in the future there will probably be 
smaller bidding zones in Europe and even a certain level of harmonisation 
of the size of these zones.  
To design price zones, at least five criteria should be used. Firstly the 
bidding zone borders need to align to the physical congestion points of the 
network. Secondly, one needs to take into account the existing bidding 
zones and the already decided changes to them such as the splitting of 
Sweden into four zones. This might not be in all cases ideal but defining 
price zones just based on technical parameters is not very realistic due to 
political considerations. Thirdly, the bidding zone split needs to take into 
account the extreme generation deficit areas such as Brittany and Bucharest 
where a separate bidding zone would attract more efficiently new power 
plants. Fourthly countries with important wind power development, namely 
Germany and the UK, need to be split into bidding zones perpendicularly to 
the direction of the wind power flow to allow a gradual, stepwise price 
increase from the wind surplus zone to the main consumption areas. Finally 
areas which potentially reach full price convergence independently of 
country borders should be merged into a single bidding zone.  
The author's view on future bidding zones in Europe applying these five 
basic criteria is presented in Figure 23.   
A decision to split large price zones into several bidding zones 
fundamentally affects price formation inside the country creating high price 
and low price areas. This makes the decision highly political and is certainly 
subject to national and company interests. Generation companies are not 
keen to see their assets situated in bidding zones with potentially low prices, 
which could be the reason why vertically integrated TSOs are very hesitant 
to accept price zone splits.  Decisions on bidding zones have also direct 
consequences on price formation in the neighbouring countries.  
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Bidding  zones for Europe 
1 Belgie & France du Nord 23 Magyar 
2 Bretagne 24 Mallorca 
3 Bucureşti 25 Malta 
4 Czech 26 Nederland 
5 Danmark Vest 27 Norge Mellan 
6 Deutschland Nord 28 Norge Nord 
7 Deutschland Ost & Śląsk 29 Norge Syd 
30 Österreich 
8 
Deutschland Süd, Alsace, Lorraine, 
Schweiz, Tyrol & Vorarlberg 31 Polska centralna 
9 Deutschland West & Letzeburg 32 Portugal & Galicia 
10 Eesti, Latvija & Lietuva 33 Romania 
11 England Middle 34 Sardegna & Corse 
12 England North & Scotland 35 Sicilia 
13 England South 36 Slovenija 
14 España 37 Slovensko 
15 France Centre & Suisse 38 Suomi 
16 France Sud 39 Sverige Mellan 
17 Ireland 40 Sverige Norbotten 
18 Island 41 Sverige Nord 
19 Italia Centro Nord 42 Sverige Syd & Danmark Ost 
20 Italia Centro Sud 43 Ελλαδα  
21 Italia Nord, Svizzera & Cote d'Azur 44 Κύπρος 
22 Italia Sud 45 България 
 
Figure 23 The author's proposal for future bidding zones in Europe.119  
                                                 
119  EC, Supponen, DACH 2010 Munich, 2010; Senat, Billout et al, security of 
French electricity supply, 2007 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                  Factors that influence the targets and criteria  
69 
For example if Germany is split into several bidding zones, the Austrian 
price will align to the new Southern German price instead of today's pan-
German price which will disappear. It is also probable that splitting 
Germany into bidding zones would oblige some of the neighbours to 
introduce bidding zones as well. Thus any decision to change price zone 
structure in a country should take into account the influence on other 
countries.  
Splitting Europe into smaller bidding zones does not mean that every 
bidding zone should have a very different price of electricity. Final 
consumers have usually contracts which are linked to electricity traded via 
long term financial products. These financial products are not directly 
following hourly spot prices but a longer term average of them. This means 
that even if in short periods there might be important price differences 
between bidding zones in a region, the long term average prices in these 
bidding zones can be close to each other. Thus, for the purposes of the 
financial products, Europe could be divided into much fewer geographical 
zones, for example into five zones as in Figure 24. The design of these five 
price zones is based on the analysis in Chapter 3 on price convergence. 
 
Northern Electricity Price Index
NEPI
Central Electricity Price Index
ČEPI
Wind Electricity Price Index
WEPI
Iberian Electricity 
Price Index 
IEPI Southern Electricity Price Index
SEPI
 
 
Figure 24 The author's proposal for future price index zones for long term trading of 
electricity in Europe. 
 
Figure 24 proposes for each zone an electricity price index which serves as 
the reference price for the long term financial products. Such indexes 
already exist, namely the system price of Nord Pool Spot and the newly 
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created ELIX price index by EEX. In bidding zones in which the spot price 
differs significantly from the reference price, this price difference can be 
taken into account in the contracts with the final consumer as an extra 
margin. In bidding zones close to the borders of the price index zones the 
price may correlate with two or more price indexes. In these cases hedging 
can be made by trading a mixture of long term financial products based on 
these indexes. 
An interesting price reference will be the Wind Electricity Price Index. The 
area covered by this index will have an important surplus production. This 
means that the price will be very low in windy periods and the price will 
align to the Central European level when there is no wind. This area will be 
a death zone for any fossil or nuclear generator, some gas fired power plants 
could survive paid by system service charges such as charges for balancing, 
reserve power and voltage control. 
 
4.3.3. Nodal pricing as the solution 
 
Many experts consider nodal pricing to be the best system for taking 
transmission constraints into account in electricity markets.120 In nodal 
pricing the market price is calculated for every network node. In the case 
there is no congestion between two nodes, the price will be the same. If 
there is congestion, prices differ. The problem often mentioned in the 
context of nodal pricing is the fear of increasing possibilities for dominant 
players to manipulate the market. As many European price zones already 
have from a high to a very high market concentration level in the current 
zonal system, in a nodal system many nodes would have only one 
generation company connected. There is, however, evidence that nodal 
pricing would rather reduce the risk for market manipulation.121 It has also 
been questioned whether nodal prices provide a sufficiently stable signal for 
generation and transmission investments. 
As nodal pricing has not yet been thoroughly investigated in the European 
context, it is not proven that it would be worse regarding liquidity and 
market power than the current zonal system. In any case, nodal pricing 
should be kept on the agenda, in particular as transmission constraints 
seem to become worse in the future due to integration of wind power and 
due to increased difficulties to build new transmission assets. Wind power 
will cause more price volatility and congestion in the transmission network.  
                                                 
120  MIT, Joskow et Schmalensee, nodal pricing, 1983; Bruegel, Zachmann, Policy 
brief, 2010; KUL, Purchala et al, zonal market model, 2005 
121  Harvey and Hogan, nodal pricing and market power, 2000 
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Because of the short duration of extreme peak production situations, it is 
not thinkable that the transmission network is dimensioned to cover them 
without congestion. The inherent benefit of nodal pricing is to give efficient 
system operation signals which will be valuable in particular in these peak 
production situations. 
4.4. Influence of how benefits and costs are distributed 
4.4.1. Challenges in welfare optimisation and distribution 
 
When welfare optimisation is fully utilised, this can lead to a situation 
where a high price country such as Italy will attract import flows to such an 
extent that most of the capacity of the European network is used for 
bringing electricity to Italy. A similar situation could appear with the wind 
power flows from the North occupying most of the European transmission 
network. Even if the overall social welfare would be maximised, this creates 
a distributional effect which could be felt unfair by countries which have to 
offer most of their network for the benefit of another country. For example 
in Belgium the import and export capacity is sometimes strongly reduced 
because of wind power flows. This can have a big negative impact on price 
formation and is not easily acceptable neither for the TSO, regulator, 
government nor the market participants. For this reason the Belgian 
regulator has claimed minimum guaranteed interconnection capacities for 
Belgium in the context of the CWE market coupling.122  
One way to alleviate this problem could be to distribute congestion rents 
using a more sophisticated method based on the contribution of each 
control area to the commercial flows.123 Currently congestion rents are 
shared in most cases fifty-fifty between the TSOs at each side of the 
interconnection. Deviations from this rule have been applied in the Nordic 
market124, in the former auctions from Poland and the Czech Republic to 
Germany125 and between Switzerland and Italy. 126  
                                                 
122  Pentalateral forum 
123  Todem and Leuthold, congestion revenue distribution, 2006 
124  The Nordic market applied in the past a distribution key for congestion rents 
containing several parameters including the load in the country. Now the 
fifty-fifty rule is applied. 
125  German TSOs used to receive a higher share on congestions rents at these 
borders. 
126  Italy receives most of the congestions rents as Swiss generation companies 
still retain a major share of the interconnection capacity for their own use. 
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Moving to flow based capacity allocation will require a more refined 
method to allocate congestion rents. Methods have been proposed already 
and it is only a matter of agreeing between the TSOs and between the 
regulators on the distribution key.127 One proposed method is to distribute 
congestion rents according to the shadow price that flow based methods 
calculate for each interconnection. Simpler methods are also proposed, for 
example using physical or commercial flows in their relative or absolute 
form, comparing them to the NTC or to the thermal capacity.128 Perhaps an 
important precedent for congestion rent sharing will be the method used for 
the Central Western Europe flow based market coupling when it becomes 
operational. A method which uses as parameters the physical flows and 
capacities of interconnectors has been discussed.129 
 
  
Figure 25 The overall social welfare at maximum.  
Distribution of congestion rents becomes even more complicated when 
large price zones are split into smaller bidding zones. The split into bidding 
zones has an influence on congestion rent accrual. For example, if Germany 
is split into several bidding zones and the prices in the Northern and 
Southern German zones align with the neighbouring markets, important 
congestion rents will be generated at the internal bottlenecks inside 
                                                 
127  Todem and Leuthold, congestion revenue distribution, 2006 
128  Todem and Leuthold, congestion revenue distribution, 2006 
129  Pentalateral forum 
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Germany. This might not be the optimal outcome for example for Denmark, 
Sweden, Switzerland and Austria. 
 
4.4.2. Sharing of investment costs 
 
It is usual that both TSOs involved in an interconnector investment cover 
the costs in their own control area even if the costs and social welfare 
benefits for each TSO can be very different. The TSOs and the countries 
involved in an interconnector project will make their own assessment of the 
welfare gains. This might lead to a suboptimal investment pattern or to stop 
the project completely if there are not sufficient benefits for all parties 
involved. For any interconnector, in particular for subsea cables, the cost 
can be attributed deviating from the fifty-fifty principle. For example in the 
case of the interconnector between Ireland and Wales, the Irish cover the 
whole investment cost. By sharing the costs proportionally according to the 
benefits, both TSOs can be incentivised to join the project. The usual fifty-
fifty distribution of congestion rents could also be changed to balance the 
costs and benefits. This is not yet very common. 
 
4.4.3. ITC mechanism 
 
An Inter TSO Compensation (ITC) mechanism is provided by the European 
legislation130 to compensate countries through which electricity is transited. 
After a long debate, a simple method was adopted which compensates the 
network losses caused by transit flows and a reasonable share of the 
infrastructure costs. It was difficult to agree on many basic assumptions 
needed to establish the system, such as whether one can differentiate 
between a transit flow, supposed to pass through the country, and a pair of 
flows, one entering the country and another of the same size leaving it. It is 
common that the transit countries benefit from the transit flows through 
increased trading possibilities and through important congestion rents.  
The ITC mechanism yearly net compensation amounts ranged between 48 
– 70 M€ in the period 2002 – 2009 for the biggest net beneficiary 
Switzerland and between 48 – 75 M€ for the biggest net contributor 
France.131 Even if the compensation amounts in some cases can have an 
influence on the economics of an interconnector investment, they are far 
less important than the congestion rents. This means also that it is not 
                                                 
130  Regulation No 774/2010 2 September 2010 
131  EC, ITC consultation documents, 2008; Gustafsson and Nilsson, ITC 
mechanism, 2009  
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conceivable in normal cases to get an interconnector investment paid 
through the income from the Inter TSO compensation scheme. 
In spite of the fact that the current ITC system might not be perfect and it 
will not solve the issue of financing future European investments, it gives 
certainty for making investment decisions. For example the decision of 
Skagerrak IV cable between Norway and Denmark was probably delayed 
until the increase of the ITC payments for Norway due to this investment 
was known. 
 
4.4.4. Choice of counterpart 
 
Even if interconnector investments are by definition bilateral investments, 
the influence of them spreads in a meshed network to a wide area. 
Sometimes there are options for choosing the most interesting counterpart. 
This is true for example regarding the cables from Norway. For Norway to 
sell electricity to Central Europe through Denmark leaves an important part 
of the added value in form of congestion rent to the Danish and German 
TSOs. By building a link directly to the Netherlands or to Germany, a much 
bigger congestion rent is captured by the Norwegian TSO. 
Until now the possibility to choose the counterpart has existed mainly for 
undersea cable projects. In the future this question might become very 
important when planning the transmission investments needed for wind 
integration. Transmission corridors will span through several countries and 
they will be expensive, perhaps using more and more DC technology. TSOs 
do not want to propose new lines through countries that would unduly 
profit from congestion rents without investing in a proportionate manner 
themselves. A caricature situation would be to build a European North-
South link from Norway to Italy with Switzerland tolling the congestion 
rent, a situation that already exists today in the current AC network. 
  
4.4.5. Third countries with different rules  
 
The European electricity system is subject to the EU legislation on the 
internal electricity market. There are, however, countries connected to the 
system which are not bound to this legislation. Switzerland is in the middle 
of the European transmission system as an important transit country, 
Russia and Ukraine export to the EU, Morocco mainly imports from the EU.  
Russia and Ukraine have maintained their export monopoly. An export 
monopoly can always sell at the EU market price as there is no competition 
on these exports. Switzerland is a rather similar case. For the transmission 
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capacity towards Italy, which is the most lucrative export direction, Swiss 
supply companies retain most of the transmission rights. 
In all these cases companies receive monopoly rents from the exports. If 
there was competition for the export capacity, the TSOs would receive the 
price difference as congestion rents from the interconnection. Thus it is 
mainly in the interest of the monopoly exporter to invest in new 
transmission capacity, a situation existing for example for the merchant line 
projects between Italy and Switzerland. These projects try to capture the 
potential congestion rent into the developers’ pockets instead of these rents 
going as income to the regulated TSO.  
4.5. Influence of flaws in price formation 
4.5.1. Regulated prices 
 
Price for electricity supply is not determined in all European countries 
through a market even it should be the case according to the European 
legislation. Many governments still maintain regulated prices in order to 
prevent the incumbent dominant player from increasing the prices to a 
politically unacceptable level. 
 
 
                          Figure 26 Vicious circle of regulated prices. 
In most cases regulated prices create a negative incentive to build 
generation assets. The incumbent might be able to invest either invited by 
the government or hoping that it can influence the level of the regulated 
price and thus will be able to recover the investment costs in long term. For 
newcomers it is usually too risky to invest under these conditions.  
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Table 5 EU Member States applying regulated prices for electricity with the share of 
customers with regulated prices in each consumer group in 2010.132   
 
Country 
House-
holds 
Small 
businesses 
Medium to 
large 
businesses 
Energy 
intensive 
industry 
Bulgaria 100% 100% 98%   
Croatia 100%       
Cyprus 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Denmark 94% 95% NA NA 
Estonia Derogation Derogation 100% 100% 
France  96% 83% 94% 82% 
Greece 100% 100% 100%   
Hungary  100% NA     
Ireland 80% 52% 28%   
Italy 91% 78%     
Latvia 99% 99%     
Lithuania 100% NA     
Netherlands 100% 100%     
Poland 100%       
Portugal  92% 88% 39% 62% 
Romania 100% NA NA   
Slovakia 100% 100%     
Spain  91%       
Legend 
   >95 % of customers have regulated prices 
   >50 % of customers have regulated prices 
   >10 % of customers have regulated prices 
NA  Information not available 
 
When there are regulated prices, the export or import price is in most 
cases not linked to the regulated price. However, the export potential of the 
incumbent is usually limited because of a supply obligation to domestic 
consumers which reserves in practise the incumbent's generation portfolio 
for its national customer portfolio. Only if there is surplus electricity, 
incumbents are free to export this surplus and they can profit from the 
higher prices in the neighbouring markets.  
Regulated prices easily lead to a vicious circle, see Figure 26. The only 
sustainable way to keep the price level low is to have sufficient electricity 
production capacity with reasonable costs. This situation is almost 
impossible to reach with government tendering or if a monopolistic market 
prevails. Regulated prices are generally prohibited by the European 
legislation, with some exceptions for household consumers.133  
                                                 
132  ERGEG, regulated price report, 2010 
133  EU, court decision Federutility C-265/08, 2010 
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In the Table 5 the share of regulated prices in various consumer groups is 
shown for the EU countries which still apply regulated prices for electricity. 
Another potential distortion of electricity price is due to artificial 
distortion of fuel price, in particular of gas price. The price of gas can differ 
considerably between two neighbouring countries for example because of 
differences in gas market functioning or in fiscal treatment of gas. In these 
situations, instead of locating power plants close to the load, power plants 
are built where gas is at cheapest. This may require an electricity 
transmission line investment which would be avoided if artificial differences 
between countries in gas price were removed. Transporting gas is in most 
cases much cheaper than transporting electricity. 
 
4.5.2. Differences in transmission charges 
 
Network tariffs are in principle supposed to cover only network costs. In 
practise network tariffs are used for various policy goals. A recent paper 
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by Sakhrani and Parsons is 
good reading in this respect.134 In many countries network charges are used 
for collecting funds for supporting renewables or simply for filling the state 
budget. This additional burden usually takes place in the national context 
but it has also a cross border dimension. For example high grid tariffs for 
generators in one country penalise the generation companies in that 
country compared to their competitors in countries with lower grid tariffs.  
There is a big difference between the European countries in the way 
transmission costs are covered through grid tariffs. Costs vary also 
considerably, in some countries customers pay a cost related to the 
historical book value of the assets, in some other countries the transmission 
grid has been sold to investors and the charges are aligned to how much the 
investor is allowed to benefit from the investment. 
One difference regarding transmission tariffs is how charges are split 
between consumers and producers. In Central Europe there is a tendency to 
have low or zero generation charges, network costs are mainly covered by 
consumers. Opposing to this, the UK, the Nordic countries and Romania 
have maintained a substantial charge for generators and they are allowed to 
keep these charges even if for the rest of Europe a much lower upper limit 
for generation charges has been agreed upon.135  
                                                 
134  CEEPR, Sakhrani and Parsons, tariff design, 2010 
135  Regulation No 774/2010 2 September 2010 
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Difference in transmission charging is usually not an issue that affects 
interconnector economics. However, charging systems such as the past 
Triad-charging in the UK, based on winter peak conditions, could influence 
interconnector building as there is a risk for high charges to be paid by the 
interconnector. The UK is currently revising the transmission charging 
system.136 
 
4.5.3. Cross-border fees 
 
Some countries still apply cross-border fees even if they are prohibited by 
the European legislation. For this reason cross-border fees are often 
dissimulated as something else. Cross-border fees are usually meant to 
protect the market rather than to cover the investment costs of an 
interconnector. Cross-border fees are common in particular in the new 
Member States, for example Bulgaria and Romania apply them.137 Existence 
of cross-border fees changes the economics of interconnector investments 
making them less attractive for the potential users. 
 
4.5.4. Feed in systems and other forms of public support 
 
Capacity payments and other type of support schemes for power plants, 
providing a stream of revenues additional to the revenues from selling 
electricity in the market, can have an influence in interconnection capacity 
target setting. These payments and support schemes include a large variety 
of mechanisms such as payments to compensate availability of generation, 
feed in tariffs, top-up payments over the market price and direct investment 
subsidies. These payments are financed either through network tariffs, from 
separate electricity levies and taxes or directly from the state budget.  
Feed in tariffs and other forms of public support are a cornerstone to meet 
renewable electricity targets in Europe. They give investors a high level of 
certainty for the investment. There are several types of feed in tariffs 
accompanied with a varying level of priority regarding network access. The 
most important feed in systems from the transmission network point of 
view are the wind power feed in systems because the volumes are high and 
volatile and the transmission distance is often long. Support systems for 
wind power differ considerably depending on the country.  
 
                                                 
136  Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) is doing a Transmission 
Access Review. 
137  EFET, RO and BG cross-border fees, 2010 
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Figure 27 Correlation of spot price and wind production as percentage of installed capacity 
in Germany in 2009.138 
As an example, the German feed in system obliges the TSOs to buy the 
wind power at the feed in price and sell it through the spot market. Wind 
power has a strong influence on the market price as shown in Figure 27. 
Before 2010, selling of the wind power was handled by the trading 
companies of the vertically integrated TSOs which was not a very 
transparent arrangement.  
The German market has seen low, even negative prices during high wind 
periods. This phenomenon is called the merit order effect as wind power 
production reduces the marginal price of the system by pushing more 
expensive plants out of merit.139 This effect is important regarding both 
interconnector and generation investments. In markets in which a high 
share of investments is financed through feed in tariffs or other types of 
public support such as capacity payments, the wholesale electricity price has 
less influence on investment decision and can be significantly lower than in 
the neighbouring markets. Thus the country on the other side of the 
interconnector has the opportunity for getting cheap subsidised electricity 
by increasing interconnection capacity. This might, however, make its own 
generation investments non-profitable because of the cheap electricity 
imported from the neighbour.  
Even if the possibility to export and import subsidised electricity should 
increase economic efficiency, some level of harmonisation at the European 
level is needed on how investments are supported both for renewable and 
                                                 
138  Source: Amprion 
139  Pöyry, merit order effect of wind power, 2010 
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conventional power. Otherwise investment signals will become too varied 
creating an extra uncertainty for the investors. 
4.6. Influence of security of supply considerations 
The role of interconnectors regarding security of supply is not 
straightforward. In general interconnectors are beneficial for the secure 
operation of the network as a big system can better digest network incidents 
than a small system. However, if interconnectors are used to their limits, 
this can increase the risk for major disturbances as demonstrated by the 
black-out in Italy in 2003. For some countries interconnectors are vital for 
sufficient supply of electricity. Italy, the Netherlands and Finland are 
dependent on imports, at least for keeping the electricity price reasonable. 
Also Norway is dependent on imports in dry years. For small transit 
countries, namely Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia and Denmark, imports are 
necessary to counterbalance the volumes exported. 
Transmission investments are closely linked to generation investments. In 
a deficit area there is in principle always a choice between increasing cross-
border capacity and building more generation capacity. Interconnectors 
have one major advantage compared to generation investments, namely the 
possibility to flow power to both directions. This allows using the 
complementarities of the generation systems at both ends of the 
interconnector. Connections inside the Nordic region, connections from the 
Nordic countries to Central Europe and connections from Germany to 
Switzerland and to Austria are largely exploiting these complementarities. 
The major disadvantage of interconnectors compared to generation 
investments is that they do not produce any electricity and thus do not 
improve security of supply in situations when all generation assets at both 
ends of the interconnector are already in use. 
For an exporting country, increasing interconnection capacity often 
means reducing security of supply at peak load as the neighbour could 
attract power in times of scarcity by just letting the market price increase. 
This might be felt unfair, in particular in countries which have introduced 
capacity payments to maintain sufficient generation capacity. Capacity 
payments are usually financed from transmission tariffs and are to be 
considered as a public intervention to ensure security of supply.  
In case the share of imports is high, the need to provide reserve power in 
the own control area might be an obstacle to further development of 
interconnectors. According to the TSO rules, each TSO needs to be able to 
ensure that sudden interruptions of transmission lines, including cross 
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border lines, will not cause major disturbances. This question has been 
raised for example in the Netherlands140, in the aftermaths of the Italian 
black-out141 and in the context of the Finnish Government decision142 not to 
allow increasing the import capacity from Russia.  
There are past cases of using export restrictions in order to secure supply 
in the own country. Spain refused exports during the shortage of electricity 
in France in summer 2003. Similar cases of limiting exports exist also for 
example with France, Poland and Greece.  
The fact that interconnectors could secure supply in the uncertain future 
also might play in favour of interconnector investments and not only stop 
them. Electricity is such an important good that no government can afford a 
major failure in securing electricity supply. 
4.7. Influence of the transmission investment itself 
An interconnection capacity increase changes the investment signals for any 
future investment at this interconnection.143 The obvious effect is the shift 
of the operation point in the parabolic congestion income curve described in 
Figure 10. This means that a new investment also affects the congestion rent 
accrual for the existing capacity. 
A new investment influences the prices on both sides of the 
interconnector. As the price in the higher price zone will decrease, there is a 
reduced incentive to invest in new generation capacity in this zone. In the 
lower price zone, on the contrary, prices increase and thus there is an 
increased incentive to invest in generation. Thus any addition of 
interconnection capacity will in longer term potentially cause a further 
imbalance of generation capacity between these two price zones. 
There is no natural end to the development of this generation imbalance if 
there is a permanent advantage in investing in one price zone compared to 
the other. This advantage can be for example due to the availability of fuel 
or other resources, possibility to build nuclear power or difference in taxes 
or subsidies. Only linking generation and transmission investment signals 
could create a system which drives investments to an overall optimum. A 
similar result could be achieved by the TSO making a global welfare 
                                                 
140  ECN, reserve power in the Netherlands, 2003 
141  Terna reduced cross-border capacities after the black-out. 
142  TEM, United Power decision, 2006 
143  Pöyry and Thema Consulting, Nordic study on transmission investments, 
2010 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                  Factors that influence the targets and criteria  
82 
optimisation calculation including both generation and transmission 
investments. Interconnection capacity would be dimensioned according to 
the global optimum, not only taking into account the costs and benefits of 
transmission. It is, however, questionable whether TSOs have sufficient 
competence regarding generation investments and whether it is appropriate 
that TSOs do this kind of calculations as the results potentially influence the 
market. 
European wide, no method, except the price zone concept itself, has been 
used to link generation and transmission investment signals across borders. 
Internally in some countries methods have been used for this purpose, the 
most advanced example being the system used in Great Britain where the 
modulated generation and load access tariffs have been reasonably 
successful in driving the location of power plants and transmission 
investments. However, investments in renewables seem to override this 
former system in Great Britain. For new plants the TSO will be obliged to 
give access to the transmission network with a "connect and manage" 
principle which guarantees income for the generator even if possibly needed 
wider network reinforcements are not ready when the generator is 
connected.144 
Some TSOs publish how much there is available capacity for connecting 
new power plants in each grid area.145  This could become a more important 
tool in the future to avoid unnecessary transmission investments. Preferred 
locations could be promoted for example with lower connection charges.146 
This approach requires that the TSO is fully independent of any generation 
interests and that there is a full regulatory oversight in order to prevent 
discrimination between potential investors.147  
4.8.  Influence of opposition on transmission lines 
Transmission investments are often contested by the population living 
along the planned transmission path. This is perhaps the biggest obstacle to 
building new lines, and could be far more important than all the other 
influencing factors together. The gap between the current and the optimum 
                                                 
144  Connect and manage principle is a concept put forward by Ofgem in the 
Transmission Access Review following publication of the Energy White Paper 
in UK in 2007. 
145  RTE, annual report 2009, 2010 
146  In Norway reduced access charges are applied in some locations for the first 
15 years. 
147  Consentec, EWI and IEAW, security of German electricity supply, 2008 
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level of transmission capacity might well be explained by the difficulties to 
overcome local opposition. Even if this issue is of utmost importance, this 
study does not try to address it more in detail except to some extent in the 
empirical country by country analysis.  
 
 
 Figure 28 Monster mast.148 
4.9. Influence of uncertainty 
Interconnector investments usually take several years before they are 
completed counting from the date of the planning decision. Investments 
also have a long lifetime, it is normal to consider 25 - 40 years when 
calculating the profitability of a transmission investment. Uncertainty can 
stop projects as the cost and benefit calculation for such long time periods 
has a high level of uncertainty.  
                                                 
148  Norwegian press reported about "monster masts" planned for the 
transmission line crossing an arm of the Hardanger fjord. 
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As the benefits of an interconnector are dependent on many influencing 
factors as explained above, there is a need to find pragmatic tools to 
appraise the overall soundness of an interconnector investment. One 
approach is to use today’s generation and grid model and market outcome 
as the starting point. However, because of the long lifetime of transmission 
investments, it is necessary to have forward looking tools including 
scenarios to calculate their profitability. It is usually possible to estimate 
rather accurately the costs and it is possible to have a rough idea of the price 
arbitrage benefits of an investment. However, many other influencing 
factors discussed in this chapter are far more difficult to estimate. Thus the 
optimal capacity based on price arbitrage needs to be adjusted based on 
tacit knowledge taking into account these other factors. As the optimum is 
typically on a flat curve in this type of cases, an approach based on the TSOs 
setting the target for interconnection capacity for a reasonably long period, 
based on the combination of the best estimate of the welfare optimum by 
the TSOs and a judgement by the regulators using tacit knowledge, could be 
justified. Market participants including investors in generation would then 
have an improved certainty for their decisions.  
For this type of approach it is essential how the decision making regarding 
the target capacity level is organised. The TSOs do not have all the necessary 
knowledge themselves but they are dependent on the stakeholders. There 
are several ways how a consultation process could be organised to get the 
best out of the stakeholders' wisdom.149 
4.10. Proposal for a mechanism to redistribute the costs and 
benefits between countries 
The discussion above concludes that distribution of social welfare is an 
important element to be taken into account in interconnector investments. 
The welfare effects depend on several parameters such as price elasticity 
and variability of the market price in the markets to be connected. The 
effect can be very different on each side of the border, for example the 
increase in overall welfare for one country can be much higher than for the 
other.   
As already discussed above, there are several ways to readjust the welfare 
distribution between two countries if needed. Currently each TSO covers the 
costs in its own territory and the congestion rents are shared fifty-fifty. This 
does not necessarily make the investment equally desirable for both sides. 
                                                 
149  Surowiecki, Wisdom of Crowds, 2004 
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For bilateral cases rather simple solutions can be applied. Projects in which 
the benefits are spread regionally require a more sophisticated approach. 
Mechanisms to redistribute the costs and benefits between countries can 
be ex-ante or ex-post. An ex-ante mechanism is to adjust the share of 
project costs for each country in the investment phase. This approach is 
clear cut and efficient if the costs and benefits of the project can be 
estimated with reasonable accuracy. The approach is easy to apply if the 
main part of the investment is for example a DC undersea interconnector. 
The application is more difficult if one country would need to pay 
investments in another country. For the moment, within the EU, national 
tariff systems do not allow asset base investments in other countries. To 
address this challenge, a European transmission fee has been proposed for 
example by the Czech Government in order to finance investment needed 
for the European grid. Funds collected through this tariff could be used for 
example to finance projects in the Trans European Energy Networks 
framework instead of using the EU budget. In this way the amount of funds 
for these projects could be considerably increased. 
A result similar to readjusting cost allocation of individual projects can be 
achieved by agreeing on a package of projects involving several TSOs. In 
this case, instead of acting on participation in individual projects, one would 
act on the overall costs and benefits of the package. The package should be 
constructed in a way that makes all parties involved reasonably satisfied 
with the overall result. 
One of the problems of any ex-ante mechanism to redistribute the costs of 
an investment is the high level of uncertainty linked to the calculation of 
benefits. As discussed earlier, a scenario based approach is necessary to 
estimate the benefits. Calculations for a long time period based on scenarios 
can be very sensitive for example to the conditions of investment in 
generation capacity in each of the interconnected countries, to changes in 
the policy and regulatory environment and to changes in fuel prices. 
Mechanisms to redistribute costs and benefits require negotiations 
between TSOs for each individual project or for the package of projects. 
Even if negotiations as such might be an efficient way to find a solution, 
there is a risk of abuse of dominant position by a TSO. TSOs being in a 
monopoly position in their territory, some of them could try to blackmail 
other TSOs to get inflated benefits in case they are indispensable for the 
project. For example transit countries potentially could use their 
geographical position for this purpose. Thus it is important that the process 
of redistributing the costs and benefits of an interconnector investment is 
transparent and there is proper regulatory oversight on it. The same risk of 
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seeking over proportional benefits of course also exists at the level of 
regulators and governments.  
Continuous mechanisms, for example sharing congestion rents based on 
various welfare distribution parameters, allow readjusting the mechanism 
along the lifetime of the investment. The ITC mechanism is the currently 
existing continuous mechanism to redistribute costs and benefits of the 
electricity transmission system. It addresses network losses and a share of 
the past investment costs. The main weakness of the current ITC 
mechanism is that it does not provide sufficient incentives for new 
investments. 
When capacity allocation in a region is flow-based, a specific key is needed 
how to distribute the congestion rents. The distribution keys applied until 
now have not been published, there seems to be some mystery in how these 
keys are generated. This is probably because  congestion rents are an 
important source of income at least for some TSOs. One problem in basing 
welfare benefit redistribution strongly on congestion rents is the volatility 
and the potential dependence of the TSOs on these rents. If there is a fear 
that congestion rents are declining and this possibility is not properly taken 
into account in the regulatory system applied, the motivation of the TSOs 
for investing might be seriously affected.  
Based on the above discussion, it is proposed that a two-tier system is 
developed to redistribute costs and benefits targeting in particular new 
investments. This system should have an ex-ante part which is applied for a 
project or a package of projects in order to readjust if needed the share of 
investment costs attributed to each TSO. The criteria shall be transparent 
and agreed between regulators. The system should have also an ex-post part 
which will further readjust the share of costs and benefits for each TSO after 
the investments have been made. This ex-post system can be a development 
of the current ITC system, but with a more global view of the costs and 
benefits than in the current system. It should address all the main items of 
cost and benefit distribution discussed above, such as sharing of 
commercial capacity and congestion rents, in addition to the items already 
addressed in the current system, namely network losses and infrastructure 
costs.  
This study gives examples in Chapter 5 of the existing cases which have 
applied ex-ante reattribution of costs and benefits. It also gives indications 
that there are several potential transmission projects which would benefit 
from this reattribution. However, it remains to be seen for how many 
projects it is really necessary. It might be that for a large majority of the 
projects the old principle that each TSO covers the costs in its own territory 
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is sufficient. It is a well established principle, thus there needs to be good 
reasons to deviate from it. A more flexible mechanism to share costs and 
benefits might, instead of promoting investments, introduce in the 
negotiations arbitrary elements which potentially could delay agreeing on 
interconnector projects. 
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5. INTERESTS AND BEHAVIOUR OF TSOS 
REGARDING TRANSMISSION INVESTMENTS 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter a template for a country’s behaviour is developed, assuming 
that each country tries to optimise its own benefits. A similar template for a 
TSO's behaviour is developed in function of its ownership structure, the 
main principle being maximising the benefits for the owner of the TSO. It is 
then analysed whether the past and planned behaviour of the European 
countries and TSOs follows the templates.  
This template approach by definition undermines the influence of 
differences in the internal dynamic of the TSO organisations and in the 
attitude of the owners. Some TSOs can be more profit seeking, some others 
more overall welfare seeking. Also, there can be a big difference between 
TSOs in the risk attitude regarding investments.  
5.2. Expected influence of national interests 
Every government is interested in how much their consumers pay for 
electricity. In particular for energy intensive industry electricity costs are 
important for its competitiveness. In some countries there is a policy to 
keep household electricity prices low at least for lower income consumers. 
As cross-border trade has an influence on electricity prices, any 
interconnector investment will be judged based on how it affects prices. 
This means that in principle governments favour links to low price zones 
but are hesitant regarding interconnectors to high price zones as this will 
increase prices in their own country.  
A possibility to build enough new generation capacity with reasonable 
production costs in the home country is the key factor to keep the market 
price at a competitive level. If this possibility exists, the potential price 
increase due to increased exports can be compensated by building more 
generation capacity. This allows accepting building an interconnector 
towards a zone with a higher price.150 The increase in transmission tariff 
due to interconnector investments also might be an issue. A sudden 
increase in transmission tariffs might not be politically acceptable even if 
transmission costs are only a small share in the final consumer bills. Energy 
                                                 
150  Ward, resource nationalism, 2009; Halina Ward develops the concepts of 
producer and consumer country resource nationalism.   
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intensive industry is the most sensitive in this respect as the transmission 
tariff is in relative terms more important for their electricity bill than for 
other customer groups. 
Even if reasonable electricity prices can be considered as a general target 
for most governments, there are many other, sometimes conflicting targets 
which influence decisions on interconnectors. For example generation 
companies have often strong influence on government decisions, in many 
cases they are state owned. As low prices defer generation investments, 
generation companies in low price areas are major promoters of 
interconnectors. For them remaining in a generation surplus pocket reduces 
their profits and worsens the business case for future generation 
investments. Some governments might also consider low prices being 
harmful from the energy saving point of view. 
Thus there is a wide range of national interest issues which governments 
and regulators need to consider when making decisions on interconnectors. 
Important trade-offs need to be made between the overall increase of 
welfare and the distribution of welfare between  consumers and producers, 
both within and between the Member States involved. However, it is very 
difficult to avoid that there are negative effects for some parties.  
In some cases a clear win-win situation helps to motivate investments. For 
example the benefits of the common Nordic electricity market are largely 
based on complementarities of thermal and hydro power plants in the 
Nordic countries.  It would not be difficult to prove that both generators and 
consumers are winners in the common Nordic market for which 
interconnectors are a necessary condition. Perhaps the lower price level 
resulting from a well functioning market is not beneficial for the generation 
companies. However, as the profits are already quite high for the main 
generation companies in the Nordic countries using a lot of hydro and 
nuclear power, the risk of competition authority interventions and increase 
in taxes keep these companies interested in a well functioning market and 
proper interconnection. 
Interest for interconnector investments is clear for importing countries. 
Also countries which need to export their surplus to maintain a reasonable 
price level to attract new investments are interested in interconnectors. This 
is in particular true for wind power surplus. Other reasons to motivate 
interconnector building could be dependence on hydro power which obliges 
to take special measures to secure the supply in dry years. Small countries 
might want to mitigate the effect of lumpy generation investments by 
having a possibility to export temporary excess capacity of a new plant. 
Price stability can also be an important objective. Interconnections can 
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mitigate price volatility caused by fuel price variation, capacity shortages, 
wind spikes etc. For the Baltic States an important motivation for building 
interconnectors is to reduce dependence on the Russian system.151 
The influence of government decisions regarding final consumer prices 
can be analysed by comparing prices in different consumer categories. The 
end user price is composed of several components. Energy price is in most 
cases market based while all other components in the final electricity bill 
including the transmission and distribution tariff, charges, levies and taxes 
are administered price components. Figure 28 compares end user prices in 
Europe for two categories of customers, households and industrial 
consumers. Transmission tariffs are shown in the picture as well. For the 
comparison, prices are normalised by calculating the ratio of the household 
price, of the industry price and of the transmission tariff to the average spot 
price in the country. These ratios are then compared with the European 
average ratio. In this way it becomes clearer which customer groups are 
favoured and which ones are penalised for example through high taxation. 
Figure 29 shows how different electricity price ratios are between 
countries in Europe. The difference between customer groups within 
countries is also very visible. For example in France, Greece and Estonia 
industry is not burdened with additional charges, in fact in France industry 
pays less than the spot price for the entire electricity supply including the 
network costs. This indicates that competitiveness of big industry is a 
concern for these governments or that there is a regulatory capture.152 
Greece, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Estonia have comparatively low 
household prices. In the other end Denmark, Norway, Germany and 
Sweden have relatively high household prices. In all these countries taxes 
and levies on electricity are high. In Denmark household consumers pay the 
highest price in Europe. This indicates that probably the priority in 
Denmark is developing wind power and energy saving and not offering low 
prices to consumers.  
National interests are usually not a single interest but a combination of 
interests of various pressure groups. Energy policy decisions including 
decisions on interconnectors depend on which groups have the biggest 
influence in decision making. 
 
                                                 
151  EU, Bemip, 2010 
152  Stigler, regulatory capture, 1971 
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Countries with low prices compared to the spot price
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Countries with high prices compared to the spot price
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Figure 29 Comparison of the ratio of the household electricity price, of the industrial 
electricity price and of the transmission tariff to the spot price in the country with the 
average ratio in Europe. Detailed results of the calculation are presented in Table 2 in 
Appendix 2.153 
                                                 
153  Source: European Statistical Office (Eurostat); ETSO, transmission tariffs 
2008, 2009. 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                                          Interests and behaviour of TSOs  
92 
5.3. TSO behaviour and ownership interests 
Companies have to follow the interests of their owners, TSOs are not an 
exception of this rule. However, being regulated entities, TSOs have to work 
in the framework set by the national and the European legislation and the 
regulator. In the case of vertical integration the owner of the TSO is a 
generation company which means that in principle investments which 
increase market prices are promoted and investments which reduce market 
prices are discarded. Unbundling tries to break this perverse incentive 
linked to ownership. It is, however, clear that even with extreme functional 
unbundling measures it is difficult to break this link completely. Seemingly, 
the owner’s voice will always be somehow present. The European 
Commission tried to achieve a complete ownership unbundling of the 
European TSOs with the 3rd Energy market liberalisation package. Some 
Member States opposed this and thus an option to remain vertically 
integrated remains, even if accompanied with many additional controls to 
gain the best possible independence of the TSO from the owner.154 
As shown in Table 6, it is assumed that a vertically integrated TSO 
maximises profits for the whole business chain including generation and 
supply. It would seek to increase export capacity to countries with a higher 
electricity price in order to give the generation arm the possibility to export 
more and to increase the price in the home country. Similarly, it would try 
to keep the import capacity low from countries with a lower price, in order 
to avoid the decrease of the price level in the home country and to avoid 
competition from abroad.155 Analogously it is assumed that an independent 
TSO would seek primarily to keep electricity prices low for consumers in 
addition to caring for profits for itself. It would maximise imports from 
cheaper countries and minimise exports to more expensive countries. 
For TSOs with mixed ownership including generation companies, 
industrial consumers, the state and investors, it is more difficult to define a 
natural behaviour based on ownership interests.  This is in particular true 
for state ownership which is the most common case in Europe. When the 
state owns both the TSO and a generation company, the state needs to 
balance between consumer and generation interests. In many countries the 
state owned generation company has a strong influence on the government. 
                                                 
154  EU, third package, 2009 
155  The direction of flows at most European interconnections is predominantly 
in one direction. It is, however, possible that this predominant direction 
changes over time. If this happens, the cheap country becomes the expensive 
one which inverts also the direction of the consumer and producer welfare 
changes. 
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Thus the TSO often has to strike a delicate balance between lower prices for 
consumers and higher profits for the incumbent generation company. 
 
Table 6 The Ownership of the European TSOs and the expected behaviour of the TSOs based on the 
ownership, situation in 2009. 
Independent TSOs 
(Owner does not have 
interest in generation 
business) 
Semi-independent TSOs 
(Owner has interest in 
generation business) 
Vertically integrated 
TSOs 
State 
owned 
without 
existence 
of state 
owned 
generation 
business 
Privately 
owned 
without 
interest in 
generation 
business 
State 
owned with 
existence 
of state 
owned 
generation 
business 
Private or 
mixed 
ownership 
partially  
with gene-
ration 
compa-
nies 
Vertically 
integrated 
with state 
ownership 
Vertically 
integrated 
with 
private 
owner-
ship 
Tennet (NL) 
National Grid 
(UK) 
CEPS (CZ) Elia (BE) 
Augstspriegu-
ma tikls  (LV) 
EoN (DE) 
 REE (ES) Eirgrid (IE) Fingrid (FI) Elering (EE) EnBW (DE) 
  
Energinet.dk 
(DK) 
REN (PT) ELES (SI) RWE (DE) 
  
Lietuvos 
Energija (LT) 
Swissgrid 
(CH) 
EOS (BG) Tiwag (AT) 
  
PSE-
Operator 
(PL) 
Terna (IT) HTSO (GR) VKW (AT) 
  SEPS (SK)  Mavir (HU)  
  
Svenska 
Kraftnät (SE) 
 RTE (FR)  
  
Statnett 
(NO) 
 
Vattenfall 
(DE) 
 
  Transelect-
rica (RO) 
 Verbund APG 
(AT) 
 
Expected basic behaviour of the TSO based on the owner's priorities 
Low prices to consumers 
Balancing between 
consumer interests and 
generation and supply 
business interests 
Optimise profits in the 
generation and supply 
business 
 
In reality the picture is much more varied across the three categories of 
TSOs. For example state owned TSOs might follow closely the government 
energy policy which is very different depending on the Member State. Also, 
some TSOs seem to pursue a suboptimal investment policy without any 
obvious reason for this behaviour. 
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Figure 30 Incentive of the TSOs to build interconnection capacity to meaningful directions 
in Europe based on the influence of the ownership in 2009.156  
 
Figure 30 gives an overview how the expected behaviour of the TSOs 
depending on their ownership explained above could influence the overall 
motivation of the two TSOs for building an interconnector. It is assumed 
that both an independent and a semi-independent TSO accepts increasing 
capacity if it brings overall welfare benefits. Vertically integrated TSO is 
assumed to favour investments only in export directions and to stop or 
delay them in import directions. 
According to Figure 30 it is clear that the most difficult area for getting 
the investments done due to the influence of the owners' interests on the 
TSOs is Central Europe. There is notably a large joint area including France, 
Germany, Austria, Slovenia and Hungary in which vertical integration will 
be maintained. However, the recent sales of the former EoN and Vattenfall 
transmission networks to independent TSOs could have a strong positive 
influence on interconnector development as these grids are strategically 
located in Europe.  
Ownership interests among semi-independent TSOs may in particular 
endanger building the necessary interconnectors from the Nordic countries 
to Central Europe as the governments in the Nordic countries might 
                                                 
156  Meaningful direction in this study is the predominant direction of 
commercial flows in 2008. TSOs are assumed to build interconnectors only 
to meaningful directions. The incentive of the TSOs to build interconnector 
capacity is (i) positive from the less independent TSO to a more independent 
TSO, (ii) neutral between two semi-independent TSOs of from an 
independent TSO to a semi-independent TSO and (iii) negative to the 
direction of a vertically integrated TSO. 
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conclude that it is better to keep cheap electricity for their own citizens. A 
similar risk exists with the East to West connections from the countries 
which now have relatively cheap electricity, namely the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.  
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Figure 31 Influence of the ownership of the TSOs on the past and planned 
interconnector investments. 157 
The evidence from the past and planned investments confirms that there 
have been fewer investments in interconnectors with negative incentives 
than for interconnectors with positive or neutral incentives, using the 
classification in Figure 30. In the period 2000 - 2010, at the positive 
incentive interconnections the increase of capacity was 15% compared to 
the potential for profitable capacity increase in 2008 estimated using the 
method of this study. At neutral incentive interconnections the increase of 
capacity was 36% compared to the potential. At negative incentive 
interconnections the increase was only 7 % compared to the potential. 
                                                 
157  TSOs are assumed to build interconnectors only to meaningful directions. 
Meaningful direction in this study is the predominant direction of 
commercial flows in 2008. The incentive for the TSO to build interconnection 
capacity is (i) positive from the less independent TSO to a more independent 
TSO, (ii) neutral between two semi-independent TSOs of from an 
independent TSO to a semi-independent TSO and (iii) negative to the 
direction of a vertically integrated TSO. The past and planned increase is 
compared to the profitable potential of capacity increase in 2008, calculated 
using the method of this study. The overall estimated potential for positive 
incentive interconnectors was 25900MW, for neutral incentive 
interconnectors 7400MW and for negative incentive interconnectors 
17100MW. Data is presented in Tables 2 - 5 in Appendix 1. 
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Regarding the future capacity, the ENTSO-E network development plan 
includes a 43% increase of capacity in the positive incentive category, 90% 
in the neutral incentive category and 34% in the negative incentive category 
compared to the potential in 2008. This result is shown in Figure 31. 
5.4. Changes in unbundling and TSO Ownership following the 
new legal requirements  
Unbundling requirements of the third package will have a big influence on 
the independence and ownership of TSOs. Figure 32 gives a preliminary 
view regarding unbundling and ownership arrangements of the European 
electricity TSOs. Two vertically integrated TSOs have already been sold to 
independent TSOs. Several TSOs will remain, however, vertically integrated. 
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Figure 32 Expected changes in the unbundling and ownership of the TSOs following the 
implementation of the 3rd internal market package.158 
                                                 
158  The choices made regarding unbundling were not finalised when this study 
was written. Independent TSO are defined in this study to be companies 
which are owned by private or public bodies without ownership of generation 
or supply companies. Semi-independent TSOs have owners who own 
generation or supply companies without being vertically integrated. 
Vertically integrated companies host a TSO in a company that has also 
generation or supply activities. 
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5.5. Past and planned development of cross-border 
transmission capacity  
Calculation of NTC-values was already discussed in Chapter 4. NTC- values 
are in principle determined by an objective method applied similarly by all 
TSOs. In practise, the upper limit of exports and imports are in many cases 
not defined in a transparent process but  TSOs can give preferential 
treatment to most wanted directions. Consequently, the NTC values, in 
addition to being indicative, contain an element of choice by the TSOs. A 
general rule is that the lower value proposed by one of the two TSOs 
involved is applied. Thus it is interesting to analyse the NTC values also 
from the point of view of possible influence of national and company 
interests on the calculation of NTC-values. 
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Figure 33 Development of electricity import and export capacity (in NTC) in meaningful 
directions in Europe between summer 2000 and 2010. Negative values are presented as 
patterned bars.159  
                                                 
159  Figure 31 compares ENTSO-E NTC values of summer 2000 and summer 
2010. Meaningful direction in this study is the predominant direction of 
commercial flows in 2008. 
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In most countries, the NTC values have increased only modestly during 
the time of market liberalisation, in some cases the NTC-values have even 
diminished as illustrated in Figure 33. 
5.6. Projects included in the ENTSO-E ten year network 
development plan 
Regarding the planned transmission projects in Europe the reference is the 
ENTSO-E biennial ten year network development plan which is one of the 
key tasks of ENTSO-E.160 ENTSO-E started to work on the plan immediately 
when it was founded in 2009, not waiting for the formal establishment in 
2011. The first plan, called a pilot plan, was released on 1 March 2010. 
The pilot plan was clearly a compilation of national transmission 
investment projects, without any systematic European modelling to justify 
the projects. The plan did not try to estimate the capacity increase due to 
the investments presented in the plan. The number of projects in the plan, 
altogether 471, was impressive. 
When publishing the plan ENTSO-E declared that it was work in progress 
and invited stakeholders to comment on it in view of developing a proper 
methodology for the preparation of the future plans.161 Among the 471 
projects there were about 70 cross-border projects, the rest being internal 
lines. Even if it is clear that also many investments inside the national 
networks are needed to achieve the targeted cross-border capacity increase, 
the plan only occasionally showed the interdependencies of the internal and 
the cross-border projects. Costs of individual projects were usually not 
indicated. 
In the ENTSO-E pilot ten year network development plan no systematic 
set of criteria was used to choose the projects for the plan. However, the 
plan mentioned that methodologies developed for some regional plans 
could be used in the future by ENTSO-E. The appendix of the pilot plan 
refers to the Baltic Sea regional plan, to the analysis made for the France-
Spain-Portugal interconnections and to the work done in Central Western 
Europe. 
The estimated capacity increase following the ENTSO-E ten year network 
development plan is shown in Figure 34. For many interconnections from 
which substantial congestion rents are collected today, an increase of 
interconnection capacity is planned. However, there are also many 
                                                 
160  ENTSO-E, ten year network development plan, 2010 
161  EC, comment on ten year network investment plan, 2010 
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potentially highly beneficial interconnectors which could be entirely 
financed through congestion rents missing from the list. Projects linking 
neighbouring EU Member States are missing between Romania and 
Hungary, Austria and Slovenia, France and Germany (only a very modest 
project is presented), Sweden and Denmark, Poland and Slovakia, Romania 
and Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Belgium, Poland and the Czech Republic, 
the Czech Republic and Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Slovakia 
and Austria as well as Sweden and Germany. Using the classification given 
to interconnections in Figure 30 based on the ownership of the TSO, all 
these missing projects are at the borders with negative or neutral incentives, 
none at the positive incentive borders. This is strong evidence of the 
influence of ownership interests on choosing whether to develop an 
interconnector project or not. 
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Figure 34 Planned development of electricity import and export capacity (in NTC) in 
meaningful directions in Europe in 2011 – 2025.162  
                                                 
162  Planned additional capacities at interconnections in the ENTSO-E ten year 
network development plan, are from the study: KEMA, electricity 
infrastructure, 2010. Additional capacities are shown in Table 4 in Appendix 
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5.7. Analysis of TSOs' historical and planned behaviour  
For analysing the historical and planned behaviour of the TSOs, the past 
investments of the TSOs in 2000 – 2010 and the planned investments 
proposed for the period 2011 – 2025 in the ENTSO-E ten year network 
development plan are compared with the from the overall social welfare 
point of view optimal transmission investments identified in Chapter 3 and 
summarised in Table 3. The TSOs' behaviour regarding the past and 
planned investments is analysed using the method developed in this study, 
already applied for identifying the optimal investments. To recall the main 
features of the method, it estimates the price arbitrage potential between 
two countries by calculating an equivalent price difference based on the 
congestion rents in 2008. In addition, a linear supply curve for both sides of 
the interconnection is generated from the spot market data. This allows 
establishing the optimal interconnection capacity and the corresponding 
increase of welfare. Equally, the welfare effects of the past and planned 
capacity increase are calculated.  
The main results and observations from these calculations are shown in 
Figures 35 – 37. The method, input data and detailed results for all 
countries are presented in Appendix 1.  
Even if indicative, the results are very interesting. First of all they indicate 
which TSOs have been able to increase social welfare in the past and are 
planning to increase it in the future. They also show, whether this increase 
of social welfare is taking place through increasing the welfare for 
consumers or for generators. It is important to note that in the European 
context both are equally important, there will be no welfare increase for the 
consumers in the importing country without an increase in producer 
welfare in the exporting country, which usually means that the consumer 
surplus in the exporting country is diminished. 
In Figures 35 – 37 the past increase of social welfare is converted into 
negative values for presentational reasons. Thus the lower the point 
representing the country is in the graph, the higher the welfare increase has 
been in the past period. For future welfare the opposite is true, the higher 
the point, the bigger the welfare increase. The middle point corresponds to 
the planned projects and the end point to the optimal projects. The position 
of the point in the horizontal scale corresponds to who is benefiting from 
this welfare gain, producers on the right hand side and consumers on the 
left hand side of the graphs. 
                                                                                                                    
1. Meaningful direction in this study is the predominant direction of the 
commercial flows in 2008. 
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Figure 35 Social welfare increase by the past and future interconnector investments of 
Norway, France, the UK, Spain and Switzerland. The past investments are based on NTC 
increase in 2000 – 2010 and the future investments are based on ENTSO-E ten year network 
development plan. The method used is explained in Appendix 1 and the calculation results for 
all countries are presented in Tables 6 – 8 of Appendix 1. 
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 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                                          Interests and behaviour of TSOs  
102 
AT
HU
HU
CH
CH
DK
SE
AT
AT
CZ
CZ
CZ
HU
CH
DK
DK
SE
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
-2000 -1000 0 1000 2000
Consumer welfare increase (-) or producer welfare increase (+) M€/a 
O
ve
ra
ll 
w
el
fa
re
 in
cr
ea
se
 fo
r t
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
, p
as
t (
-) 
an
d 
pl
an
ne
d 
&
 o
pt
im
al
 (+
) [
M
€/
a] Future consumer welfare 
oriented behaviour Future producer welfare 
oriented behaviour
Past producer welfare 
oriented behaviour
Past consumer welfare 
oriented behaviour
 
Figure 37 Social welfare increase by the past and future interconnector investments of 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Denmark and Portugal. Switzerland is shown to 
facilitate comparison with pictures 35 and 36 which have a different scale.  
 
From Figures 35 - 37 one can see the countries with the biggest potential 
for welfare increase, namely Norway, Germany and the UK, and the ones 
with somewhat smaller potential, namely the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Poland, Italy, France, Spain, Denmark, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Austria and Sweden. Regarding exporting countries, Norway has planned 
concrete projects to benefit from capacity increase to Central Europe and to 
the UK. France has also ambitious plans to benefit from its exporting 
potential. On the contrary, Poland, Austria and Sweden have been very 
passive and are not even planning interconnectors in spite of their export 
potential. Regarding importing countries, Germany and the UK are the 
most potential beneficiaries, both are addressing their import potential in 
their plans. Portugal, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands also have planned 
capacity increase for profitable imports. On the other hand Switzerland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary seem to be passive in spite of their import 
potential. 
In the past there have been several countries which have promoted 
producer welfare increase when it would have been more optimal to 
promote consumer welfare increase, Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary are in this category. In addition, the UK has been passive in 
spite of an important consumer welfare increase potential. On the contrary, 
Sweden, Romania, Poland and Belgium have promoted consumer welfare 
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increase in the past even if it would have been more beneficial from the 
overall social welfare point of view to promote producer welfare increase.  
Regarding future investments, only the Czech Republic remains slightly 
wrongly on the producer welfare side and Sweden wrongly on the consumer 
welfare side. However, in addition to these two countries, Poland, 
Switzerland, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece are passive regarding planned 
investments taking into account the welfare potential. Of course it remains 
to be seen for all countries which of the planned investments will be realised 
and what is the role of the TSO's motivation or lack of motivation for the 
achievement or non-achievement of these projects. 
In most cases the behaviour shown by the analyses is in line with the 
expected behaviour of the TSO. Many of the above mentioned TSOs situated 
in a non-optimal quadrant favourable to producer welfare regarding the 
past behaviour are vertically integrated companies. This gives strong 
evidence that vertically integrated companies tend to put the interests of 
their owner above the increase of the overall social welfare as increasing 
export capacity increases profits for their generation business. Only the 
Swedish TSO, remains in the non optimal quadrant favourable to 
consumers regarding planned investments. The Swedish TSO is a state 
agency which might well explain the preference for keeping the consumer 
prices low rather than increasing the overall social welfare. 
It seems evident that there is a link between the creation of an 
independent TSO and the importing nature of the country. All TSOs with a 
high level of independence from generation interests, namely the Dutch and 
British TSOs, are in importing countries. Other major importing countries 
such as Italy and Portugal have semi-independent TSOs. All these TSOs, 
except the UK TSO, have been rather successful in increasing social welfare 
through building interconnectors. 
Similarly it seems evident that there is a link between being an exporting 
country and the wish to keep the TSO vertically integrated, such as in 
France, Germany, Switzerland and Bulgaria. The most common ownership 
choice for exporting countries is a fully state owned TSO as in Norway, 
Sweden and the Czech Republic. Two main exporters, France and Germany, 
are defenders of maintaining vertical integration, both at the company and 
government level. This can be a sign that export revenues are considered as 
benefiting not only the company but also the country even if extensive 
export increases prices in the home country. Also in some of the most 
important transit countries, namely Switzerland, Slovenia and Austria the 
TSO will remain vertically integrated. 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                                          Interests and behaviour of TSOs  
104 
Transit countries, the most important ones being Denmark, Switzerland, 
Austria and Slovenia, deserve special attention when drawing conclusions 
from this study based on whether the TSO's behaviour is consumer or 
producer welfare oriented. Our analysis is based on summing up the welfare 
increase of bilateral projects without making connection between all the 
projects in each country. Such an analysis made separately for each project 
is reasonably accurate for big countries as a single interconnector only 
marginally influences prices and flows. However, small transit countries 
need to develop exports and imports simultaneously for keeping a 
reasonable energy balance in their country, thus a more integrated analysis 
would be more appropriate for them. Among these countries Switzerland 
has focused on increasing significantly export capacity, while Austria, 
Denmark and Slovenia have increased both import and export capacity, 
rather modestly though.  
In Austria one of the reasons for the modest increase of  interconnection 
capacity has been that it has struggled with its internal bottlenecks. Now 
finally Austria has been successful in relieving some of these bottlenecks.  
5.8. Empirical country by country analysis of TSOs’ behaviour 
regarding historical and planned transmission investments 
This empirical part of the study compares the findings obtained using the 
method developed in the study to empirical knowledge on concrete 
investment projects. Empirical knowledge is also used to identify the  most 
important success factors of an investment. In particular the influence of 
the other factors than price arbitrage, identified in Chapter 4, is discussed 
here. These other factors are not directly taken into account in the method 
used in this study because the method focuses on social welfare increase 
through price arbitrage and does not try to quantify for example security of 
supply or competition benefits of interconnectors. 
This chapter is divided into regional sections. In each section the results of 
the analysis on whether company and national interests have influenced the 
past and planned investments presented above are used as the reference. 
Empirical knowledge on real projects is then used to confirm or reject these 
results.  
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5.9. Northern Europe 
5.9.1. Regional overview 
 
For the Nordic countries it seems that the possibility to build nuclear plants 
in Sweden and Finland, fulfilling the renewable targets and the 
development of wind power in the Baltic Sea and North Sea creates so much 
surplus capacity that the potential increase in electricity prices because of 
increasing exports is not a problem.163 On the contrary, interconnectors are 
necessary to keep a price level that allows generation investments to remain 
profitable. 
 
< 500MW
> 500MW
> 1000MW Planned increase in 2011 - 2025
In construction
Increase of capacity in 2000 - 2010
 
Figure 38 Northern European interconnectors. 
For the counterparts of the interconnectors, the Central European 
countries and the Baltic States, the need for interconnectors is very much 
dependent on the future development of nuclear and wind power. Wind 
power has already changed Germany to one of the most important exporters 
in Europe. The Netherlands will also become an exporter in the future. 
Because of the wind power,  flexibility of the Nordic hydro power will 
become more and more valuable. Sharing this flexibility with Central 
Europe seems to increase the profitability of future interconnector projects 
between the Nordic countries and Central Europe. 
                                                 
163  Vattenfall, Løseth, 2011 
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5.9.2. Denmark 
 
According to the analysis in this study, Denmark has slightly given priority 
to producer welfare. However, for Denmark as a transit country, it is utmost 
important to have a reasonable equilibrium between the capacity in the 
North and in the South. Denmark has two price zones which were linked 
with a cable in 2010. The Danish small but well connected market has a 
price locked between the Nordic and the German price. Whether the price is 
closer to the former or to the latter depends very much on the behaviour of 
the main generator in Denmark, state owned Dong.164 
For imports from Norway, after completion of the Skagerrak IV cable 
under construction, no further capacity increases are planned. New cables 
seem to bypass Denmark. The Norned I cable from Norway to the 
Netherlands has been very profitable and the construction of Norned II has 
already been decided. There are also two cable projects from Norway to 
Germany at the planning stage. The main reasons for bypassing Denmark 
are probably the possibility offered by DC cable technology to connect 
distant points across the sea without being dependent on permits for 
overhead lines. Other reasons why Denmark is losing its role as a transit 
country is the recent decision to underground165 most of its transmission 
grid and the lack of progress in building away the bottleneck in the 
Hamburg area by the German TSOs. A Danish attempt to still benefit from 
transit is the Cobra interconnector from Denmark to the Netherlands, in 
this case the bypassed country is Germany. 
The Danish TSO Energinet.dk has cared for equilibrium of capacity 
between the North and the South. Most of the interconnection capacity was 
built already before the liberalisation of electricity market. 
 
5.9.3. Estonia 
 
Estonia has been very active in interconnector building. One cable to 
Finland is already in operation since 2006, and a second one is under 
construction. These projects at the moment show priority to producer 
surplus as Estonia is an exporting country. However, the development of 
market price in the Baltic States is difficult to predict in the longer term, the 
Baltic market could well import from the Nordic market in the future. The 
analysis in this study shows that when the Estlink II cable is ready there will 
be high price convergence with the Nordic market. This is no surprise as 
                                                 
164  KSF, Elsam case, 2005 
165  Energinet.dk, kabelhandlingsplan, 2009 
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after completion of Estlink II, Estonia will be the most interconnected 
country in Europe. 
The Estonian TSO Elering has worked for integrating Estonia in the 
Nordic market. 
 
5.9.4. Finland 
 
The Finnish TSO Fingrid has achieved a high level of market integration 
with Sweden in the context of the Nordic market, measured based on the 
level of price convergence. In these conditions investments cannot be 
justified with the method used in this study focusing on price arbitrage, but 
the behaviour has to be judged based on other criteria such as benefits from 
increased competition or improved security of supply. If these investments 
keep market prices competitive, the benefit can be much higher than the 
investment cost. 
Fingrid has a mixed ownership including the main producers but also the 
main industrial consumers and the state. Because of the new unbundling 
requirements of the 3rd legislative package the ownership structure needs to 
be changed. The state is ready to buy the majority of Fingrid.166 
Fingrid has increased capacity with Sweden in several stages in the past 
and further increase is planned. Connections with the Baltic States are also 
developed. The first connection with Estonia, the Estlink I cable, is a 
merchant investment. The second cable Estlink II, this time a regulated 
interconnector, has been decided and will be in operation in 2014.  
Currently Finland imports annually about 10 TWh from Russia.167 
Building further interconnection capacity with Russia has been refused by 
the Finnish government based on system security arguments.168 On the 
existing DC back-to-back interconnector an upgrade is ongoing in order to 
allow exports to Russia which is currently not technically possible.  
The Finnish TSO Fingrid has pursued a policy of low transmission tariffs 
and high price convergence with Sweden. 
 
5.9.5. Germany 
 
The past behaviour of the German TSOs according to the analysis in this 
study shows preference for producer welfare. This is the expected behaviour 
as all German TSOs used to be vertically integrated. Interconnector 
                                                 
166  TEM, press release on Fingrid, 2011 
167  Source: ENTSO-E 
168  TEM, United Power decision, 2006 
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investments in export directions, in particular to the Netherlands, have 
been favoured and capacity in import directions such as from Poland, the 
Czech Republic and the Nordic countries has not been developed. 
Almost a school book example for this study is the Viking-cable project 
from Norway to Germany. It was abandoned by Preussen Elektra, one of the 
predecessors of Eon.169 Looking backwards, this cable would have been one 
of the most profitable transmission infrastructure investments in Europe in 
spite of its high cost. The only understandable reason for stopping the 
project is the loss of profits for German producers. Now this project is again 
alive in a different setup.170  
Future plans show a change compared to the past. For export capacity a 
modest increase towards France and a substantial increase towards the 
Netherlands is planned. In import direction there is a capacity increase 
project with Denmark and two projects to connect Germany with Norway. 
All these projects are in the control area of Tennet Germany, formerly the 
transmission grid of the vertically integrated Eon. This would indicate that 
Tennet together with Elia, the new owner of the former transmission grid of 
Vattenfall in Germany, now called 50Hz transmission, might develop 
interconnectors to the North as they do not have their own generation 
interests in Germany.  
For one of the cables from Norway, Norger, the connection point in 
Germany is Brunsbüttel which is situated to the north of the congestion in 
the Hamburg area. Intuitively it would be more interesting to connect the 
cable further south in order to bypass this congestion.  
Germany is the biggest market in Europe and already strongly 
interconnected with the neighbours. Because of its big size, interconnectors 
can, however, only marginally influence the market price. The focus in 
Germany has been in connecting wind power and keeping the integrity of 
the German price zone. Building more capacity to connect Northern Europe 
makes no sense if internal bottlenecks are not relieved at the same time. 
Development of wind power in the North-Sea and the Baltic-Sea area 
increases the North-South flows which will worsen the loop flows in the 
Dutch, Belgian, Polish and Czech networks as discussed in Chapter 4.  
From the four German TSOs, Amprion and EnBW will probably remain 
vertically integrated. However, the new ownership of the two other TSOs 
could facilitate splitting Germany into several bidding zones if needed 
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because of the increasing wind power production, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
A decision of splitting needs to be taken a couple of years ahead of 
implementation because of the forward contracts sold for the German single 
price zone and in order to prepare the market participants for the change.171 
In this matter there might be a conflict of interest between the unbundled 
and the non unbundled German TSOs. In general, the new setup of TSOs in 
Germany will increase the regulator’s role in deciding on transmission 
investments and in making sure that the approved projects are actually 
build. 
 
 
 
Figure 39 Where to locate wind back-up generation in Germany?  
Germany has changed from an importing country to an exporting country 
in recent years. The export potential comes largely from wind generation 
which is in steep increase. Because of the big surplus volumes it seems 
evident that Germany has an interest to export during peak wind 
production. This surplus requires sufficient transmission capacity towards 
consumption areas in Central Europe. If all wind power produced in 
Germany needs to be consumed in Germany, expensive transmission 
expansion and back-up power plant projects are needed inside the country 
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to accommodate the variable wind production. Spreading German wind 
power wider in Europe is most probably the least cost solution for Germany.  
For the transmission network it is very important where the power plants 
used for back-up for wind generation will be located. To illustrate this, 
Figure 39 presents a schematic example of the German situation. It shows 
that the back-up capacity should be placed in the generation deficit areas in 
the South, not in Northern Germany which already has a generation 
surplus. Thus all new power plants for which the location can be chosen 
relatively freely such as combined cycle or open cycle gas turbines should be 
placed in the deficit areas presented in Figure 5, notably in Southern 
Germany and Northern Italy.  
For this reason it is perhaps a historic mistake from the transmission 
system point of view that it is still possible to build power plants in 
Northern Germany, even with a guaranteed access to the network.172 Some 
investors have already drawn the same conclusion.173 This area is the 
crossroads for the wind surplus from the North Sea and the Baltic Sea as 
well as for the electricity coming from the Nordic market with an expected 
increasing surplus in the coming years. 
In Figure 39 the two main alternatives to build wind back-up capacity in 
Germany are compared. In alternative A the back-up is located in Northern 
Germany. This results in a constant loading of the lines from the North to 
the South, from flows originating either from wind generation or from back-
up generation. In alternative B the back-up is located in Southern Germany. 
In alternative B the line from the North to the South is fully loaded only in 
peak wind conditions, with no loading when there is no wind. This leaves 
transmission capacity available for trading purposes when there is less 
wind. Additionally, in alternative A, Southern Germany is dependent on the 
transmission line for its security of supply, in alternative B both Northern 
and Southern Germany can be supplied even if the transmission line 
connecting them is out of order.  
German TSOs have in the past clearly pursued the interests of their 
owners. Among the four TSOs, Vattenfall was most open to innovative 
solutions such as introducing implicit auctions to the Kontek cable in 
2005.174 EoN changed its course later and joined the market coupling 
project between the Nordic countries and Germany in 2008.175 The TSO 
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landscape in Germany has recently changed radically and it is not clear yet 
what objectives the TSOs will pursue. 
 
5.9.6. Latvia 
 
The Latvian TSO Augstsprieguma Tikls is part of vertically integrated 
Latvenergo. The Latvian transmission system is small and technically 
integrated into the Russian system as the systems of the other Baltic States. 
Latvenergo is a shareholder in the Estlink-cable between Estonia and 
Finland. Full price convergence between the three Baltic States and high 
price convergence with the Nordic market is expected once the Baltic 
electricity market is fully operational and new interconnectors with the 
other EU Member States are ready. 
The Latvian TSO Augstsprieguma Tikls has followed the interests of the 
integrated company and the government. The unbundling solution for the 
Latvian TSO is not yet clear. 
 
5.9.7. Lithuania 
 
The Lithuanian TSO Lietuvos Energija had a rather independent position 
when it was created. However, for the purpose of building the Visaginas 
nuclear power plant the government regrouped the electricity sector under 
Lietuvos Elektros Organizacija (LEO) holding company which was dissolved 
in 2009.176  Now a new TSO, Litgrid, will be established as an entity directly 
owned by the state. 
The Lithuanian TSO has actively followed the government policy to 
increase independence from the Russian system and to connect with the 
other EU Member States. Full price convergence between the three Baltic 
States and high price convergence with the Nordic market is expected once 
the Baltic electricity market is fully operational and new interconnectors 
with the other EU Member States are ready. 
 
5.9.8. Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands has in the past clearly shown preference for increasing 
consumer welfare and this seems to continue in the future. In the 
Netherlands most generation assets are owned by companies from the other 
EU Member States such as GDF Suez, RWE, Eon and Vattenfall. The TSO 
Tennet is particularly independent of generation interests as the owner of 
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Tennet, the state, does not own power plants. This is clearly visible in the 
behaviour of the TSO. It has systematically increased import capacity from 
the early days of liberalisation. Phase shifters and new lines at the German 
border, the NorNed cable to Norway and the BritNed cable to the UK are 
among the most important investments.  
Interconnectors have already efficiently aligned the historically high 
prices in the Netherlands close to the level of the neighbouring countries. 
The start of the Central Western Europe market coupling has further 
aligned prices. Netherland is thus a good example how a small country with 
originally high electricity prices can best utilise its big neighbour. Increasing 
interconnection capacity with Germany has converged prices providing a 
substantial absolute increase in welfare and a transfer of welfare from 
producers to consumers. The price level in the Netherlands is still sufficient 
to attract generation investments, which has been proven in practise. With 
the completion of the BritNed cable, and with the two further cables 
planned, Norned II to Norway and Cobra to Denmark, the Netherlands will 
become a hub for the future North-Sea wind power with a good possibility 
to get welfare benefits for the Netherlands in form of electricity subsidised 
by other Member States.  
Public consultation on the Norned I cable177 is an interesting case for 
analysing company interest regarding transmission investments. Some 
generation companies active in the Netherlands were against the 
investment arguing that it is not profitable. It is difficult to think that major 
players in the European market could have done such a big mistake in their 
calculations.  
To sum up, the Dutch TSO Tennet has followed a consumer oriented 
policy by achieving a high level of price convergence with the neighbouring 
countries. 
 
5.9.9. Norway 
 
According to the method used in this study Norway has shown a strong 
preference for increasing producer welfare both in the past and even more 
so regarding future investments. This has been done very consciously with a 
strong government steer on electricity policy. The state is the owner of the 
TSO Statnett and the biggest producer Statkraft.  
Some parties claim that the Norwegian hydro power should be kept for 
the Norwegians. Indeed, by closing the borders electricity would be very 
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cheap in wet years. However, the potential of Norway to increase social 
welfare for Norway through the European market is huge. There are four 
main drivers for this welfare potential, all linked to Norway's storage hydro 
capacity, biggest in Europe, and interconnectors.  
Firstly, the development of the North Sea wind power needs desperately 
connection to storage. Norway has a lot of storage capacity and can capture 
a lot of added value with this storage by importing when electricity is cheap 
and exporting when it is expensive.  
Secondly, the whole European system will need in the future much more 
balancing and regulating power for secure system operation. The same 
hydro power plants in Norway can offer this service at a reasonable cost. 
Thirdly, Norway can exploit its nuclear neighbours, Sweden and Finland, 
and pass electricity produced in these countries through the interconnectors 
to Central Europe. This business seems to work well as Sweden has been 
passive in developing its own interconnectors and Finland is too far away 
from Central Europe. The profit from this trade for Norway comes mainly in 
form of congestion rents.  
Finally, interconnectors to the Central Europe secure the supply of 
Norway in electricity in dry years. If there is little water, cables are turned to 
importing to Norway instead of exporting. 
The biggest obstacle to exploiting the huge welfare potential seems to be 
local resistance against building transmission lines as illustrated in Figure 
28. Norway has a relatively weak internal transmission grid, lack of 
investments in the past decade did not improve the situation. To fully 
exploit the potential of the European market, internal transmission 
investments are desperately needed. They are also crucial for offering 
reliable electricity supply inside the country. 
Distribution of welfare internally in Norway regarding electricity should 
not be a big problem even if it has been discussed extensively in Norway. 
Most of the producer welfare is captured for the society through selling 
hydro rights and through imposing taxes and levies. In addition, hydro 
power is mostly publicly owned. Foreign companies have been kept out of 
the Norwegian hydro power by protectionist measures.178 
To exploit the welfare opportunities of Norway, more connections are 
planned with the most lucrative markets such as the Netherlands, Germany 
and the UK. Capacity to Denmark will be increased by building the 
Skagerrak IV cable. Norway is also an active partner for developing the 
North Sea wind power potential. 
                                                 
178  IFP, Dong sells hydropower, 2010 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                                          Interests and behaviour of TSOs  
114 
Skagerrak IV cable is a good example of how national interest influence 
investment projects. In 2004 the Nordic TSOs decided on five 
infrastructure investments in a Nordic package.179 One of the underlying 
ideas was that the package will mitigate national interests as all countries 
will profit from the overall package even if they might consider that their 
own project in the package is not profitable. All the other projects went 
ahead rather quickly except Skagerrak IV. Only after negotiations with the 
Danish TSO on how the costs and benefits are shared and reserving some 
capacity to regulating power, the project finally was accepted in Norway. 
This decision was perhaps also facilitated by the agreement on the Inter 
TSO compensation mechanism, which gave certainty on the additional 
compensation amount to be paid by the Norwegian TSO because of the 
exports through the Skagerrak IV cable. 
Another example of careful priority setting of Statnett is the hesitation 
around the new connection from Norway to Southern Sweden. This link 
might compete with the Norwegian projects connecting directly with 
Central Europe in case Sweden was to develop interconnectors to the 
South.180 
As a founder of the Nord Pool power exchange the Norwegian TSO 
Statnett has a long history in developing the European electricity market 
and it has continued to be very active in developing it further. Also 
regarding interconnectors, in particular DC cables, it is perhaps the leading 
TSO in the world. Statnett has been completely in line with the government 
policy and has been seeking with success to increase the Norwegian welfare 
with its transmission investments. 
 
5.9.10. Sweden 
 
According to the analysis of this study, Sweden has given strong preference 
for consumer welfare both in the past and in the plans for the future. The 
increase of Svenska Kraftnät's export capacities has been rather modest, 
except through the SwePol link, which was already decided between 
vertically integrated companies before the market liberalisation. In fact, 
Svenska Kraftnät has continuously limited the export capacity of 
interconnectors in order to reduce the system security risk and to decrease 
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redispatching costs caused by the internal bottlenecks in Southern and 
Central Sweden.181 
Sweden is an important transit country with alternating transit directions 
depending on the rainfall in the Nordic countries. Sweden has less and less 
surplus generation capacity, which probably helps to make interconnector 
projects acceptable both to consumers and generators. However, Sweden 
could become a major exporter in the future because of the decision to allow 
replacement of existing nuclear plants once they are at the end of their 
lifetime and because of the renewable targets requiring substantial 
investments in renewable generation capacity. 
Sweden and Norway realized early the Nordic complementarities in 
electricity generation and have fully supported the development of the 
Nordic market. However, the creation of the Nordic market and building 
interconnectors to Denmark, Poland and Germany worsened the 
bottlenecks inside Sweden. The situation was further deteriorated by the 
closure of the Barsebäck nuclear power plant situated in Southern Sweden. 
In spite of this, Svenska kraftnät has during the last ten years invested very 
moderately in the transmission network which explains why the bottlenecks 
have persisted. Only after a long debate in Sweden and in the other Nordic 
countries, and with the help of a complaint to the EU by the Danish Energy 
Association, concrete actions have been taken. The main measures are 
building more lines in the Southern Sweden and splitting Sweden into four 
bidding zones.182  
The Swedish TSO Svenska kraftnät is part of the state and thus it is 
natural that it follows closely the government energy policy. Contrary to 
Norway, it seems that Sweden lately has adopted a low profile regarding 
developing cross-border transmission networks even if it would have all the 
ingredients for being one of the leading countries in the world in this 
respect. Sweden could get important welfare gains by following the 
Norwegian example, even if the hydro resources are smaller than in Norway 
and situated quite far away in the North. Linking the Baltic States is a 
politically important project, but bigger welfare gains can be expected from 
links to Germany and Poland which are currently not developed.  
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5.10. Central Eastern Europe 
5.10.1. Regional overview 
 
Most countries in Central Eastern Europe are so well connected to Germany 
and Austria that price convergence within the whole region is easily 
achieved. In Central Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic is a major exporter 
and will probably remain an exporter in the future. There are also deficit 
areas in the region and in the neighbouring countries, namely Southern 
Germany, Hungary and Serbia.  
 
< 500MW
> 500MW
> 1000MW Planned increase in 2011 - 2025
In construction
Increase of capacity in 2000 - 2010
 
 
Figure 40 Central Eastern European interconnectors. 
5.10.2. Austria 
 
According to the analysis in this study, Austria has in the past favoured 
increase of consumer welfare. This is implied by the fact that the cross-
border capacities of Austria have diminished. Future plans include capacity 
increase with the Czech Republic and Hungary.  
Austria is centrally located in the European transmission network. It is 
both a transit country and an important provider of regulating power from 
its storage hydro plants. Austria has historically a weak internal North-
South connection which is dealt with by limiting the NTCs towards most of 
its neighbouring countries. After many years of delays, mainly linked to 
local opposition, the missing link of the 400kV ring in the East was taken 
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into operation in 2009.  This has improved the situation and the capacity in 
particular towards Slovenia has increased. However, the NTCs with the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy still remain modest and with Slovakia 
there is no interconnection in spite of the minimal distance between 
appropriate connection points.  
Austria has declared that there is no congestion between Austria and 
Germany. If there was a price zone border towards Germany, this would 
automatically mean that the Western part, which is part of a German 
control area, would be in another price zone than the Eastern part.  
In Austria prices would rise if interconnection capacity to Italy was 
developed. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Austria has not succeeded 
to develop transmission capacity towards Italy even if this interconnection 
has the highest social welfare increase potential for Austria. 
Austria aims to keep its TSO vertically integrated. As there is a good 
forecast for increasing profitability of regulating power, network expansion 
will probably concentrate on getting higher profits from the existing and 
future hydro power plants. 
Austria strongly opposed the solution adopted for the ITC mechanism 
claiming that the compensation for transit countries is too modest.183 
Austria indeed suffers from excessive loop-flows. According to Figure 21 the 
losses due to loop flows for Austria in form of non received congestion rents 
is estimated to be 35M€ per year in 2008. 
In summary, the Austrian TSO Austrian Power Grid (APG) has finally 
made progress with the crucial reinforcements of the internal transmission 
grid, beneficial for the whole Europe and is now putting emphasis on the 
grid development necessary for exploiting the Austrian hydro power 
potential. 
 
5.10.3. Czech Republic 
 
The Czech TSO ČEPS has clearly given priority to producer welfare 
according to the analysis in this study, because the import capacity from the 
only import direction Poland has been reduced and the export capacity to 
Slovakia and Austria has been or is planned to be increased. This behaviour 
is beneficial for power producers but might also be rational from the 
national interest point of view. The Czech market is so strongly connected to 
the German market that price convergence is very likely.  
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Price convergence will be even higher when the Czech-Slovak market will 
be integrated into the North West European market coupling. Thus it could 
be acceptable for the governments of the Czech Republic and Slovakia that 
the overall national welfare is increased through the revenues from exports. 
Consumers will in any case have competitive prices through efficient market 
integration. 
ČEPS is one of the key players regarding the development of the European 
transmission grid. The Czech Republic is the country which is suffering the 
most from loop flows. According to Figure 21 the losses for the Czech 
Republic in form of non received congestion rents is estimated to be almost 
100M€ per year in 2008. This might lead ČEPS to invest in protecting itself 
from external influence for example by installing phase shifters at its 
borders.184 Alternatively, ČEPS could also choose to be an active player in 
building the new European transmission system. The current changes in the 
ownership of the German TSOs might help choosing this option. 
In summary, the Czech TSO's strategy has been fully aligned with the 
government policy to maintain the role of Czech Republic as a major 
exporter of electricity. 
 
5.10.4. Hungary 
 
According to the analysis in this study, the Hungarian TSO has shown 
preference for producer interests, mainly because the capacity from 
Romania has been reduced. This is the expected behaviour of a vertically 
integrated company. Future plans show more import oriented investments 
with Slovakia and Austria and also an export oriented investment with 
Slovenia. 
Hungary is an example of a country where the interest for keeping the 
electricity price reasonable conflicts with the state owned generation and 
supply company interest for higher profits. Hungary has a relatively tight 
demand supply balance so it is dependent on its neighbours. Additionally 
three of its neighbours, Croatia, Slovakia and Serbia, are also importing 
countries. Fearing shortage of supply, the Hungarian government has in the 
past obliged domestic generators to serve Hungarian consumers first.  
Hungary struggles between regulating end-user prices and creating a well 
functioning market with competitive prices. Hungary reversed its 
unbundling decision by reintegrating the TSO into the incumbent company. 
Hungary has actively developed its network but the cross-border capacities 
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are dependent for example on the decisions of Austria on how to distribute 
NTCs between its interconnections. Developments regarding the power 
exchange in Hungary and market coupling with the neighbouring countries 
could be very important for the Hungarian market. As discussed in Chapter 
3, end consumers in a small high price country have a strong interest to 
connect tightly with a big neighbouring low price area. 
To sum up, the Hungarian TSO Mavir has been active in developing the 
network but the obvious gains for consumers from reaching price 
convergence with the neighbours have not yet been realised. 
 
5.10.5. Poland 
 
According to the analysis in this study, the Polish TSO Polskie Sieci 
Elektroenergetyczne Operator S.A. (PSE Operator) has in the past given 
strong preference for consumer welfare. This result is mainly because of the 
significant decrease of export capacity towards Germany and Slovakia and 
because the import capacity was increased through taking into operation 
the SwePol link with Sweden. One needs to note, however, that the export 
capacity decrease is mainly due to loop flows from German wind power and 
that the Swepol link was decided between vertically integrated monopolies 
but started operation only in year 2000. Regarding future investments in 
cross border capacity, Poland has included a small increase of capacity with 
Slovakia and the LitPol-project with Lithuania in the ENTSO-E ten year 
network development plan. Thus no major increase in social welfare 
through additional interconnection capacity neither for producers nor for 
consumers is foreseen. 
The current price level in Poland does not seem sustainable. Poland needs 
to renew a considerable part of its generation capacity in the coming years. 
There are no resources available in Poland to produce cheap electricity 
taking into account the emission allowance costs. Building nuclear capacity 
takes at least twenty years as there is no regulatory framework in place yet 
for nuclear power. Thus an alignment of the Polish electricity price with the 
Central European price seems evident in the short and medium term. 
Poland has regulated prices and has used export restrictions in the past to 
prevent extreme price spikes and shortage of supply. Poland has historically 
a weak transmission network with frequent congestion inside the grid. 
Congestion is aggravated by the injection of German wind power in the 
North and its return to Germany in the South through Southern Poland and 
the Czech Republic. The congested grid prevents optimal dispatch of 
generation in Poland and the full use of interconnectors including the 
SwePol link to Sweden. The TSO has ambitious plans to reinforce the grid 
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including increasing connections towards Germany and constructing a link 
with Lithuania, but the progress is very slow. The political backing for 
getting the necessary permits and financing has not been sufficient. 
Finding a solution to the North-South flows originating from wind 
generation is indeed a European level question. According to Figure 21 the 
losses due to loop flows for Poland in form of non received congestion rents 
is estimated to be 40M€ in 2008. If Poland does not consider strengthening 
the transmission grid to host these flows to be in its national interests, 
increasing North-South capacity will be difficult as explained in Chapter 4. 
A careful consideration of the approach is necessary as imported wind 
power could provide Poland with cheap electricity subsidised by other 
Member States. As one option, PSE Operator is analysing whether nodal 
pricing could improve congestion management in Poland. 
In summary, the Polish TSO PSE Operator has not managed to develop 
the grid in pace with the increasing requirements and thus there has been a 
decrease of cross-border capacities. This has lead, according to our analysis, 
to a transfer of welfare from the Polish generation companies to the 
consumers. The obvious downside of the Polish policy in this regard is the 
generation adequacy problem that Poland faces in the coming years. 
 
5.10.6. Slovakia 
 
According to the analysis in this study the Slovakian TSO Slovenska 
elektrizacna prenosova sustava (SEPS) has given a slight preference for 
consumer interests in the past. Interconnection capacity with the Czech 
Republic has been increased. A substantial increase of capacity with 
Hungary has been planned.  
Slovakia has a relatively strong transmission grid. The Czech Republic and 
Slovakia have coupled their markets through market splitting justifying it 
with the strong physical connection between the two countries. There is 
indeed almost full price convergence. SEP, the old incumbent generator 
nowadays owned by ENEL, has plans to build new nuclear power plants. 
The Czech-Slovak price has a strong alignment to the German price which 
will probably continue in the future. It could be acceptable for the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia to increase national welfare through revenues from 
exports rather than through lower prices to consumers. In any case, 
Slovakia as a small system has already profited from its integration in the 
regional market which should be further improved when the flow based 
methods and market coupling with the rest of the region will be 
implemented. 
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Slovakia has used export fees to prevent electricity produced in Slovakia to 
be exported to other countries.185  
North-South loop flows are strongly affecting Slovakia. According to 
Figure 21 the losses for Slovakia in form of non received congestion rents 
are estimated to be almost 40M€ in 2008.  
 
5.10.7. Slovenia 
 
Slovenia has given preference for consumer welfare as it has been able to 
increase capacity from import directions in the past and is planning to do so 
in the future. Slovenia's TSO Elektro-Slovenija (ELES) is part of the fully 
integrated state owned electricity company. Through political decisions at 
the beginning of the electricity market opening, the benefits of congestion 
rents at the Italian border were kept with the generation company for some 
time.186  
Slovenia has suffered from low level of commercial capacity apportioned 
to it at the Italian border compared to the actual physical flows through 
Slovenia. France on the contrary has a commercial capacity exceeding the 
physical flows at the Italian border, Switzerland and Austria being quite 
balanced in this respect. Thus Slovenia is a good example of how national 
interests influence discretionary decisions on commercial capacity. One 
argument used against Slovenia requesting a higher NTC towards Italy has 
been its relatively weak connection to Italy. After ELES installed a phase 
shifter at the Italian border, NTC values have been readjusted in favour of 
Slovenia.187 
5.11. Western and South Western Europe 
5.11.1. Regional overview 
 
Western and South Western Europe includes three big countries, France, 
the UK and Spain, three smaller countries, Belgium, Ireland and Portugal 
and one very small country, Luxembourg. This region is very interesting 
from electricity point of view. Three major technologies for carbon free 
                                                 
185  EFET, Slovakian export fee, 2008 
186  Council Regulation (EC) No 1223/2004 of 28 June 2004 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council as regards the date of application of certain provisions to Slovenia 
187  Source: ELES 
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electricity production, wind, nuclear and solar power, are strongly prevalent 
in this region.  
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Figure 41 Western and South Western European interconnectors. 
 
 
5.11.2. Belgium 
 
The past behaviour of the Belgian TSO Elia has been strongly consumer 
welfare oriented according to the analysis in this study. Elia has pursued a 
tighter connection with the neighbouring countries. With market coupling 
with France and the Netherlands already in 2006188, and with the North 
West European market coupling from November 2010189, Belgium is well 
integrated into the European market. The new project to the UK will have 
more focus on producer welfare if the flow pattern remains from the 
continent to Great Britain. 
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The Belgian transmission system operator Elia has been transformed from 
a vertically integrated company to a company with a majority of the shares 
listed on the stock market and the remaining shares mainly owned by 
Belgian municipalities. Elia has been able to increase cross-border 
capacities even if the increased flows from wind power in Northern 
Germany have strongly influenced these capacities. Some cross-border 
investments have been relatively easy, such as adding a new circuit to an 
existing interconnector with France.190 Elia has invested in three phase 
shifting transformers which it considers necessary for managing variable 
wind power flows. 
The Belgian market is very concentrated. This could be one of the reasons 
why Elia has efficiently connected the market with the neighbouring 
markets, through investments in the network and through promoting 
market coupling with the neighbours. This development might also have 
been in the interest of the incumbent which is strongly established in all 
neighbouring countries as well. Otherwise the risk of regulatory 
intervention in the incumbent's behaviour would have been even higher 
than today.  
Recent developments have reduced market concentration. GDF Suez and 
Eon swapped assets in Belgium and Germany in 2009 and EdF sold one of 
its Belgian power plant projects, both at the request of the European 
Commission. Also several other companies have power plant projects in 
Belgium. 
With the acquisition of the former transmission grid of Vattenfall in 
Eastern Germany Elia becomes a major player in Germany. It remains to be 
seen how the relations with the German government and regulator develop 
in the future. Elia has a good understanding of the consequences of 
developing wind power. It could thus lead in finding European solutions to 
grid development together with other affected parties such as the Dutch, 
Polish, Czech and Slovak TSOs. 
In summary, the Belgian TSO Elia has pursued a policy to become 
properly unbundled and to integrate Belgium strongly into the European 
market for the benefit of consumers. Now there are already more 
challenging targets in sight.  
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5.11.3. France 
 
According to the analysis in this study, the French TSO RTE has in the past 
sought for both consumer and producer welfare in a rather balanced 
manner. In addition to substantial increase in export capacity to Belgium, 
some capacity increase has also been made towards Switzerland and Italy. 
RTE has been able to increase import capacity from Germany. This capacity 
increase has been perhaps due to recalculation of the NTC as there has been 
only one substantial investment project realised between Germany and 
France in the observation period 2000 – 2010.191 The fact that Germany has 
changed from an importing country to an exporting country can also have 
influenced the cross-border capacity with France. 
Regarding planned investments RTE gives clearly priority to producer 
welfare. There are important interconnector projects to all main export 
directions in the ENTSO-E ten year network development plan, namely 
towards the UK, Spain and Italy. The Spanish interconnector development 
is based on an engagement following a merger case.192 
The future electricity balance in France, still the biggest exporter in 
Europe, is uncertain.193  If France maintains and further develops the 
nuclear surplus capacity, it could export more than today. If nuclear 
capacity in France will just follow domestic demand increase, France will 
become a country with a changing import and export pattern.  In this case 
in peak consumption periods France will import and in low load periods 
France will export as much as the interconnectors allow. 
France has strongly supported maintaining vertical integration. France 
has until now maintained a monopoly on nuclear power and has not tried to 
dilute the dominant position of the incumbent through structural measures. 
EdF has profited from liberalisation being able to make important 
investments outside France. EdF is present in almost all parts of Europe 
through acquisitions and shareholdings in several companies. 
A dilemma for France is that potentially the electricity price in France 
could remain lower than in the neighbouring countries because of the high 
share of old nuclear power. However, EdF is not obliged to offer electricity 
to the market at the variable costs of the marginal plant even if it has a 
dominant position in France.194 Prices in the French market rather align to 
                                                 
191  RTE, Vigy-Uchtelfangen, 2003 
192  EC, competition case EnBW, 2002 
193  Senat, Billout et al, security of French electricity supply, 2007 
194  CRE, market monitoring 2007, 2009 
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German prices even when demand is low and there is a lot of idle nuclear 
capacity. In France the nuclear capacity is far higher than the lowest 
consumption levels and therefore EdF regulates down nuclear plants when 
consumption is low. The marginal variable cost in those instances could 
even be negative. 
The French government's solution to this dilemma has been to regulate 
end user prices. As this is against European legislation, a new law, Nouvelle 
organisation du marché d'électricité (NOME), obliges EdF to sell a 
considerable amount of electricity to French suppliers at a price linked to 
production cost with the idea that the price for the French end-consumers 
would not increase even if the regulation of end-user prices was lifted.195 
The NOME-law will thus in practise introduce a two-price system, a lower 
price for French consumers and a higher price linked to the German price 
for any exports and imports. 
This system of two prices is a radical way to redistribute social welfare 
benefits. The system will allow the incumbent company to collect profits 
from exports but most of these benefits are transferred to French 
consumers through the regulated electricity price. In this way the overall 
social welfare for the country is increased without a welfare loss for the 
French end consumers. It goes without saying that this method does not fit 
well to the idea of the European internal electricity market. 
The French TSO RTE has actively promoted efficient methods of capacity 
allocation, in addition to promoting new interconnectors. It has the best 
resources among the TSOs in Europe, it has been innovative and involved in 
the European co-operation. Well functioning markets and efficient cross-
border trade are probably also in the owner's interest.  
 
5.11.4. Ireland 
 
According to the analysis in this study, Ireland has in the past been passive 
regarding interconnectors thus giving preference for producer interests. 
Now an interconnector with Great Britain is being built with a promising 
business case. The role of the existing link between the two islands, the 
Moyle interconnector, has been adapted to the Single Electricity Market 
(SEM) which integrates the whole Ireland. Interconnectors between North 
and South are treated as internal lines in the SEM. 
Ireland is another example of a country where the national interest  in 
imports and in keeping the electricity price reasonable conflicts with the 
                                                 
195  CERNA, Leveque and  Saguan, loi NOME, 2010 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                                          Interests and behaviour of TSOs  
126 
generation and supply company interest in higher prices. In Ireland the 
electricity prices are still largely regulated even if there is a plan to introduce 
competition in the retail market dominated by the incumbent. Ireland has 
opted for an Independent System Operator (ISO) structure for the TSO 
Eirgrid. 
The Irish TSO has been in the past strongly integrated into the incumbent 
electricity company. With unbundling and with a new interconnector with 
the UK the future seems to be increasingly market based. 
 
5.11.5. Luxembourg 
 
In Luxembourg the electricity sector remains vertically integrated. There is 
a plan to interconnect the Western and Eastern systems, which would mean 
that the transmission system of Luxembourg could play a role in the 
European system. Almost all electricity is imported. 
 
5.11.6. Portugal 
 
According to the analysis in this study Portugal has successfully increased 
consumer welfare by building interconnection capacity with Spain and there 
are plans to further increase this capacity in the future. The Portuguese TSO 
Rede Eléctrica Nacional (REN) together with the Spanish TSO Red Eléctrica 
de España (REE) have acted with a strong political backing to create the 
Iberian market. The Iberian market was delayed several times but is now 
operational. One possible reason for the delays was protecting generation 
company interests in Portugal. Portugal has maintained regulated prices for 
all groups of consumers. 
The Portuguese TSO REN is ownership unbundled but the incumbent 
generation company has a minority share in it. Portugal is another example 
of how a small country with a high price level can get important social 
welfare benefits for consumers by improving connection with a bigger 
neighbour.  
 
5.11.7. Spain 
 
According to the analysis in this study, Spain has been neutral in the past 
regarding social welfare to consumers and producers. Capacity has been 
increased substantially to the export direction towards Portugal with a 
strong political backing from both countries. The start of the Iberian market 
after building lines between Spain and Portugal was delayed rather by the 
governments, for reasons perhaps related to protection of national markets. 
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Market integration has lead to a high level of price convergence between 
Spain and Portugal. Capacity from  France has increased only modestly. 
Future plans show a clear preference for consumer welfare through the 
substantial increase of interconnection capacity over the Pyrenees.  
The interconnector project with France has taken a long time to prepare 
and has only recently started the construction phase. As this interconnector 
from the outset should be in both TSOs’ interest, the main reason for the 
delays might be the difficulty of crossing the mountains, not the company or 
national interests. The solution finally adopted is very expensive and will 
considerably reduce the social welfare benefits from that interconnector 
even if it will probably still be profitable. If solar power develops in the 
future in Southern Europe and Northern Africa to the extent some scenarios 
suggest, Spain could become a major gateway for electricity supply to 
Central Europe from the South. 
The Spanish TSO REE is one of the privately owned TSOs without a direct 
owner’s interest in generation. It is motivated to increase cross-border 
capacity but the success depends very much on France. 
 
5.11.8. UK 
 
The British TSO National Grid has not increased interconnection capacity at 
all in the observation period of this study, in spite of the important potential 
to increase social welfare for consumers in the UK according to our analysis. 
This has clearly been beneficial for generation companies in the UK. Now 
finally in 2011 the BritNed project between the Netherlands and the UK, a 
merchant link constructed by the two TSOs, becomes operational.  
The passivity of National Grid and the most evident counterpart RTE is 
difficult to understand in light of the potential social welfare gains 
estimated in Chapter 3. A partial explanation for the non-action might be 
that the UK regulatory regime has been geared towards merchant 
interconnectors and has prevented financing interconnectors from the UK 
transmission tariff. Another explanation might be the presence of EdF on 
both sides of the Channel, even if increased trading possibilities over the 
Channel should also be in EdF’s interests. However, future plans change the 
picture completely. Almost 4 GW of interconnection capacity is foreseen, 
not counting BritNed. A second link to Ireland is included among these 
projects, see the chapter on Ireland. 
National Grid is perhaps the most independent TSO in Europe judged 
based on the ownership structure. Ofgem uses a very sophisticated incentive 
scheme to regulate National Grid's behaviour. For example, there have been 
incentives to remove bottlenecks inside Great Britain. The current 
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regulatory regime has favoured merchant interconnectors financed through 
congestion rents. As the overall social welfare generated by interconnectors 
is only partially captured by congestion rents, the risk of underinvestment 
has been evident. The policy seems to be changing towards regulated 
interconnectors.196 
To sum up, the British TSO Grid has pursued a producer welfare oriented 
policy by being passive regarding interconnector development, probably 
partly due to legal constraints. Now the picture seems to radically change. 
5.12. Southern and South Eastern Europe 
5.12.1. Regional overview 
 
Italy is the main importer in Southern and South Eastern Europe attracting 
flows from all possible directions, Switzerland being the hub for these 
imports. Three South East European Member States, Bulgaria, Greece and 
Romania are only weakly connected with the rest of the EU. Between these 
three countries there could be a strong regional market with a lot of 
complementarities in the energy mix just like in the Nordic market. This 
situation has clearly not been exploited as cross-border capacities remain 
very small and there is hardly any new capacity planned. Even the existing 
transmission capacity is not utilised efficiently. For example, the Italy-
Greece interconnector is half empty most of the time. Malta and Cyprus are 
not yet connected to any other country. 
< 500MW
Planned increase in 2011 - 2025
In construction
Increase of capacity in 2000 - 2010
> 500MW
> 1000MW
 
Figure 42 South East European interconnectors. 
                                                 
196  Ofgem, interconnectors, 2010 
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In South East Europe, Romania and Bulgaria are potential exporters. 
However, in the future, the demand in these countries could increase 
making it difficult to predict the future electricity balance.  
 
 
5.12.2. Bulgaria 
 
The Bulgarian TSO Elektroenergien Sistemen Operator EAD (EOS) has 
given priority to generation interests by reducing capacity from Romania, 
which is an import direction, and increasing capacity to Greece which is an 
export direction. Overall capacities to both directions remain relatively 
small. 
Bulgaria is only at the beginning of market liberalisation. Electricity is 
largely in the hands of the vertically integrated state owned company, even 
if independent power producers exist in Bulgaria. The integrated company 
held until recently a monopoly for cross-border trade. Cross-border fees 
have been applied in Bulgaria to protect the market even if they are illegal in 
the EU. 197 The behaviour of Bulgaria seems short sighted in the light of 
Bulgaria traditionally being a major exporter in South East Europe. Bulgaria 
could seemingly profit from investments in power generation and would 
strongly benefit from interconnectors as well as from a well functioning 
market. It could supply other countries in South East Europe, many of them 
having a deficit in electricity supply. 
 
5.12.3. Cyprus 
 
Cyprus does not have any existing or planned interconnectors at the 
moment. 
 
5.12.4. Greece  
 
The behaviour of the Greek TSO Hellenic Transmission System Operator 
(HTSO) is difficult to analyse with the method used in this study because 
there are many special features in the Greek electricity market. The capacity 
from Bulgaria, which is the main importing direction, remains surprisingly 
low even if it has been increased in the past. This indicates a preference for 
producer interests. In Greece the power sector is vertically integrated, very 
few potential competitors have shown interest to enter the market.  Prices 
remain regulated, except for the biggest industrial consumers.  
                                                 
197  EFET, RO and BG cross-border fees, 2010 
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The utilisation ratio of the interconnector with Italy is very low. Capacity 
on this interconnector has been curtailed when there has been shortage of 
supply in Greece. The shortage of generation capacity is a natural 
consequence of having regulated prices, thus lacking proper scarcity signals.  
To sum up, the behaviour of the Greek TSO HTSO is aligned to the overall 
government policy to limit competition and to regulate prices. 
 
5.12.5. Romania 
 
Romania is a large country but the interconnection capacities to the 
neighbours are very small. For the Romanian TSO, Transelectrica, the 
analysis in this study shows a preference for consumer interests as export 
capacities have been considerably reduced in the past and no increase is 
planned according to the ENTSO-E ten year network development plan. 
This partly prevents optimal use of resources in South East Europe which 
has a lot of complementarities regarding the generation mix. 
 
5.12.6. Italy 
 
The Italian TSO Terna has in the past shown preference for increasing 
consumer welfare by increasing import capacity. Several projects exist to 
further increase import capacity in the future. 
In spite of about 6 GW of import capacity today, the price difference with 
the neighbouring countries remains significant. One reason for this is that 
Italy is the only big country in the EU besides Poland without nuclear 
power. Together with the other past energy policy decisions this has 
resulted in the highest electricity wholesale prices in the EU. This is true in 
spite of Italy being one of the rare countries which took important structural 
measures to reduce the dominant position of the incumbent generation 
company. The consequence of these high prices is that all electricity 
transported to Italy is very profitable. The volume of the electricity trade 
with Italy is so high that the transmission lines to Italy are permanently 
congested and the flows are felt in the whole Central European transmission 
system.  
The TSO Terna has ENEL, the incumbent generation company, as  a 
minority shareholder. The transmission network in Italy is weak and there 
are many bottlenecks inside the Italian system. This has lead to splitting the 
country into six price zones. Increasing import capacity is an important 
political target for the government. Several attempts have been made to 
reserve part of the imported electricity to industrial consumers in order to 
avoid them paying the high Italian price. Part of this policy has been to 
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promote merchant lines, in particular with Switzerland. Terna also has 
several projects to build more import capacity. However, building new lines 
in the alpine area is difficult and as imports are already at a high level, there 
are serious system security concerns linked to capacity increase.  
Italian high prices have attracted plenty of new generation investments 
mainly based on gas. The pressure on imports has become a bit smaller, in 
short periods Italy has even been exporting, which was unthinkable in the 
past. It is likely that to reduce prices, further generation investments in Italy 
are necessary as there is no transmission technology in sight that could 
allow to solve the problem of high prices by only increasing imports. 
In summary, the Italian TSO Terna has pursued a consumer welfare 
oriented policy and has tried to operate efficiently the relatively weak 
transmission grid. 
 
5.12.7. Malta 
 
Malta has only a distribution network. A cable to Italy is planned. 
 
5.12.8. Switzerland 
 
According to the analysis in this study, in the past Switzerland has been able 
to increase consumer welfare. One has to be careful with this result, as 
Switzerland is an extreme transit country and only a simultaneous analysis 
of all changes in cross-border capacity at the Swiss borders, which is not 
done in this study, would give a more reliable result. 
The Swiss transmission grid is still owned by generation companies. Now 
the assets are transferred to the TSO Swissgrid, but the generation 
companies remain the owners of the TSO.  
Switzerland has increased import capacities from commercially 
interesting import directions, which would normally lower prices and 
reduce benefits for the Swiss generating companies. This unexpected 
behaviour could be explained by the fact that the Swiss market is not open 
and the prices for final consumers are to a large extent regulated but exports 
can be made at prices of the neighbouring markets. Thus imports are 
mainly done by the generation companies themselves for reselling the 
electricity abroad for increased profits. The Swiss Federal Energy Agency 
reported that the difference between the income from exports and the costs 
for imports was 2115 million SFR (about 1600 million Euros) in 2008.198 
Additionally, the increase of import capacity from France is all used for the 
                                                 
198  Swiss Federal Office of Energy, electricity statistics 2008, 2009 
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long-term contracts between EdF and Swiss Companies for free under 
priority reservation, thus profiting again directly Swiss generation 
companies. 
Switzerland has a strong dilemma regarding its relation with the EU 
electricity market. Switzerland has been allowed to fully participate in the 
EU electricity market and Swiss companies are among the most active 
traders in Europe. Swiss traders were early to profit from trading 
opportunities and they are still making big profits from the contracts made 
in the past. In contrast, access to the Swiss market is only very limited for 
non-Swiss companies which makes it difficult for them to trade inside and 
around Switzerland. Additionally most of the profitable import and export 
transmission capacity is retained by the Swiss generation and supply 
companies, a practise which is not allowed in the EU. Consequently the 
value of potential congestion rents is collected by the Swiss generation and 
supply companies and increases their profits, instead of being collected by 
Swissgrid which would use congestion rents for investments. Thus Swiss 
consumers are losing as they have to pay a higher transmission tariff than 
what they would pay if all potential congestions rents were received by 
Swissgrid.  
Swiss generation companies are allowed to trade freely in Europe. Further 
integration of Switzerland to the European electricity market is hardly 
possible without an agreement between the EU and Switzerland.199 If the 
Swiss took a longer term view, they might conclude, like Norway has already 
done, that a deeper integration in the EU market gives the best value for the 
Swiss hydro power. An agreement would also give a more stable investment 
environment for energy investments in Switzerland.200 
To sum up, the Swiss TSO Swissgrid and its predecessors have followed 
carefully the owners' interests. It remains to be seen how unbundling and 
other planned changes affect its behaviour in the future. 
5.13. Other third countries 
Russia, Ukraine, Morocco and the non-EU South East European countries 
including Turkey are trading electricity with the EU Member States. The 
level of trade and reciprocity in market access depends on the country. 
Some of these third countries have an electricity deficit, some of them are 
                                                 
199  EC, Oettinger speech, 2011 
200  EC, Barbaso speech, 2010; Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Leuenberg speech, 
2010 
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keen to sell electricity to the EU. There has been some increase in these 
cross-border flows, in particular imports from Ukraine developed in the 
observation period 2000 – 2010. The motivation for trade varies depending 
on the country, in some cases the income from the electricity sold is the 
most important, and in other cases security of supply or political influence 
through interconnection are the driving factors.   
5.14. Summary of the TSOs' behaviour 
The results of the analysis based on social welfare calculations and 
empirical knowledge of the TSOs' behaviour are summarised in Table 8. 
The table summarises the national and company interest factors identified 
in this study for all EU countries except Malta and Cyprus, and for Norway 
and Switzerland. The factors in the table are divided into two parts, negative 
and positive factors. Negative factors are illegal or harmful practises from 
the point of view of European transmission investments, for example if they 
unduly try to transfer social welfare benefits from one Member State to 
another. Positive factors are practises which are favourable to transmission 
investments such as ways to redistribute social welfare inside a Member 
State in order to get acceptance for these investments. 
From Table 8 one can see that regulated prices are still a very common 
practise, even for industrial consumers. Regulated prices do not only 
disturb prices in the market but they are also an indication of lack of 
motivation of the Member State for establishing a functioning electricity 
market in their own country. One could argue that such a country is not 
interested in investing in interconnectors or at least the criteria for deciding 
on investing in interconnectors might not be the same as for those countries 
who believe in functioning electricity markets. 
Regarding the positive factors, investing in wind power is becoming more 
and more important to justify interconnector building. Denmark, Spain and 
Germany need to export in the peak production periods, otherwise wind 
power would be difficult to integrate into the system. The basic reason for 
interconnector investments, namely increasing social welfare, applies to 
most European countries. For importing countries this factor is evident. For 
exporting countries often a factor that mitigates the negative effects of 
redistribution of social welfare from consumers to producers is the public 
ownership of generation companies. This helps in many countries accepting 
additional welfare benefits for producers as public ownership allows using 
various methods to circulate these benefits back to citizens. 
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Another important factor on the positive side is the possibility for the TSO 
to increase congestion rents. This possibility is quite common as many 
borders are far from price convergence. The aim to achieve price 
convergence with the neighbouring country is also among these positive 
factors, even if it means that congestion rents are reduced. The cases where 
this applies are very important for the development of the single electricity 
market. Potential price convergence areas are Central Europe, the Nordic 
countries and the Iberian peninsula.  
The possibility to redistribute social welfare through taxes and levies shall 
also be considered as a positive factor. This applies in particular for 
Germany and Denmark which collect funds for supporting renewables from 
grid tariffs and for Norway and Switzerland which collect taxes and 
concession revenues for public bodies. Industrial policy could promote 
investments in the grid in countries which have companies producing 
equipment for transmission systems, in particular in Germany, Sweden and 
France. 
Regarding negative factors, an important one is causing loop-flows to 
neighbouring countries. Where this is possible, in particular in Germany 
and France, it reduces the motivation of the TSO for investing in the grid as 
the system can be operated by partly using the grid of the neighbours. 
Analogically, the countries which suffer from loop-flows such as the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria, are not 
keen to develop their grid if it is mainly used by the neighbour. A similar 
negative factor appears when the TSO has a possibility to hoard commercial 
capacity at the most wanted border, usually possible for big countries with 
several interconnections. 
Both import and export limitations are common practises regarding 
interconnections. These limitations can be used for influencing prices in a 
country, but often they are used for managing internal bottlenecks in the 
grid. The motivation for increasing interconnection capacity is small if this 
increase aggravates internal bottlenecks and makes their congestion 
management more difficult.  
Regulating wholesale prices, prices for industry and prices for households, 
still common practises in many countries, distort the price signals for 
generation investments, usually also making building interconnectors less 
attractive. Lack of generation investments is sometimes compensated by 
export fees or export limitations in tight supply situations. Examples of this 
type of measures can be found in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, 
Poland and Greece. 
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Positive factors
Mitigating variability of wind power 2.7 x x x x x x x
Possibility for major congestion rent 
increase
3.3 x x x x x x x x x x x
Possibility for major consumer 
welfare increase
3.4 x x x x x x x x x x x x
Possibility for major producer 
welfare increase
3.4 x x x x x x x x x x x
Price convergence 3.13 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Redistribution of social welfare 
through taxes and levies
4.4 x x x x
Generation welfare to the local 
public owners
5.9 x x (x) x x (x) x (x) x x x (x) x x x (x) x x x (x) (x)
Industrial policy  5.9 x x x x
Negative factors
Causing loop flows to neighbouring 
countries
4.2 x x
Suffering from extra physical flows 4.2 x x x x x x x x
Hoarding of commercial capacity 4.2 x x x x
TSO limits unduly imports 4.3 x x x
TSO limits unduly exports 4.3 x x x x x
Regulation of wholesale price 4.5 x x x
Regulated prices for industry 4.5 x x x x x x x x
Regulated prices for households 4.5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Cross-border fees 4.5 x x x
Use of security of supply clauses to 
restrict exports
4.6 x x x
Redistribution of social welfare 
through a two price system
5.9 x x
Passivity in building interconnectors 5.9 x x x x x x x x
A special case regarding price regulation is France which is introducing a 
two price system. Even if the measure as such shall be considered negative, 
it can boost interconnector investments as the wholesale price is decoupled 
from the end user price in France. In this way export revenues can be 
increased without influencing too much the price for French consumers. 
 
Table 8 Summary table of the factors that influence transmission investments based on the analysis in 
this study.  
 
 
Finally the table identifies countries which have been passive regarding 
interconnector investments for various reasons even if there would have 
been a high potential for welfare benefits. For Austria, in addition to the 
loop flows discussed above, acceptance of new transmission infrastructure 
has been particularly difficult. German TSOs have been passive in particular 
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regarding investments for increasing imports which would lower prices in 
Germany. The Swedish TSO has been passive regarding investments in 
increasing exports which would increase prices in Sweden. The UK TSO has 
had legal restrictions in investing in interconnectors. For Bulgaria and 
Romania it is quite difficult to understand the reason for the passive 
behaviour regarding interconnector investments. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS  
6.1. Evaluation of the methodology used in this study 
The methodology used in this study consists of an analytical and an 
empirical part. The analytical part, for which a method is developed in this 
study, uses current congestion rents and interconnection capacity as the 
basis to analyse how much welfare gains could ideally be achieved by 
building interconnectors. Year 2008 is used as the reference year because 
there is a full set of data available for that year and it was almost unaffected 
by the economic crisis, contrary to year 2009, another possible candidate 
for the reference year. There are differences in prices and cross-border trade 
patterns from year to year, for example year 2010 was very dry in 
Scandinavia and there was much more South-North flows in the 
interconnectors than in the past. Thus the results are specific for the 
reference year. However, the variations between years do not dramatically 
change the overall results obtained in this study even if they might influence 
the results at some interconnections. 
After calculating how much welfare the past and planned interconnection 
capacity increase has generated and could potentially generate in the future, 
a behavioural pattern for each TSO is developed. The pattern is based on 
analysing which potentially profitable projects have been promoted and 
which have not. This pattern is then compared with what would be the 
assumed behaviour of the TSO according to the company and national 
interests. To validate the results from this analysis, empirical knowledge on 
real interconnector projects is used. It is studied whether the actual 
behaviour of the TSOs regarding investments is equal to the assumed 
behaviour according to the national and company interests or whether the 
success or failure of the TSO to invest is better explained through other 
factors. 
The methodology has provided some interesting findings. It provides a 
good combination of analytical results and their validation through 
empirical knowledge. The analysis is based on real data and not on 
scenarios. This is at the same time the strength and the weakness of the 
methodology. Investment decisions on interconnectors need to be based on 
their future profitability which requires the use of scenarios. Developing a 
scenario for the future system would, however, require significant further 
assumptions which could introduce additionally arbitrary elements in the 
analysis. This is why the situation in 2008 is used as the base case for the 
analytical part of this study. 
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The quantitative analysis of welfare gains in this study is only used as an 
indicator to reveal and compare TSOs' behaviour. The results should not be 
used as such for the profitability calculation of any interconnector as the 
analysis is not designed for that purpose. Using standard investment costs 
for interconnection capacity is one important simplification which reduces 
the usability of the results regarding profitability. However, in spite of these 
limitations, the results give an indication which interconnectors have the 
highest potential for welfare gains and how these gains are distributed. The 
results also serve as a model for the information that needs to be made 
available to stakeholders in the context of a public consultation on an 
interconnector project. Be it a single interconnector case or a regional or 
European plan, decision makers and stakeholders need to understand the 
effects of new interconnectors on the market and on the welfare 
distribution. 
One strong assumption in the analysis is the use of the price load 
correlations in spot markets as a proxy for supply curves. Using these 
correlations, the calculation answers the question what had been the change 
in market results if interconnection capacity would have suddenly been 
increased in 2008. It is clear that the supply curve reflecting long term 
elasticity is different. For constructing long term supply curves it is 
necessary to make assumptions on what kind of generation capacity will be 
constructed or withdrawn if the supply and demand balance in the 
countries involved changes due to a new interconnector. It is also clear that 
no national system has enough spare generation capacity necessary to 
supply the electricity to fill several thousands of megawatts of additional 
interconnection capacity, which was in some cases necessary for reaching 
the full or the optimal price convergence point. In this sense the results of 
calculation for these cases are unrealistic. For these reasons it is necessary 
to emphasise the indicator nature of the calculated values. 
The analytical method used in this study is less well adapted for countries 
with a high share of transit flows because in this study each interconnection 
is analysed separately. For transit countries it is important to analyse the 
development of all interconnections in an integrated manner including the 
increase both in import and export capacity. In spite of this, even for transit 
countries the results give a good insight of the past and potential future 
welfare gains when properly interpreted.  
For countries in which significant loop flows decrease cross-border 
capacities, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, one should be careful in 
drawing conclusions from the welfare calculations in this study. For these 
countries calculating welfare border by border does not properly take into 
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account the effect of loop flows, thus regional models should be used 
instead. 
6.2. Results regarding the research objective 
The study has provided strong evidence that national and company 
interests have influence on cross-border transmission investments. The 
findings indicate that national and company interests have contributed to 
serious underinvestment in the European transmission network from the 
overall social welfare point of view. The study has identified an overall 
annual social welfare potential of around one billion Euros when increasing 
interconnector capacity between regions, from which potential only about 
two thirds is addressed in the first ENTSO-E ten year network development 
plan.  
The study has shown that the EU Member States have very different 
possibilities to benefit from interconnector investments. In high price 
countries lowering the price through increased imports is an obvious target 
for the government. For example in Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal 
interconnectors have been built with this target in mind. Other targets have 
been pursued as well, for example Finland and Belgium have achieved a 
high level of price convergence with the neighbouring countries through 
building interconnectors. The welfare effect of increased competition 
achieved through price convergence can potentially be far more important 
than the social welfare benefits from price arbitrage. This welfare effect is, 
however, not analysed in this study as it would require a completely 
different approach. 
The study has revealed the beauty contest nature of interconnector 
investments. In particular in countries with several borders, prioritisation 
of developing interconnectors probably is necessary for reasons such as 
limited resources of the TSO and limited capacity of the country to absorb 
more imports or exports. For this prioritisation maximising the TSO or 
national benefits seems to be one important criterion. 
The study has investigated how vertically integrated TSOs behave with 
respect to their owners' interests. Vertically integrated TSOs, often situated 
in exporting countries, prioritise investments which increase income for 
their owner through a higher market price in their home country and 
through improved export possibilities. Profitable interconnectors in import 
directions are sometimes not developed at all, such as in the case of the 
German TSOs in the past or in the case of the French TSO regarding 
planned investments.  
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The behavioural pattern is less clear for the majority of the TSOs which 
are publicly owned or with a mixed public/private ownership and can be 
considered as semi-independent because the state owns also generation 
assets. Among these TSOs the behaviour varies considerably from 
generation welfare oriented, such as the in Czech Republic and Norway, to 
consumer welfare oriented such as in Belgium, Sweden, Poland and 
Slovakia. The study discusses in the empirical part reasons which could 
explain these differences, for example plans to expand nuclear generation 
capacity, importance of increasing competition or reducing prices, or as in 
the case of Poland capacity reductions because of loop flows from 
neighbouring countries. 
Independent TSOs without interests in generation business, often situated 
in importing countries such as Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal, align 
their behaviour to the national interests in order to lower electricity prices 
and increase competition by increasing import capacity. Interconnector 
projects have been successfully finalised and there are more projects 
planned for the future. An exception of this behaviour is the UK TSO which 
has been passive regarding interconnector building in spite of the high 
potential for welfare gains, probably because of the legal restrictions to 
finance interconnectors from tariffs.  
The assumption of the TSO behaviour is validated by analysing how TSOs 
have developed interconnectors in meaningful directions,201 depending on 
the type of ownership of the TSO on each side of the border. The analyses 
uses simple assumptions that (i) a vertically integrated TSO prefers to 
increase capacity only to export direction, (ii) an independent TSO is 
positive both to export of import capacity increase and (iii) a semi-
independent TSO with an indirect link to generation business acts neutrally. 
The results indicate that TSO ownership has had a strong influence on the 
choice of interconnectors which have been developed in the past and which 
are planned to be developed in the future, see Figure 43.  Further 
unbundling of vertically integrated TSOs already seems to have influenced 
the planned interconnector projects in such a way that a higher share of the 
overall social welfare potential will be addressed in the future compared to 
the past. A good example is the interconnector project between Germany 
and Norway.  
                                                 
201  Meaningful direction in this study is the predominant direction of 
commercial flows in 2008.  
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Figure 43 Influence of the ownership of the TSO on the past and planned 
interconnector investments.202 
The study has demonstrated that there is an important dimension of 
welfare distribution between the two countries involved in an 
interconnector project due to the change in the market outcome in both 
countries. The effects depend on several parameters such as on the price 
elasticity and on the variability of market price in the markets to be 
connected. The effect can be very different on each side of the border, for 
example the increase of the absolute welfare for one country can be much 
higher than for the other. The study also has demonstrated that there is an 
important dimension of internal welfare distribution within the two 
countries involved. This is due to the transfer of welfare between producers 
and consumers.  For this reason at least part of the benefits are often 
redistributed back from the winners to the losers inside each country. A two 
price system in France, taxes and a relatively high share of grid costs paid 
by generators in Norway and maintaining price regulation for the end user 
prices in several Member States are examples of this welfare redistribution. 
Redistribution of welfare seems to be commonly used to get political 
acceptance for major interconnector investments.  
                                                 
202  The motivation of the TSO to build interconnection capacity is (i) positive 
from the less independent TSO to a more independent TSO, (ii) neutral 
between two semi-independent TSOs or from an independent TSO to a semi-
independent TSO and (iii) negative to the direction of a vertically integrated 
TSO. The calculation is presented in Chapter 5.3. 
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Even if the study has demonstrated that company interests are important 
regarding the selection of interconnector projects, the study has also 
indicated that company interests might not always be the determining 
factor for the success of transmission investments. There are many cases in 
which there is a clear company interest on both sides to invest but the 
project is not successful. This could be due to the difficulty to get local 
acceptance for the project. This may be a far more serious obstacle to 
interconnector investments than company interests. Thus projects may not 
be finalised independently of whether the TSOs had the motivation for 
trying hard or not. 
Our findings indicate that there are a number of factors that potentially 
influence the motivation of TSO for investing. Among these factors security 
of supply considerations tend to promote investments. Uncertainty 
regarding many assumptions needed for profitability calculation can stop or 
delay investments, as also uncertainty regarding the development of the 
project, for example whether the project gets a permit or not. A serious 
distortion of investment signals is caused by the difference between 
commercial and physical flows, inherent to electricity networks. This issue 
is aggravated by the fact that large countries can make discretionary 
decisions on cross-border capacities and can influence flows through 
dispatching decisions while small countries have fewer possibilities for this. 
Without any global agreement on this issue, usually referred as loop flows, 
there is a risk that the European transmission network will be developed 
using partial optimisation leading to important welfare losses. A worrying 
example of the consequences of this phenomenon is the uncoordinated 
investment in phase shifter transformers and the uncoordinated operation 
of these transformers. Several disputes are ongoing on how to share the 
commercial capacity for example at the borders of Italy or in the Central 
Eastern Europe region.  
The influence of company and national interests in transmission 
investments could become more aggravated in the future. The need to build 
transmission capacity for integrating wind power is huge and the projects 
will be increasingly expensive. Price arbitrage between regions then 
becomes one determinant among several others. Cross-border flows will not 
be marginal exchanges between two countries but they will spread all over 
Europe from wind production areas to consumption areas. More countries 
feel the effect of variable loop flows which are originating from distant 
locations such as from the North Sea. Wind power will thus have a strong 
market integration effect as the whole Europe needs to be motivated for 
being part of the system. The way the social welfare benefits and costs are 
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distributed between countries will become even more important. In 
addition to the common co-ordinated transmission infrastructure plan for 
the whole Europe, the governments, regulators and TSOs need to agree to 
the implied costs and price effects of the plan, otherwise the new network 
simply will not be built. 
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Figure 44 Overall motivation of the European countries for investing in the electricity 
transmission infrastructure in the time period 2020 – 2030. 
 
An overall picture of the motivation of each European country for building 
transmission infrastructure based on the findings of this study is presented 
in Figure 44. Countries are divided into four categories depending on their 
level of motivation for investing in the European grid. The main reason for 
each country for the motivation or lack of motivation is indicated in the 
figure. 
6.3. Other findings and proposals based on this study 
The study has estimated that the annual congestion cost in the European 
electricity market is more than two billion Euros based on analysing the 
congestion between regions using 2008 as the reference year. This 
estimation is based on a method with some heroic assumptions, the main 
purpose of the method being to analyse TSOs' behaviour regarding 
transmission investments. However, the results are also interesting for 
welfare calculation as the method allows estimating welfare potential of 
interconnectors for countries without transparent market price data.  
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The results indicate that there is a lot of potential to increase social 
welfare benefits by building interconnectors. This is in particular true for 
interconnectors from Central Europe to the regions at the perimeter, 
namely to Italy, the Iberian peninsula, the UK, and the Nordic countries. 
This study estimates that connecting these regions as planned in the 
ENTSO-E ten year plan will increase the annual social welfare by about 700 
million euros. The optimum annual social welfare increase which amounts 
almost to one billion euros would require more than a two times higher 
capacity increase compared to what is planned in the ENTSO-E ten year 
plan.  
As the cost of interconnectors from Central Europe to the perimeter 
regions is high, an average absolute price difference of about 5 €/MWh is 
needed at the optimal investment level if only the price arbitrage benefits 
are taken into account. This means that no full market integration between 
Central Europe and these other regions will be achieved. However, inside 
Central Europe, including both the Western and Eastern parts of Central 
Europe, a high level of price convergence is achievable and is already the 
case today to a large extent. Spreading of market coupling will further 
improve price convergence. However, the increasing volatile wind 
production will oppose this trend by causing in high wind periods big price 
differences inside the Central European region. In order to provide efficient 
locational signals in the more volatile market, price and bidding zones need 
to be redesigned with the underlying network and the scarcity signals in 
mind. This study contributes to the discussion by presenting a subjective 
view on how to split Europe into 45 bidding zones and into five price index 
areas. 
The study shows that it is possible to develop objective criteria for 
interconnector investments. Social welfare benefits from price arbitrage 
should be one criterion but several other criteria should be used as well 
including price convergence, security of supply and competition benefits. 
These other criteria can be included with a reasonable accuracy in the social 
welfare calculation. 
The study shows that uncertainty linked to infrastructure investments is 
increasing. The need for transmission investments depends to a large extent 
on how much and which type of generation capacity is built and where it is 
located. Most of the new generation capacity in the European electricity 
system will be subsidised renewable capacity. The way these subsidies are 
attributed varies considerably across Europe. These differences together 
with the inherent uncertainty linked to political decisions create uncertainty 
for interconnector investment decisions.  
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The study has only shortly discussed merchant investments presenting the 
difficulties to have merchant investments in the same network as regulated 
investments. EU's current legislation assumes that most interconnectors 
will be built by the regulated TSOs. However, in some countries there is a 
risk that the regulated TSO will not proceed with the necessary projects 
because of rapidly increasing investment needs, limited human resources of 
the TSO, limited capability of the TSO to finance projects with debt and 
equity, and finally because of a distorted incentive structure. Thus it might 
be necessary to reopen the discussion on the need for merchant 
investments. 
The study discusses the close relation between transmission and 
generation investments and suggests that the ten year network development 
plan prepared by ENTSO-E should promote optimal location of generation. 
This plan should be consistent with the market design including 
optimisation of the price and bidding zones. TSOs should define and 
publish a realistic target for transmission capacity between price and 
bidding zones, taking into account the generation and load scenarios of the 
Member States. The aim should be to set the target at the level of the best 
estimate of the optimal capacity.  
The study discusses how distribution of welfare between countries and 
between TSOs can be addressed by developing financing and cost and 
revenue distribution schemes which aim at a better distribution of the 
project costs and welfare benefits. This is possible for example when 
deciding on the value of commercial capacity, on sharing of project costs 
and on sharing of congestion rents. Currently each TSO covers the costs in 
its own territory and congestion rents are shared fifty-fifty which does not 
necessarily make investments equally desirable for both sides. In the future 
when the European transmission system needs to be developed in a more 
global manner, a more sophisticated system should be developed to finance 
projects that are important from the European perspective and cannot be 
attributed only to one or two single countries.203  
A European transmission financing system should first address the 
current flaws in the cost and benefit sharing, such as the cases of unfair 
distribution of commercial capacity and congestion rents identified in this 
study. Transparency of network income, costs and investments should also 
considerably improve. Network development plans should include, besides 
                                                 
203  The infrastructure package of the European Commission proposes that such a 
mechanism should be developed. EC, infrastructure package, 2010 
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investment costs, a calculation of social welfare benefits and how they are 
distributed. This helps to address the issue of sharing the costs and benefits.  
The study discusses how to implement in practise the cost and benefit 
readjustment of transmission investments. For example the investment can 
be paid or the congestion rent can be shared proportionally to the benefits. 
One of the problems is that there is currently no mechanism in any Member 
State how the tariff system can take into account investments in another 
country.  
Investments can be decided in a global package designed to make all 
parties satisfied when summing up the costs and benefits for each party. 
This type of a package has already been successful for example in Northern 
Europe. Investments can also be promoted by a fund in which all countries 
would contribute for example through a European levy in the transmission 
tariffs or through a portion from the congestion rents.204  
This study presents the basic elements for the design of a two-tier 
European transmission financing system. This system consists of an ex-ante 
part for sharing the investment costs and benefits and an ex-post part for 
the continuous distribution of costs and benefits during the lifetime of the 
investment.  
6.4. Recommendations for further work 
This study has not depleted the topic of influence of national and company 
interests on transmission investments. It would be interesting to know to 
what extent the recently decided unbundling requirements will improve the 
situation regarding investments. The results of such a study would give an 
indication whether further steps are needed and whether unbundling also 
should be pursued in distribution networks. Another topic of interest is how 
efficient unbundling is when the state owns both the TSO and a generation 
company. Even if the ownership is formally separated, there is a risk that at 
the government level decisions are not taken in an independent manner. 
Data on interconnector usage reveals interconnectors which are not used 
efficiently. One should study to what extent TSOs unduly reduce cross-
border capacity to manage their internal congestion problems. The usually 
modest sums used for redispatching give an indication that limiting cross-
border capacity is a widely used practise. 
The social welfare calculations of this study have been made using a 
simple model with strong assumptions using 2008 as the reference year. 
                                                 
204  Proposal made by the Czech Government in the context of the discussion on 
ITC mechanism in 2009. 
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The same calculations could be made using network modelling and load and 
generation scenarios for the future time periods. It would be interesting to 
calculate the social welfare for a combination of projects, at least per region.  
This study gives indications that there are several transmission projects 
that would benefit from reattribution of costs and benefits in order to 
motivate all TSOs involved to do their share of the investment. However, 
further work should be done to identify the individual projects suitable for 
this kind of reattribution and to estimate the efficiency of reattribution. 
Transparency of network data is still an area which requires further work. 
Even if this study only uses rather elementary data, we have not been able to 
find coherent and complete datasets for the analysis, even if there has been 
an enormous progress in the past years regarding the availability of relevant 
network data. ENTSO-E should make a further effort to publish a complete 
set of relevant data in an easily accessible form. Redispatching costs is one 
example of missing data which would be important for understanding 
congestion in the European transmission network. 
The ENTSO-E ten year network development plan needs to include 
generation scenarios. The ten year plan should also include a social welfare 
calculation, not only for price arbitrage, but also estimations of security of 
supply and competition effects of investments. The plan should have a 
global view of Europe with the aim to find an optimal combination of 
investments and to define binding target values for cross-border capacity. 
Further research should address the competition benefits of 
interconnectors, in particular for regions with high price convergence. It is 
possible that the competition benefits of increasing interconnection 
capacity for these regions are far higher than the price arbitrage benefits. 
One should also address the potential threat for increased market power 
through interconnectors. Academic literature of these topics exists and 
calculations have been made for some regions, but they do not cover well 
the whole of Europe. 
Optimal price zones for Europe should be studied. There is research in 
this area and the Central Western Europe regulators have decided to launch 
a study on this issue for their region. Also nodal pricing should be kept on 
the research agenda in Europe, in particular as Russia applies it already and 
Poland is planning to do so. 
Local opposition is the biggest obstacle to overhead high voltage line 
investments. This topic is not well covered by academic studies. Literature 
exists on this topic for transport infrastructure such as roads and railways. 
More studies should be made how local opposition can be overcome for 
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example through more efficient compensations schemes for people living 
close to transmission lines and through improving the planning process. 
It should be studied whether the new institutions put in place in the 
recent European legislation, namely ENTSO-E and the ACER, are 
sufficiently equipped for addressing the challenge of European transmission 
investments. It is possible that the new investment challenges partly driven 
by technology opportunities require increasing the powers of these new 
institutions regarding investment decisions. 
Building the future European grid needs strong co-operation between 
Member States. National interests will not disappear, it is clear that 
governments need to take care of their citizens' interests. For this reason the 
European co-operation should be organised in such a way that national 
interests are properly taken into account in transmission investment 
decisions. Every participant should be equally thrilled when building the 
future transmission grid for Europe. This did not quite succeed when the 
monks made experiments with their grid in Paris in 1746. 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Supergrid experiment in Paris in 1746.205 
                                                 
205  Lindell, history of electricity, 1994. Nollet made an experiment in Paris in 
1746 in which 200 monks were connected with metal wires to a 1.5 km chain. 
An electric discharge was connected to both ends of the chain which made the 
monks scream. However, all monks did not feel the thrill. This has been 
explained to be due to wet sandals causing an earth fault. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Description of the method used in this study to analyse past, 
planned and optimal interconnector investments 
 
The method used in this study to calculate the social welfare effects of the 
past, planned and optimal interconnector investments uses as parameters 
(i) supply curves with the slope equal to the slope of the linear regression 
line of correlation between spot price and load in 2008 (2009) for each 
country, see Figure 1, (ii) cross-border capacities and commercial flows 
between countries in 2008 and (iii) congestion rents collected from each 
border in 2008.  
 
 
Figure 1 Illustration of the method used in this study. 
Firstly an equivalent price difference between two countries is calculated 
by dividing the congestion rents in 2008 by the corresponding cross-border 
flows. The effects of increasing the interconnection capacity are then 
calculated by assuming that the additional interconnection capacity is fully 
used until the price convergence point.  
The slopes of the linear regression lines of correlation between spot price 
and load in 2008 (2009 and 2010) for each country, the congestion rents, 
commercial flows and cross-border capacities in 2008 as well as the past, 
planned and optimal increase of the interconnector capacity including their 
welfare effects are in Tables 1 – 5 of this appendix. Welfare calculation 
results for each country are shown in Tables 6 - 8 of this appendix.  
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The model uses 2008 as the reference year. The effects of the past, 
planned and optimal investments are calculated using this reference year as 
the base case. Regarding past investments the results answer thus the 
question: if everything else remains as it was in 2008, what was the welfare 
effect of a single investment in the past? Similarly regarding planned 
investments the results answer the question: what will be the welfare effect 
of each planned investment in the future if only one interconnector is built, 
everything else remaining as in 2008. Regarding the optimal investments 
the approach is the same as for the planned investments. First the optimal 
capacity is determined using the model, after that the corresponding 
welfare effects are calculated. 
The benefit of using congestion rents for calculating the price difference 
between countries is that it allows analysing also interconnectors which do 
not have spot prices on both sides of the interconnector. 
In the calculations the cost of an AC interconnection is assumed to be 
10.000€/a/MW and the cost of a DC interconnector 50.000M€/a/MW, 
based on the author's estimation for reasonable average costs relying on 
data on existing investment projects. 
The data for 2008 is presented in Tables 1 – 2.  Some missing data is 
replaced by estimated values, the reasons are explained in the tables and in 
Endnote 2 of this appendix. 
 
The following formulas have been used in the calculation. 
 
Equivalent price difference in 2008, 
 
   Peq i = CR i / CFi,    (1) 
 
where CR i = congestion rent in 2008 at interconnector i and CFi 
is the sum of net nominated flows over the interconnector in 
2008. 
 
Additional flow due to capacity increase, 
 
  CFadd i = Cadd i * 8760h,                   (2) 
 
where Cadd i is the capacity added. 
 
Absolute increase in producer welfare, 
 
PW i = CFadd i * Cadd i * pa / 2,  (3) 
 
where pa is the slope of the supply curve in Country a. 
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Absolute increase in consumer welfare, 
 
CW i = CFadd i * Cadd i * pb / 2,         (4) 
 
where pb is the slope of the supply curve in Country b. 
 
 
Shift from congestion rent to producer welfare, 
SCRP i = Cadd i * pa /Peq i * CR i .                           (5) 
Shift from congestion rent to consumer welfare,  
SCRC i = Cadd i * pb/Peq i * CR i .               (6) 
Change in congestion rent, 
CRadd = CR i – SCRP - SCRC + (Peq i –Cadd i *(pa+pb))*Cadd i.  (7) 
Shift from consumer welfare to producer welfare in Country a, 
SCP i = Cadd i * pa* La,                   (8) 
 
where La is the load in Country a. 
 
Shift from producer welfare to consumer welfare in Country b, 
 
SPC i = Cadd i * pb* (Lb-CFi) – CW i,           (9) 
 
where Lb is the load in Country b. 
 
An equivalent price difference is calculated from the realised flows and 
not from the theoretically feasible flows which would be the other 
alternative. Most interconnectors with significant price difference between 
price zones which they are connecting have utilisation ratios of around 70 
%. There are several reasons why the utilisation is not higher. First of all, 
the capacity is not available at all times for example due to maintenance. 
Secondly, on many interconnectors there are still inefficient methods to 
allocate capacity such as explicit auctions which reduces the utilisation 
ratio. Thirdly, as the price difference is in reality volatile and not static as 
assumed in this method, there are usually periods of price convergence even 
at interconnectors with a substantial average price difference which means 
that it is not rationale to use the full capacity in those periods. 
On the contrary, the method assumes that the capacity additions are used 
to their theoretical maximum. An alternative would be to use a standard 
utilisation ratio lower than 100 % based for example on the average 
utilisation ratio for all interconnections or an individual utilisation ration 
based for example on the current utilisation ratio of that interconnector. 
This would, however, add another strong assumption which would 
somewhat change the results but would not be significant regarding the 
conclusions drawn from them.  
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For each interconnector the capacity for full price convergence and the 
optimal capacity are calculated.  
 
Capacity needed for full price convergence, 
 
Cconv i =  Peq i / (pa + pb).    (11) 
 
The optimal capacity is assumed to be at the level of additional capacity in 
which the absolute increase in producer and consumer welfare equals to the 
cost of building new capacity. 
 
Optimal capacity, 
 
Cadd i opt = (Peq i – COint / 8760h) / (pa+pb),   (12) 
 
where COint is the annual cost of the interconnector, for AC  
10.000 €/MW and for DC 50.000 €/MW. 
 
It is interesting to note that the remaining price difference at the optimum 
point is constant, 5.7 €/MWh for DC interconnectors and 1.1 €/MWh for AC 
interconnectors with these cost assumptions.  
Using these formulas the various social welfare components are calculated 
for the past, planned and optimum investments. The results for each 
interconnector are shown in Tables 3 - 5 and the overall changes for each 
country in Table 6 - 8 of this appendix.  
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Table 1 Load and slope of the supply curve used in the welfare calculations. 
Country 
Load in 
2008 
[TWh] 
Slope of the 
supply 
curve 
[€/GW] 
Year of the spot market data from 
which the slope of the supply 
curve is calculated 
FI 87 2.8 2009 
NO 128.9 1.4 2009 
NL 120.2 12.2 2008 
DK 36.4 17.0 2009 (average of East and West) 
DE 557.2 2.6 2008 
SE 144.1 1.3 2009 
PL 142.9 9.7 2009 
FR 494.5 1.0 2008 
BE 89.5 16.0 2008 
UK1 333 1.3 2010 (part of the year) 
ES 270.9 1.6 2008 
CH 64.4 12.1 2010 (part of the year) 
AT 68.4 9.0 Estimated 
CZ 65.1 9.2 2009 
SK 27.6 25.0 Estimated 
HU 41.3 18.4 2010 (part of the year) 
SI 12.7 55.2 Estimated 
RO 55.2 14.6 2008 
BG 34.5 14.0 Estimated 
GR 56.3 14.5 2008 
IT 339.5 3.3 2008 
PT 52.2 5.6 2009 
IE and NI 37 15.6 2010 (part of the year) 
EE 8 33.7 2010 (part of the year) 
LV 7.6 46.9 Estimated 
LT 11.5 14.9 Estimated 
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Table 2 Interconnection data from 2008 used for welfare calculations. 2 
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NO NL 3.4 0.3 700 700 60% 112.5 30.4 
NO DK 4.8 0.4 750 710 80% 95.3 18.2 
DK DE 9.1 1.4 2050 1500 59% 105.6 10.0 
SE DE 2.5 0.5 600 600 58% 0.0 20.0 
SE DK 6.7 1.8 1980 2240 49% 55.1 6.5 
SE PL 2.1 0.1 600 350 42% 0.0 15.0 
DE NL 14.4 0.1 3925 3450 42% 64.7 4.5 
PL DE 1.3 0.0 1150 1000 13% 21.8 16.8 
DE FR 14.4 1.8 2575 2675 64% 156.3 10.9 
FR BE 9.9 0.9 2950 1650 42% 25.1 2.3 
NL BE 3.7 2.2 2150 2200 32% 33.7 5.7 
FR UK 12.0 0.6 2000 2000 72% 202.2 16.0 
FR ES 3.3 0.6 1300 500 34% 93.4 17.0 
FR CH 18.5 0.1 3100 1850 68% 0.0 8.8 
DE CH 4.0 3.2 1900 4200 43% 67.6 9.4 
DE AT 8.6 0.7 1500 1600 71% 0.0 0.0 
CZ DE 7.6 0.2 2275 750 39% 27.3 3.5 
PL CZ 0.8 0.0 1630 800 6% 12.6 14.8 
PL SK 0.8 0.0 475 525 18% 15.9 20.8 
CZ SK 3.6 0.1 1150 1000 37% 23.1 6.3 
SK HU 6.4 0.0 1000 600 73% 34.1 5.3 
CZ AT 2.5 1.6 250 500 186% 5.4 1.3 
AT HU 1.0 0.2 500 100 29% 32.2 25.7 
AT CH 1.6 0.5 1000 1100 24% 17.1 8.2 
AT SI 3.0 1.1 350 650 132% 41.9 10.3 
RO HU 1.2 0.0 800 600 18% 24.6 19.7 
RO BG 1.4 0.0 625 625 26% 14.1 9.8 
BG GR 3.7 0.0 550 300 77% 37.4 10.0 
IT GR 1.8 0.2 500 500 45% 11.3 5.7 
ES PT 9.3 0.1 1200 1200 90% 64.5 6.8 
FR IT 17.9 0.0 2525 930 81% 299.9 16.7 
CH IT 20.0 0.0 3525 1300 65% 146.5 15.0 
AT IT 1.7 0.0 210 75 90% 30.4 18.3 
SI IT 3.0 0.2 380 140 93% 21.4 6.9 
FI SE 4.2 3.9 1600 2000 58% 1.3 0.2 
NO SE 8.9 2.4 2825 2350 46% 85.1 7.5 
NO DE 0.0 0.0 0 0 NA 0.0 24.4 
NO UK 0.0 0.0 0 0 NA 0.0 30.4 
BE UK 0.0 0.0 0 0 NA 0.0 18.3 
UK IE 0.7 0.2 410 80 24% 0.0 10.0 
DK NL 0.0 0.0 0 0 NA 0.0 14.5 
HU SI 0.0 0.0 0 0 NA 0.0 5.0 
NL UK 0.0 0.0 0 0 NA 0.0 13.7 
EE FI 2.4 0.0 350 350 77% 0.0 5.0 
LT SE 0.0 0.0 0 0 NA 0.0 5.0 
LT PL 0.0 0.0 0 0 NA 0.0 5.0 
LV EE 1.3 0.0 750 750 20% 0.0 0.0 
LT LV 1.0 0.0 1100 900 10% 0.0 0.0 
Sum 224 26 55210 45350 Av 46% 1979 Av 11,2 
Incentive for the TSOs:      = Positive       = Neutral       = Negative 
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Table 3 Past welfare increase due to cross border capacity increase in 2000 – 2010 
compared to 2008 welfare. 
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NO NL 700 76 77 619 609 113 40 48 
NO DK -50 -7 -8 -25 -21 -2 -1 -5 
DK DE 350 127 160 297 292 -17 23 -5 
SE DE 140 15 16 118 118 14 4 4 
SE DK -270 -33 -35 -107 -80 22 9 -16 
SE PL 600 47 48 123 123 33 2 3 
DE NL 200 122 125 124 109 -14 -5 7 
PL DE -750 -134 -136 -140 -140 -12 -7 -6 
DE FR 1450 1508 1540 515 503 73 61 41 
FR BE 1450 300 305 870 791 -45 -25 50 
NL BE 500 231 241 226 212 -12 1 5 
FR UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FR ES 300 51 51 45 44 15 6 6 
FR CH 700 236 244 373 277 -53 -22 65 
DE CH 1210 301 304 408 377 25 9 38 
DE AT -250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CZ DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PL CZ -1085 -65 -65 -28 -27 -5 -3 -3 
PL SK -320 -82 -82 -41 -39 -8 -5 -6 
CZ SK 780 171 178 197 180 4 5 16 
SK HU 250 125 151 138 120 -29 9 3 
CZ AT -230 -80 -86 -83 -77 11 0 0 
AT HU -200 -35 -36 -44 -42 -10 -6 -7 
AT CH -1210 -57 -59 -72 -69 -1 -3 -3 
AT SI 450 99 106 113 70 -42 -17 19 
RO HU -1150 -64 -67 -108 -105 -11 -8 -9 
RO BG -430 -73 -75 -43 -41 -2 -3 -3 
BG GR 400 149 159 252 242 18 17 18 
IT GR 500 252 253 183 180 11 -6 -4 
ES PT 600 233 239 157 136 14 10 25 
FR IT 600 234 241 545 520 43 26 44 
CH IT 660 333 427 479 453 -51 65 -3 
AT IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SI IT 30 20 24 31 31 -3 3 -1 
FI SE 350 49 53 38 36 -5 0 -2 
NO SE 1245 103 110 109 102 28 15 14 
NO DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NO UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BE UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UK IE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DK NL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HU SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NL UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EE FI 350 73 84 66 65 12 8 -2 
LT SE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LT PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LV EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LT LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 7870 4228 4489 5335 4948 113 202 328 
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Table 4 Welfare increase for capacity increase planned in the ENTSO-E ten year network 
development plan. 3 
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NO NL 450 450 81 85 660 629 73 29 56 
NO DK 700 700 126 134 433 334 -35 -27 64 
DK DE 400 400 248 331 579 567 -75 44 -27 
SE DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SE DK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SE PL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DE NL 1000 302 437 449 442 384 -65 -25 21 
PL DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DE FR 250 250 362 372 124 119 7 12 7 
FR BE 300 136 67 69 195 170 -25 -13 11 
NL BE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FR UK 1000 1000 495 511 433 411 91 38 43 
FR ES 2600 2600 1286 1325 1127 1063 207 78 102 
FR CH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DE CH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DE AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CZ DE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PL CZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PL SK 200 200 277 280 138 130 19 12 17 
CZ SK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SK HU 800 123 85 106 94 78 -34 0 -5 
CZ AT 800 72 43 46 44 42 -5 -4 -4 
AT HU 340 340 209 218 258 241 37 25 34 
AT CH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AT SI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RO HU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RO BG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BG GR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IT GR 500 322 361 364 263 247 -11 -15 -2 
ES PT 1500 951 412 433 278 206 -65 -19 33 
FR IT 1150 1150 552 579 1288 1201 30 13 73 
CH IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AT IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SI IT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FI SE 1550 39 10 10 7 7 -1 -7 -8 
NO SE 375 375 68 75 71 65 10 10 9 
NO DE 1400 1400 253 265 2028 2006 231 92 103 
NO UK 1400 1400 253 265 606 595 327 140 140 
BE UK 1000 1000 1432 1502 433 427 9 50 -15 
UK IE 500 500 216 218 289 265 0 -11 11 
DK NL 700 497 308 326 729 716 0 1 -4 
HU SI 800 68 51 52 47 46 0 -4 -3 
NL UK 1290 958 1405 1455 672 663 0 17 -24 
EE FI 650 137 37 51 33 32 -12 -8 -21 
LT SE 700 309 53 59 58 57 0 -11 -17 
LT PL 1000 203 35 38 282 280 0 -22 -23 
LV EE 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 
LT LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 23605 15883 9162 9619 11613 10982 713 394 569 
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Table 5 Welfare increase with optimal capacity increase compared to 2008 welfare. 
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NO NL 2154 1818 328 358 2667 2408 0 -16 213 
NO DK 926 677 122 130 419 325 -31 -25 62 
DK DE 454 222 281 378 658 644 -89 50 -32 
SE DE 4835 3665 687 778 5309 5127 139 69 160 
SE DK 291 41 8 8 26 19 -4 -3 3 
SE PL 2933 1967 368 396 963 890 78 17 63 
DE NL 224 0 325 334 329 287 -46 -15 18 
PL DE 1273 901 1764 1849 1844 1821 -8 75 13 
DE FR 2699 1431 3910 4094 1335 1259 - 105 -3 
FR BE 69 0 34 35 99 87 -12 -6 6 
NL BE 161 0 236 249 231 213 -25 0 4 
FR UK 6473 4488 2219 2364 1943 1754 94 80 123 
FR ES 6099 4343 2148 2247 1883 1723 173 78 137 
FR CH 588 239 291 303 458 308 -137 -59 79 
DE CH 628 281 362 368 490 414 -53 -23 46 
DE AT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CZ DE 201 0 120 136 291 287 -16 7 -5 
PL CZ 724 483 1004 1032 434 407 -4 22 21 
PL SK 567 435 786 804 391 345 -9 10 39 
CZ SK 150 16 90 96 103 87 -17 -3 7 
SK HU 97 0 67 83 74 62 -26 3 -1 
CZ AT 10 0 6 6 6 6 -1 0 0 
AT HU 895 729 551 593 680 595 -22 26 70 
AT CH 335 119 207 217 261 247 -11 3 7 
AT SI 143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RO HU 562 424 339 370 571 533 -18 19 27 
RO BG 303 143 244 256 146 134 -9 6 5 
BG GR 313 152 151 173 255 232 -30 6 7 
IT GR 258 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
ES PT 793 158 344 360 232 174 -46 -11 30 
FR IT 3625 2563 1231 1306 2871 2625 -69 -24 148 
CH IT 900 604 470 636 676 631 -156 72 -48 
AT IT 1395 1024 630 687 1147 1126 30 46 10 
SI IT 98 20 14 18 23 22 -3 2 -2 
FI SE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NO SE 2349 658 424 495 447 381 13 66 61 
NO DE 5815 4673 843 977 6770 6521 234 134 249 
NO UK 10851 9159 1653 2167 3965 3487 458 514 478 
BE UK 995 731 1046 1084 316 313 37 37 3 
UK IE 524 254 110 111 147 139 9 -1 6 
DK NL 458 302 187 193 442 437 15 7 5 
HU SI 52 0 40 40 37 36 1 0 1 
NL UK 879 559 820 837 392 389 28 17 3 
EE FI 106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LT SE 238 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LT PL 157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LV EE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LT LV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 63600 43280 24461 26570 39331 36497 334 1286 2011
 
XX  =  Value chosen for the calculations.
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 Table 6 Summary results for each country of the welfare increase due to the past electricity 
interconnector investments in 2000 – 2010  compared to the welfare in 2008. 
 
 Past 2000 - 2010 
Country 
Consumer 
welfare 
increase 
[M€] 
Producer 
welfare 
increase 
[M€] 
TSO revenue 
increase 
[M€] 
Overall 
welfare 
increase for 
the country 
[M€] 
FI 17 -12 -7 -2 
NO -172 180 45 53 
NL 511 -477 22 56 
DK -259 261 0 2 
DE -1657 1699 15 57 
SE 117 -110 19 26 
PL 404 -405 -11 -13 
FR -307 340 -6 27 
BE 1096 -1003 -38 54 
UK 0 0 0 0 
ES -188 195 10 16 
CH 375 -158 -53 165 
AT -89 88 -24 -25 
CZ -119 119 1 2 
SK 31 10 -22 20 
HU -13 27 -26 -13 
SI 93 -46 -25 22 
RO 137 -142 -6 -11 
BG -192 200 6 14 
GR 436 -422 0 14 
IT 803 -751 -19 33 
PT 157 -136 4 25 
IE and NI 0 0 0 0 
EE -73 84 -3 8 
LV 0 0 0 0 
LT 0 0 0 0 
Sum 1107 -459 -117 530 
 
 Doctoral Dissertation – Matti Supponen                                                                                                 Appendix 1 
173 
Table 7 Summary results for each country of the welfare increase due to the planned 
electricity interconnector investments in 2011 – 2025 compared to the welfare in 2008. 
 Planned 2011 - 2025 
Country 
Consumer 
welfare 
increase 
[M€] 
Producer 
welfare 
increase 
[M€] 
TSO revenue 
increase 
[M€] 
Overall 
welfare 
increase for 
the country 
[M€] 
FI 24 -22 -31 -29 
NO -780 823 202 245 
NL 426 -274 -62 90 
DK -122 323 -92 109 
DE 1809 -1751 6 64 
SE 137 -129 -23 -16 
PL 5 0 -17 -12 
FR -2276 2365 34 123 
BE -1237 1332 -34 61 
UK 1927 -1878 84 133 
ES 715 -630 -1 83 
CH 0 0 0 0 
AT -165 176 10 21 
CZ -43 46 -7 -4 
SK 53 -23 -13 17 
HU 301 -267 -8 25 
SI 47 -46 -4 -3 
RO 0 0 0 0 
BG 0 0 0 0 
GR 263 -247 -18 -2 
IT 928 -837 -32 59 
PT 278 -206 -40 33 
IE and NI 289 -265 -13 11 
EE -37 51 -23 -10 
LV 0 0 -1 -1 
LT -88 97 -43 -34 
Sum 2451 -1363 -125 963 
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Table 8 Summary results for each country of the welfare increase due to the optimal 
electricity interconnector investments compared to the welfare in 2008. 
 Optimal 
Country 
Consumer 
welfare 
increase 
[M€] 
Producer 
welfare 
increase 
[M€] 
TSO revenue 
increase 
[M€] 
Overall 
welfare 
increase for 
the country 
[M€] 
FI 0 0 0 0 
NO -3370 4128 -84 673 
NL 2382 -2046 -83 252 
DK -23 227 -83 121 
DE 10275 -9602 -221 452 
SE -616 801 -41 145 
PL -2591 2795 -34 170 
FR -4588 4996 -342 66 
BE -717 783 -20 47 
UK 6506 -5834 -67 606 
ES 1539 -1363 -49 127 
CH 739 -333 -201 204 
AT -1382 1492 -34 76 
CZ 218 -169 -25 24 
SK 427 -349 -30 48 
HU 1286 -1150 -40 96 
SI 22 -18 -2 2 
RO -583 626 -18 25 
BG -5 39 -23 11 
GR 256 -233 -17 7 
IT 4716 -4403 -204 109 
PT 232 -174 -27 30 
IE and NI 147 -139 -2 6 
EE 0 0 0 0 
LV 0 0 0 0 
LT 0 0 0 0 
Sum 14870 -9928 -1645 3297 
                                                 
1   In this study for UK the data for Great Britain is used, Northern Ireland is 
together with Ireland. 
2  The shaded price difference values are estimated by the author as on these 
interconnections the congestion rent does not represent the arbitrage value of the 
capacity or it is not known. This may be due to non market based capacity 
allocation. CRE, interconnection 2008, 2009. 
3  For planned investments capacity increase is taken into account in the welfare 
calculations only up to the price convergence point, except for costs which are 
calculated for the full planned capacity. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Detailed data for Figures 10 and 29 
 
Table 1 Calculations for Figure 10.  
 
Capacity  [GW] 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Load A [ TWh/a] 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Load B  [TWh/a] 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 200 
Cost [M€/a] 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 
Price difference between A 
and B [€/MWh] 
20   18  16  13  11  9  7  4   2   0  0  
Flow from A to B [TWh/a] 0   4  9  13  18  22  26  31   35   39  39  
Congestion rent  [M€/a] 0   78  136  174  193  192  171  130   70   0  0  
Additional producer welfare 
in A  [M€/a] 
0   2  7  15  26  41  59  80   105   133  133  
Additional consumer 
welfare in B  [M€/a] 
0   3  13  30  53  82  118  161   210   266  266  
Shift from cons. welfare to 
prod. welfare in A [M€/a] 
0 150 300 450 600 750 900 1050 1200 1350 1350 
Shift from prod. welfare to 
cons. welfare in B [M€/a] 
0 147 287 420 547 668 782 889 990 1084 1084 
Net income for the TSO  
[M€/a] 
0   53  86  99  93  67  21  -45   -130   -225  -250  
Net increase in social 
welfare  [M€/a] 
0   58  105  143  172  190  198  197   185   174  149  
Slope of the supply curve in 
A [€/GW] 
1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 1,5 
Slope of the supply curve  
in B  [€/GW] 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Net benefit A [M€/a] 0 28 49 64 73 74 70 58 40 21 8 
Net benefit B [M€/a] 0 30 56 79 99 115 129 139 145 154 141 
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Table 2 Calculations for Figure 29.206 
 
Country 
 
Household 
price/spot 
price 
compared 
to the 
European 
average 
ratio 
 
 
[%] 
 
 
Industrial 
price/spot 
price 
compared 
to the 
European 
average 
ratio 
 
 
[%] 
 
 
Transmis-
sion 
tariff/spot 
price 
compared 
to the 
European 
average 
ratio 
 
[%] 
 
Average 
spot price 
in 2008  
 
[€/MWh] 
 
 
EL -48% -26% -16% 82 
FR -27% -38% -65% 69 
BG -34% -18% 19% 51 
EE -30% -22% -55% 54 
UK -22% -12% -24% 75 
LT -29% -4% 88% 54 
SI -21% -10% -25% 70 
FI -1% -17% -62% 54 
PT -6% -12% 92% 70 
RO -21% 6% 35% 51 
LV -19% 8% 0% 54 
IT -5% 3% 21% 87 
CZ -11% 14% 7% 64 
PL -5% 9% 53% 56 
IE 2% 2% 41% 75 
NL 9% 3% -59% 70 
HU -6% 21% -36% 70 
AT 19% 0% -20% 66 
SE 33% -12% -68% 51 
ES 8% 14% -12% 64 
SK -8% 31% 103% 70 
BE 22% 1% -54% 71 
LU 18% 15% 0% 66 
DE 44% 13% -14% 66 
NO 54% 24% -52% 42 
DK 87% 7% 109% 57 
European 
average 
ratio 
2.42 = 0% 1.53 = 0% 0.12 = 0% 
 
 
 
 
Sp = Estimated 
                                                 
206  Source for household and industrial prices is Eurostat 2009 2nd semester 
prices. Source for transmission tariffs: ETSO, transmission tariffs 2008, 
2009. Source for spot prices is Power exchanges. Some markets do not have 
spot prices or the spot market data is not available. Equivalent prices are 
estimated by the author. 
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